A fi rom?n? ?E o ru?ine!“, exclama Cioran. ?n ce m?sur? filosoful de la Paris avea dreptate? Ce ?nseamn? ?a fi rom?n“ ?ntr-o fals? tranzi?ie care aparent nu se mai termin?? La aceste ?i multe alte ?ntreb?ri ?ncearc? s? r?spund? scriitorul Ionel Necula ?n opus-ul de fa??, care ?nsumeaz? analize ale r?sturn?rilor sociale evidente, ?nregistrate ?n ultimii ?aptesprezece ani. Nu ?ntotdeauna comod, spiritul coroziv al autorului ??i spune cuv?ntul, av?nd uneori accente incendiare.

Coresponden?a lui Descartes dubleaz? opera sa propriu-zis?, fiind uneori mai expresiv? dec?t aceasta ?i cuprinz?nd cutezan?e filozofice pe care c?r?ile sale nu ?i le ?ng?duie. E aici, ?n paginile acestor scrisori, un Descartes mai viu, mai nuan?at ?n exprimare, mai amplu. O mare g?ndire filozofic?, precum aceasta, nu se resemneaz? cu propria realitate, ci se impune printr-o str?danie de a cuceri con?tiin?a public?, despre care dau seama aceste texte. Ele ?nchid ?n cuprinderea lor imaginea eforturilor prin care filozoful ??i creeaz? premisele posterit??ii sale.

De La Boétie ofer? una dintre primele ?i cele mai clare explica?ii privind servitutea voluntar?, starea care define?te supunerea majorit??ii fa?? de minoritatea care de?ine puterea politic?. Este ?i va r?m?ne acela?i lucru, indiferent de scurgerea timpului: un eseu memorabil despre m?re?ia ?i micimile naturii umane, slujit exemplar de g?ndul ?i de pana unui geniu cu care timpul nu a avut prea mult? r?bdare.,,Dar, Dumnezeule mare, ce ?nseamn? asta? Cum s? numim aceast? nenorocire? Ce viciu ?ngrozitor e ?sta, s? vezi nenum?ra?i oameni, nu doar c? se supun, ci c? slujesc, nu c? sunt guverna?i, ci c? sunt tiraniza?i, neav?nd nici bunuri, nici p?rin?i, nici copii, nici m?car propria lor via???“ ?tienne de LA Boétie

F?r? a propune o terminologie aristotelic? bine precizat? pe teritoriul limbii rom?ne, transpunerea de fa?? reprezint? un moment important ?n raportarea rom?neasc? la opera Stagiritului.Traducere de ?tefan Bezdechi efectuat? dup? textul grec publicat de W. Christ ?n colec?ia ?Teubner“, Lipsca, 1906. Pentru realizarea ei au fost utilizate urm?toarele surse:Die Metaphysik des Aristoteles, traducere ?n limba german? de J. R. V. Kirchmann, ap?rut? ?n dou? volume ?i prev?zut? cu note ample ?n colec?ia ?Philosophische Bibliothek“, numerele 38 ?i 39, la Berlin, ?n 1871;Aristoteles, Metaphysik, traducere ?n limba german? de Adolf Lasson, ?n care cele patrusprezece c?r?i ale Metafizicii sunt a?ezate ?ntr-o r?nduial? mai logic? dec?t a?a cum au fost transmise ?n originalul grec, traducere ap?rut? ?n 1924, la Jena;Aristote, Métaphysique, traducere ?n limba francez? de J. Tricot, cu o prefa?? de A. Diés, ap?rut? ?n colec?ia ?Bibliothèque des textes philosophiques“, J. Vrin, la Paris, ?n 1933.La marginea textului a fost trecut? pagina?ia edi?iei Bekker, dup? care se fac ?n mod obi?nuit cita?iile din opera lui Aristotel.Confruntarea traducerii a fost f?cut? de prof. Aram M. Frenkian.

Volumul cuprinde dou? din cele mai reprezentative lucr?ri ?n care filosoful german ??i expune concep?ia moral?: ?ntemeierea metafizicii moravurilor (1785) ?i Critica ra?iunii practice (1788). ?n ?ntemeierea metafizicii moravurilor Immanuel Kant expune principiile moralit??ii, iar ?n Critica ra?iunii practice ??i construie?te propriul s?u sistem etic, ceea ce face ca aceasta s? fie considerat?, dup? Critica ra?iunii pure, a doua sa oper? fundamental?.?ntre cele dou? lucr?ri este o at?t de str?ns? leg?tur?, ?nc?t cunoa?terea numai a uneia din ele ne-ar oferi o imagine incomplet? asupra concep?iei sale morale.Immanuel Kant a avansat idei etice ?i ?n alte opere ulterioare (Religia ?n limitele ra?iunii – 1793 sau Metafizica moravurilor – 1797), dar numai ?n cele reunite ?n acest volum se ocup? de problemele teoretice ale moralit??ii.Traducerea a fost f?cut? dup? edi?ia german? din 1956 (Leipzig, Hrsg. Von Raymund Schimidt).

Human reason, in one sphere of its cognition, is called upon to consider questions, which it cannot decline, as they are presented by its own nature, but which it cannot answer, as they transcend every faculty of the mind. It falls into this difficulty without any fault of its own. It begins with principles, which cannot be dispensed with in the field of experience, and the truth and sufficiency of which are, at the same time, insured by experience. With these principles it rises, in obedience to the laws of its own nature, to ever higher and more remote conditions. But it quickly discovers that, in this way, its labours must remain ever incomplete, because new questions never cease to present themselves; and thus it finds itself compelled to have recourse to principles which transcend the region of experience, while they are regarded by common sense without distrust. It thus falls into confusion and contradictions, from which it conjectures the presence of latent errors, which, however, it is unable to discover, because the principles it employs, transcending the limits of experience, cannot be tested by that criterion. The arena of these endless contests is called Metaphysic.Time was, when she was the queen of all the sciences; and, if we take the will for the deed, she certainly deserves, so far as regards the high importance of her object-matter, this title of honour. Now, it is the fashion of the time to heap contempt and scorn upon her; and the matron mourns, forlorn and forsaken, like Hecuba: At first, her gover Modo maxima rerum, Tot generis, natisque potens... Nunc trahor exul, inops. —Ovid, Metamorphoses. xiii under the administration of the dogmatists, was an absolute despotism. But, as the legislative continued to show traces of the ancient barbaric rule, her empire gradually broke up, and intestine wars introduced the reign of anarchy; while the sceptics, like nomadic tribes, who hate a permanent habitation and settled mode of living, attacked from time to time those who had organized themselves into civil communities. But their number was, very happily, small; and thus they could not entirely put a stop to the exertions of those who persisted in raising new edifices, although on no settled or uniform plan. In recent times the hope dawned upon us of seeing those disputes settled, and the legitimacy of her claims established by a kind of physiology of the human understanding—that of the celebrated Locke. But it was found that—although it was affirmed that this so-called queen could not refer her descent to any higher source than that of common experience, a circumstance which necessarily brought suspicion on her claims—as this genealogy was incorrect, she persisted in the advancement of her claims to sovereignty. Thus metaphysics necessarily fell back into the antiquated and rotten constitution of dogmatism, and again became obnoxious to the contempt from which efforts had been made to save it. At present, as all methods, according to the general persuasion, have been tried in vain, there reigns nought but weariness and complete indifferentism—the mother of chaos and night in the scientific world, but at the same time the source of, or at least the prelude to, the re-creation and reinstallation of a science, when it has fallen into confusion, obscurity, and disuse from ill directed effort. I do not mean by this a criticism of books and systems, but a critical inquiry into the faculty of reason, with reference to the cognitions to which it strives to attain without the aid of experience; in other words, the solution of the question regarding the possibility or impossibility of metaphysics, and the determination of the origin, as well as of the extent and limits of this science. All this must be done on the basis of principles. ABOUT AUTHOR: That all our knowledge begins with experience there can be no doubt. For how is it possible that the faculty of cognition should be awakened into exercise otherwise than by means of objects which affect our senses, and partly of themselves produce representations, partly rouse our powers of understanding into activity, to compare to connect, or to separate these, and so to convert the raw material of our sensuous impressions into a knowledge of objects, which is called experience? In respect of time, therefore, no knowledge of ours is antecedent to experience, but begins with it. But, though all our knowledge begins with experience, it by no means follows that all arises out of experience. For, on the contrary, it is quite possible that our empirical knowledge is a compound of that which we receive through impressions, and that which the faculty of cognition supplies from itself (sensuous impressions giving merely the occasion), an addition which we cannot distinguish from the original element given by sense, till long practice has made us attentive to, and skilful in separating it. It is, therefore, a question which requires close investigation, and not to b

Ralph Waldo Emerson, was born at Boston in 1803 into a distinguished family of New England Unitarian ministers. His was the eighth generation to enter the ministry in a dynasty that reached back to the earliest days of Puritan America. Despite the death of his father when Emerson was only eleven, he was able to be educated at Boston Latin School and then Harvard, from which he graduated in 1821. After several years of reluctant school teaching, he returned to the Harvard Divinity School, entering the Unitarian ministry during a period of robust ecclesiastic debate. By 1829 Emerson was married and well on his way to a promising career in the church through his appointment to an important congregation in Boston. However, his career in the ministry did not last long. Following the death of his first wife, Ellen, his private religious doubts led him to announce his resignation to his congregation, claiming he was unable to preach a doctrine he no longer believed and that "to be a good minister it was necessary to leave the ministry."With the modest legacy left him from his first wife, Emerson was able to devote himself to study and travel. In Europe he met many of the important Romantic writers whose ideas on art, philosophy, and literature were transforming the writing of the Nineteenth Century. He also continued to explore his own ideas in a series of voluminous journals which he had kept from his earliest youth and from which virtually all of his literary creation would be generated. Taking up residence in Concord, Massachusetts, Emerson devoted himself to study, writing and a series of public lectures in the growing lyceum movement. From these lyceum addresses Emerson developed and then in 1836 published his most important work, Nature. Its publication also coincided with his organizing role in the Transcendental Club, a group of leading New England educators, clergy, and intellectuals interested in idealistic religion, philosophy, and literature.

当独立、自助的生活不能再维持时，我们该怎么办？在生命临近终的时刻，我们该和医生谈些什么？应该如何优雅地跨越生命的终？对于这些问题，大多数人缺少清晰的观念，而只是把命运交由医学、技术和陌生人来掌控。影响世界的医生阿图·葛文德结合其多年的外科医生经验与流畅的文笔，讲述了一个个伤感而发人深省的故事，对在21世纪变老意味着什么行了清醒、深的探索。本书富有洞见、感人至深，并为我们提供了实用的路线图，告诉我们为了使生命*后的岁月有意义，我们可以做什么、应该做什么。 作者选择了常人往往不愿面对的话题——衰老与死亡，梳理了美国社会养老的方方面面和发展历程，以及医学界对末期病人的不当处置。书中不只讲述了死亡和医药的局限，也揭示了如何自主、快乐、拥有尊严地活到生命的终。书中对“善终服务”“辅助生活”“生前预嘱”等一系列作者推崇的理念，都穿插在故事中作出了详尽的说明，相信会给老龄化日益加剧的中国社会以启迪。 众多专家、媒体推荐。创新工场CEO李复：作为一名医生，阿图葛文德关注的是医疗的局限以及人的尊严。作为凡人，我们都将面对人生的终，《*好的告别》给我们重要的启示。《新知》杂志主编苗炜：希望大家有机会能看看阿图葛文德医生的著作，他能帮助我们更好地理解医学，知道医学的局限和可能。畅销书作家马尔科姆·格拉德威尔：这是阿图·葛文德*有力，也*感人的一本书。《自然》杂志：难得读到这样一本发人深省的书。

DAVID HUME (1711 – 1776) was a Scottish philosopher, historian, economist, and essayist known especially for his philosophical empiricism and skepticism. He was one of the most important figures in the history of Western philosophy and the Scottish Enlightenment. Hume is often grouped with John Locke, George Berkeley, and a handful of others as a British Empiricist. Beginning with his A Treatise of Human Nature (1739), Hume strove to create a total naturalistic "science of man" that examined the psychological basis of human nature. In stark opposition to the rationalists who preceded him, most notably Descartes, he concluded that desire rather than reason governed human behaviour, saying: "REASON IS, and OUGHT ONLY to BE the SLAVE of the PASSIONS". A prominent figure in the sceptical philosophical tradition and a strong empiricist, he argued against the existence of innate ideas, concluding instead that humans have knowledge only of things they directly experience.. NOTHING is more usual and more natural for those, who pretend to discover anything new to the world in philosophy and the sciences, than to insinuate the praises of their own systems, by decrying all those, which have been advanced before them. And indeed were they content with lamenting that ignorance, which we still lie under in the most important questions, that can come before the tribunal of human reason, there are few, who have an acquaintance with the sciences, that would not readily agree with them. It is easy for one of judgment and learning, to perceive the weak foundation even of those systems, which have obtained the greatest credit, and have carried their pretensions highest to accurate and profound reasoning. Principles taken upon trust, consequences lamely deduced from them, want of coherence in the parts, and of evidence in the whole, these are every where to be met with in the systems of the most eminent philosophers, and seem to have drawn disgrace upon philosophy itself. Nor is there required such profound knowledge to discover the present imperfect condition of the sciences, but even the rabble without doors may, judge from the noise and clamour, which they hear, that all goes not well within. There is nothing which is not the subject of debate, and in which men of learning are not of contrary opinions. The most trivial question escapes not our controversy, and in the most momentous we are not able to give any certain decision. Disputes are multiplied, as if every thing was uncertain; and these disputes are managed with the greatest warmth, as if every thing was certain. Amidst all this bustle it is not reason, which carries the prize, but eloquence; and no man needs ever despair of gaining proselytes to the most extravagant hypothesis, who has art enough to represent it in any favourable colours. The victory is not gained by the men at arms, who manage the pike and the sword; but by the trumpeters, drummers, and musicians of the army. From hence in my opinion arises that common prejudice against metaphysical reasonings of all kinds, even amongst those, who profess themselves scholars, and have a just value for every other part of literature. By metaphysical reasonings, they do not understand those on any particular branch of science, but every kind of argument, which is any way abstruse, and requires some attention to be comprehended. We have so often lost our labour in such researches, that we commonly reject them without hesitation, and resolve, if we must for ever be a prey to errors and delusions, that they shall at least be natural and entertaining. And indeed nothing but the most determined scepticism, along with a great degree of indolence, can justify this aversion to metaphysics. For if truth be at all within the reach of human capacity, it is certain it must lie very deep and abstruse: and to hope we shall arrive at it without pains, while the greatest geniuses have failed with the utmost pains..

It is remarkable how closely the history of the Apple-tree is connected with that of man. The geologist tells us that the order of the Rosaceae, which includes the Apple, also the true Grasses, and the Labiatae, or Mints, were introduced only a short time previous to the appearance of man on the globe.

At the time Thoreau made this wilderness canoe trip he was forty years old. The record of the journey is the latter half of his The Maine Woods, which is perhaps the finest idyl of the forest ever written. It is particularly charming in its blending of meditative and poetic fancies with the minute description of the voyager’s experiences.

In several of the dialogues of Plato, doubts have arisen among his interpreters as to which of the various subjects discussed in them is the main thesis. The speakers have the freedom of conversation; no severe rules of art restrict them, and sometimes we are inclined to think, with one of the dramatis personae in the Theaetetus, that the digressions have the greater interest. Yet in the most irregular of the dialogues there is also a certain natural growth or unity; the beginning is not forgotten at the end, and numerous allusions and references are interspersed, which form the loose connecting links of the whole.

The magi, as you know, were wise men – wonderfully wise men – who brought gifts to the new-born King of the Jews in the manger. They invented the art of giving Christmas presents. Being wise, their gifts were no doubt wise ones, possibly bearing the privilege of exchange in case of duplication. And here I have lamely related to you the uneventful chronicle of two foolish children in a flat who most unwisely sacrificed for each other the greatest treasures of their house.

Confucius believed that the welfare of a country depended on the moral cultivation of its people, beginning from the nation's leadership. He believed that individuals could begin to cultivate an all-encompassing sense of virtue through ren, and that the most basic step to cultivating ren was devotion to one's parents and older siblings. He taught that one's individual desires do not need to be suppressed, but that people should be educated to reconcile their desires via rituals and forms of propriety, through which people could demonstrate their respect for others and their responsible roles in society.

The Constitution of the Athenians describes the political system of ancient Athens. The treatise was composed between 330 and 322 BC.

Once upon a time there was a very mischievous little monkey, who lived in a big banyan tree, and his name was Jacko. And in the jungle below there lived a huge, fierce old lion and lioness.

In these talks, given in Europe and India, Krishnamurti goes into the importance of going into problems openly, without conclusions. "..because we approach our problems partially, through all these various forms of conditioning, it seems to me that we are thereby not understanding them. I feel that the approach to any problem is of much more significance than the problem itself, and that if we could approach our many difficulties without any particular form of conditioning or prejudice, then perhaps we would come to a fundamental understanding of them." An extensive compendium of Krishnamurti's talks and discussions in the USA, Europe, India, New Zealand, and South Africa from 1933 to 1967—the Collected Works have been carefully authenticated against existing transcripts and tapes. Each volume includes a frontispiece photograph of Krishnamurti , with question and subject indexes at the end. The content of each volume is not limited to the subject of the title, but rather offers a unique view of Krishnamurti's extraordinary teachings in selected years. The Collected Works offers the reader the opportunity to explore the early writings and dialogues in their most complete and authentic form.

The Critique of Practical Reason follows on from Kant's Critique of Pure Reason and deals with his moral philosophy. The second Critique exercised a decisive influence over the subsequent development of the field of ethics and moral philosophy, beginning with Johann Gottlieb Fichte's Doctrine of Science and becoming, during the 20th century, the principal reference point for deontological moral philosophy.

The first of Immanuel Kant's mature works on moral philosophy and remains one of the most influential in the field. Kant conceives his investigation as a work of foundational ethics, one that clears the ground for future research by explaining the core concepts and principles of moral theory and showing that they are normative for rational agents. Kant aspires to nothing less than this: to lay bare the fundamental principle of morality and show that it applies to us.

What the great learning teaches, is to illustrate illustrious virtue; to renovate the people; and to rest in the highest excellence. The point where to rest being known, the object of pursuit is then determined; and, that being determined, a calm unperturbedness may be attained to. To that calmness there will succeed a tranquil repose. In that repose there may be careful deliberation, and that deliberation will be followed by the attainment of the desired end.

When the war broke out at Alexandria, Caesar sent to Rhodes, Syria, and Cilicia, for all his fleet; and summoned archers from Crete, and cavalry from Malchus, king of the Nabatheans. He likewise ordered military engines to be provided, corn to be brought, and forces dispatched to him. Meanwhile he daily strengthened his fortifications by new works; and such parts of the town as appeared less tenable were strengthened with testudos and mantelets. Openings were made in the walls, through which the battering-rams might play; and the fortifications were extended over whatever space was covered with ruins, or taken by force. For Alexandria is in a manner secure from fire, because the houses are all built without joists or wood, and are all vaulted, and roofed with tile or pavement.