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Cover Page
TitlePage
Copyright
About the Author
Preface
Acknowledgments
List of Figures
List of Tables
Chapter 1 Introduction
Chapter 2 A Regime Change Model with Speculators and Stakeholders
2.1 Introduction
2.2 The Static Model
2.3 Equilibrium
2.3.1 Uniqueness
2.4 Comparative Statics
2.5 Two-Stage Games
2.6 Regime Stability in Dynamic Settings
2.6.1 No Label Changes
2.6.2 Kicking Out Stakeholders
2.6.3 Absorbing Speculators
2.7 Concluding Remarks
2.8 Appendix
2.8.1 Appendix A: The Improper Prior
2.8.2 Appendix B: Proofs
Chapter 3 Interventions Policies as Public Signals in A Dynamic Global Game
3.1 Introduction
3.2 The Model
3.2.1 Benchmark Model
3.2.2 The Speculator and Our Model
3.3 Equilibrium
3.4 Interventions
3.4.1 Deterring the Speculator
3.4.2 Rewarding Holding Investors
3.4.3 Eliminating Preemption Motives
3.5 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and the IMF
3.5.1 Capital Regulation
3.5.2 Interest Rate Defense
3.5.3 Intervention in Hong Kong
3.5.4 The IMF's Role
3.6 Concluding Remarks
3.7 Appendix: Proofs
Chapter 4 The Informational Role of Winner's Actions in a Repeated Beauty Contest Game
4.1 Introduction
4.2 The Model
4.3 Equilibrium
4.4 Equilibrium Dynamics
4.5 An Empirical Study: Miss Korea Pageant
4.5.1 Data
4.5.2 Methods
4.5.3 Results
4.6 Conclusions
4.7 Appendix
4.7.1 Appendix A: Proofs
4.7.2 Appendix B: Data and Codes
Chapter 5 Conclusions
Bibliography
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