Volumul cuprinde dou? din cele mai reprezentative lucr?ri ?n care filosoful german ??i expune concep?ia moral?: ?ntemeierea metafizicii moravurilor (1785) ?i Critica ra?iunii practice (1788). ?n ?ntemeierea metafizicii moravurilor Immanuel Kant expune principiile moralit??ii, iar ?n Critica ra?iunii practice ??i construie?te propriul s?u sistem etic, ceea ce face ca aceasta s? fie considerat?, dup? Critica ra?iunii pure, a doua sa oper? fundamental?.?ntre cele dou? lucr?ri este o at?t de str?ns? leg?tur?, ?nc?t cunoa?terea numai a uneia din ele ne-ar oferi o imagine incomplet? asupra concep?iei sale morale.Immanuel Kant a avansat idei etice ?i ?n alte opere ulterioare (Religia ?n limitele ra?iunii – 1793 sau Metafizica moravurilor – 1797), dar numai ?n cele reunite ?n acest volum se ocup? de problemele teoretice ale moralit??ii.Traducerea a fost f?cut? dup? edi?ia german? din 1956 (Leipzig, Hrsg. Von Raymund Schimidt).

De La Boétie ofer? una dintre primele ?i cele mai clare explica?ii privind servitutea voluntar?, starea care define?te supunerea majorit??ii fa?? de minoritatea care de?ine puterea politic?. Este ?i va r?m?ne acela?i lucru, indiferent de scurgerea timpului: un eseu memorabil despre m?re?ia ?i micimile naturii umane, slujit exemplar de g?ndul ?i de pana unui geniu cu care timpul nu a avut prea mult? r?bdare.,,Dar, Dumnezeule mare, ce ?nseamn? asta? Cum s? numim aceast? nenorocire? Ce viciu ?ngrozitor e ?sta, s? vezi nenum?ra?i oameni, nu doar c? se supun, ci c? slujesc, nu c? sunt guverna?i, ci c? sunt tiraniza?i, neav?nd nici bunuri, nici p?rin?i, nici copii, nici m?car propria lor via???“ ?tienne de LA Boétie

Coresponden?a lui Descartes dubleaz? opera sa propriu-zis?, fiind uneori mai expresiv? dec?t aceasta ?i cuprinz?nd cutezan?e filozofice pe care c?r?ile sale nu ?i le ?ng?duie. E aici, ?n paginile acestor scrisori, un Descartes mai viu, mai nuan?at ?n exprimare, mai amplu. O mare g?ndire filozofic?, precum aceasta, nu se resemneaz? cu propria realitate, ci se impune printr-o str?danie de a cuceri con?tiin?a public?, despre care dau seama aceste texte. Ele ?nchid ?n cuprinderea lor imaginea eforturilor prin care filozoful ??i creeaz? premisele posterit??ii sale.

Critica ra?iunii pure, tradus? de Nicolae Bagdasar ?i Elena Moisuc ?n 1969, a ajuns la cea de-a treia edi?ie. Cu acest prilej, profesorul dr. Ilie P?rvu, de la Facultatea de Filosofie a Universit??ii din Bucure?ti a ?ngrijit noua opera?ie de editare, fiind astfel corectate unele erori de tipar ?i unele inconsecven?e terminologice. Totodat?, exist? un motiv ?n plus pentru ca studen?ii care posed? edi?ia a II-a a traducerii, ap?rut? ?n 1995, s? apeleze ?i la cea de-a treia edi?ie: ?n aceasta din urm? au fost indicate diferen?ele dintre edi?ia I german? (din 1781) ?i edi?ia a II-a (din 1787).

Volumul red? circuitului public, pentru prima oar? ?n limba rom?n?, trei din operele g?nditorului atenian. Este vorba de Scrisori (?n num?r de treisprezece, deosebit de importante pentru cunoa?terea g?ndirii platoniciene, dar ?i pentru ?n?elegerea epocii ?i a personalit??ilor cu care a venit ?n contact filosoful), Dialoguri suspecte (Minos, Rivalii, Theages, Hipparhos, Clitofon) ?i Dialoguri apocrife (Axiohos, Despre drept, Despre virtute, Demodocus, Sisyfos, Eryxias).Traducerea apara?ine lui ?tefan Bezdechi, care a realizat ?i aparatul critic al Scrisorilor (introducere ?i note).

n eseul Despre prostie (ber die Dummheit, 1937) subiectul este tratat, ca de obicei, cu toate resursele familiare autorului: analiza filosofic se combin cu observaiile de tip psihologic i cu constatri din istorie i politologie. Dei proiectul iniiat de acest eseu nu a fost finalizat, se remarc, totui, atenta cartografiere a fenomenelor asociate prostiei, tratate n stilul ironiei constructive“, att de specific lui Musil.

Urm?nd acela?i tipar de p?n? acum (Logica elefan?ilor, Editura All, 2012), Ciprian V?lcan ?i Dana Percec au selectat c?te dou?zeci de eseuri care formuleaz?, ?ntr-o manier? doar aparent lejer?, un r?spuns la tot at?tea pretexte, culese cu ochiul colec?ionarului de caricaturi din presa rom?neasc? ?i interna?ional? sau din tomuri mai mult sau mai pu?in colbuite. Autorii inspecteaz? cu lupa ?i curiozitatea entomologului numeroase ?nt?mpl?ri, mesaje ?i personaje contemporane, ?ndemn?ndu-i pe cititori, prin stilul degajat ?i tonul convivial, s? se amuze pe seama absurdului din via?a de zi cu zi. Fie c? este vorba de politic?, sport, mod?, mass-media sau tribunale, de gastronomie sau vr?jitorie, eseurile demonteaz? adev?ruri mici, truisme, precum ?i pl?smuiri de tot felul. Fiec?rei p??anii evocate ?n pretext – unele ilare, cu miros de b?lci, altele aproape detestabile – autorii Metafizicii bicicli?tilor ?i r?spund ?n manier? diferit?, dar convergent?, contur?nd o nevoie de a r?scoli excesele lumii pentru a o ?ndemna s? se rea?eze.

Alchimia fericirii, publicat? ?n persan? (Kimiya?yi sa’adat), spre sf?r?itul vie?ii autorului, urm?re?te atenuarea tensiunilor dintre filosofii ?i misticii Islamului ?i scoate ?n eviden?? importan?a autodisciplinei ?i a ascetismului. Traducerea de fa?? are la baz? traducerea publicat? ?n 1910, ?n englez? de Claud Field (The Alchemy of Happiness) ?i este structurat? ?n opt capitole, aproximativ egale ca ?ntindere. Cartea de fa?? reune?te o serie de interpret?ri ale unor pilde cu con?inut religios evocate ?n Coran ?i ale unor idei exprimate de Mahomed, de al?i profe?i sau ?nv??ati musulmani. Chestiunile abordate de Al-Ghazali aduc ?n prim-plan ideea unei vie?i religioase exemplare. Astfel, el prezint? mai multe sfaturi pentru musulmanii pio?i. Raportul omului cu divinitatea, cu semenii s?i, cu rudele apropiate, dar ?i implica?iile religioase ale institu?iei c?s?toriei sau ale muzicii ?i dansului sunt printre cele mai importante subiecte din lucrarea lui Al-Ghazali. S? ?tii, o, preaiubite, c? omul nu a fost creat ?n glum? sau la ?nt?mplare, ci a fost f?cut ?ntr?un fel minunat ?i pentru un ?el ?nalt. Chiar dac? nu a existat dintotdeauna, el tr?ie?te ve?nic; ?i chiar dac? trupul s?u este slab ?i p?m?ntesc, spiritul ?i este m?re? ?i dumnezeiesc. ?i cu c?t este mai ales subiectul cunoa?terii noastre,cu at?t mai mare va fi ?nc?ntarea sim?it? ?n studierea acestuia; de exemplu, ne?ar face mai mult? placer s? ?tim secretele unui rege dec?t dac? am afla secretele unui ministru. V?z?nd c? Dumnezeu este cel mai ?nalt obiect posibil pentru cunoa?terea noastr?, cunoa?terea Sa trebuie s? ne d?ruiasc? mai mult? desf?tare dec?t oricare alta.

Imagineaz?-?i c? e?ti într-o ma?in? a timpului care te poart? înainte ?i înapoi prin propria via??. Te duce în trecut, la anii copil?riei, când înv??ai s? mergi pe biciclet?, apoi te face s? revezi primul t?u s?rut, cel dintâi serviciu sau anii mai târzii, când te confrun?i, eventual, cu divor?ul. Înso?it de Platon, afl? ce spun marii gânditori ai lumii despre toate aceste pietre de hotar de pe drumul vie?ii noastre. Aristotel î?i va vorbi despre importan?a începerii ?colii, Freud despre îndr?gostire, Heidegger despre implica?iile psihologice ale mutatului, iar Nietzsche despre criza vârstei de mijloc. La drum cu Platon te ajut? s? în?elegi ?i s? vezi cu al?i ochi evenimentele majore, momentele-cheie ?i fazele de tranzi?ie din via?a ta, f?când filosofia s? par? accesibil? ?i plin? de umor!

The present publication is intended to supply a recognised deficiency in our literature—a library edition of the Essays of Montaigne. This great French writer deserves to be regarded as a classic, not only in the land of his birth, but in all countries and in all literatures. His Essays, which are at once the most celebrated and the most permanent of his productions, form a magazine out of which such minds as those of Bacon and Shakespeare did not disdain to help themselves; and, indeed, as Hallam observes, the Frenchman's literary importance largely results from the share which his mind had in influencing other minds, coeval and subsequent. But, at the same time, estimating the value and rank of the essayist, we are not to leave out of the account the drawbacks and the circumstances of the period: the imperfect state of education, the comparative scarcity of books, and the limited opportunities of intellectual intercourse. Montaigne freely borrowed of others, and he has found men willing to borrow of him as freely. We need not wonder at the reputation which he with seeming facility achieved. He was, without being aware of it, the leader of a new school in letters and morals. His book was different from all others which were at that date in the world. It diverted the ancient currents of thought into new channels. It told its readers, with unexampled frankness, what its writer's opinion was about men and things, and threw what must have been a strange kind of new light on many matters but darkly understood. Above all, the essayist uncased himself, and made his intellectual and physical organism public property. He took the world into his confidence on all subjects. His essays were a sort of literary anatomy, where we get a diagnosis of the writer's mind, made by himself at different levels and under a large variety of operating influences. Of all egotists, Montaigne, if not the greatest, was the most fascinating, because, perhaps, he was the least affected and most truthful. What he did, and what he had professed to do, was to dissect his mind, and show us, as best he could, how it was made, and what relation it bore to external objects. He investigated his mental structure as a schoolboy pulls his watch to pieces, to examine the mechanism of the works; and the result, accompanied by illustrations abounding with originality and force, he delivered to his fellow-men in a book. W. C. H. KENSINGTON, November 1877. THE LIFE OF MONTAIGNE The author of the Essays was born, as he informs us himself, between eleven and twelve o'clock in the day, the last of February 1533, at the chateau of St. Michel de Montaigne. His father, Pierre Eyquem, esquire, was successively first Jurat of the town of Bordeaux (1530), Under-Mayor 1536, Jurat for the second time in 1540, Procureur in 1546, and at length Mayor from 1553 to 1556. He was a man of austere probity, who had "a particular regard for honour and for propriety in his person and attire . . . a mighty good faith in his speech, and a conscience and a religious feeling inclining to superstition, rather than to the other extreme. Between 1556 and 1563 an important incident occurred in the life of Montaigne, in the commencement of his romantic friendship with Etienne de la Boetie, whom he had met, as he tells us, by pure chance at some festive celebration in the town. From their very first interview the two found themselves drawn irresistibly close to one another, and during six years this alliance was foremost in the heart of Montaigne, as it was afterwards in his memory, when death had severed it.

"A megsemmisülés rejtélyes sz?vege egyszerre filozófiai traktátus, misztikus beavatás és poszthumán próza. A kortárs irodalomban egyre inkább feler?s?dik ez a nem-antropocentrikus hang, mely nem emberi sorsokat akar elbeszélni, hanem a nyelv és az ember k?z?s hiányt?rténetére mutat rá. ?Mennyien kapaszkodtak a létbe, mint egy végtelen fa t?rzsébe” - írja Horváth Márk és Lovász ?dám, hiszen az emberi állapot csak a társadalmi, nyelvi és metafizikai katasztrófa terében értelmezhet?. Apokaliptikus (neo)romantika és abszurd k?ltészet. Az utolsó ember kézik?nyve a túlélés lehetetlenségér?l."Nemes Z. Márió Az Idegenre hárult a sors ajándéka, hogy els?ként az utolsó emberek k?zu?l végignézze minden ku?ls?dleges k?telék pusztulását, és bizalmát lelkébe, s?t a lelkén is túlra helyezze, minden emberit maga m?g?tt hagyva. Minden ház gerendái k?z?tt barátságok és szerelmek jól táplált holttestei indultak oszlásnak, míg csak a csont fehérlett ki a vízb?l. Mint rég elhagyott kik?t?k tornyai, olyan hívogatóak voltak ezek a csontok az új kor embere számára.

Human reason, in one sphere of its cognition, is called upon to consider questions, which it cannot decline, as they are presented by its own nature, but which it cannot answer, as they transcend every faculty of the mind. It falls into this difficulty without any fault of its own. It begins with principles, which cannot be dispensed with in the field of experience, and the truth and sufficiency of which are, at the same time, insured by experience. With these principles it rises, in obedience to the laws of its own nature, to ever higher and more remote conditions. But it quickly discovers that, in this way, its labours must remain ever incomplete, because new questions never cease to present themselves; and thus it finds itself compelled to have recourse to principles which transcend the region of experience, while they are regarded by common sense without distrust. It thus falls into confusion and contradictions, from which it conjectures the presence of latent errors, which, however, it is unable to discover, because the principles it employs, transcending the limits of experience, cannot be tested by that criterion. The arena of these endless contests is called Metaphysic.Time was, when she was the queen of all the sciences; and, if we take the will for the deed, she certainly deserves, so far as regards the high importance of her object-matter, this title of honour. Now, it is the fashion of the time to heap contempt and scorn upon her; and the matron mourns, forlorn and forsaken, like Hecuba: At first, her gover Modo maxima rerum, Tot generis, natisque potens... Nunc trahor exul, inops. —Ovid, Metamorphoses. xiii under the administration of the dogmatists, was an absolute despotism. But, as the legislative continued to show traces of the ancient barbaric rule, her empire gradually broke up, and intestine wars introduced the reign of anarchy; while the sceptics, like nomadic tribes, who hate a permanent habitation and settled mode of living, attacked from time to time those who had organized themselves into civil communities. But their number was, very happily, small; and thus they could not entirely put a stop to the exertions of those who persisted in raising new edifices, although on no settled or uniform plan. In recent times the hope dawned upon us of seeing those disputes settled, and the legitimacy of her claims established by a kind of physiology of the human understanding—that of the celebrated Locke. But it was found that—although it was affirmed that this so-called queen could not refer her descent to any higher source than that of common experience, a circumstance which necessarily brought suspicion on her claims—as this genealogy was incorrect, she persisted in the advancement of her claims to sovereignty. Thus metaphysics necessarily fell back into the antiquated and rotten constitution of dogmatism, and again became obnoxious to the contempt from which efforts had been made to save it. At present, as all methods, according to the general persuasion, have been tried in vain, there reigns nought but weariness and complete indifferentism—the mother of chaos and night in the scientific world, but at the same time the source of, or at least the prelude to, the re-creation and reinstallation of a science, when it has fallen into confusion, obscurity, and disuse from ill directed effort. I do not mean by this a criticism of books and systems, but a critical inquiry into the faculty of reason, with reference to the cognitions to which it strives to attain without the aid of experience; in other words, the solution of the question regarding the possibility or impossibility of metaphysics, and the determination of the origin, as well as of the extent and limits of this science. All this must be done on the basis of principles. ABOUT AUTHOR: That all our knowledge begins with experience there can be no doubt. For how is it possible that the faculty of cognition should be awakened into exercise otherwise than by means of objects which affect our senses, and partly of themselves produce representations, partly rouse our powers of understanding into activity, to compare to connect, or to separate these, and so to convert the raw material of our sensuous impressions into a knowledge of objects, which is called experience? In respect of time, therefore, no knowledge of ours is antecedent to experience, but begins with it. But, though all our knowledge begins with experience, it by no means follows that all arises out of experience. For, on the contrary, it is quite possible that our empirical knowledge is a compound of that which we receive through impressions, and that which the faculty of cognition supplies from itself (sensuous impressions giving merely the occasion), an addition which we cannot distinguish from the original element given by sense, till long practice has made us attentive to, and skilful in separating it. It is, therefore, a question which requires close investigation, and not to b

DAVID HUME (1711 – 1776) was a Scottish philosopher, historian, economist, and essayist known especially for his philosophical empiricism and skepticism. He was one of the most important figures in the history of Western philosophy and the Scottish Enlightenment. Hume is often grouped with John Locke, George Berkeley, and a handful of others as a British Empiricist. Beginning with his A Treatise of Human Nature (1739), Hume strove to create a total naturalistic "science of man" that examined the psychological basis of human nature. In stark opposition to the rationalists who preceded him, most notably Descartes, he concluded that desire rather than reason governed human behaviour, saying: "REASON IS, and OUGHT ONLY to BE the SLAVE of the PASSIONS". A prominent figure in the sceptical philosophical tradition and a strong empiricist, he argued against the existence of innate ideas, concluding instead that humans have knowledge only of things they directly experience.. NOTHING is more usual and more natural for those, who pretend to discover anything new to the world in philosophy and the sciences, than to insinuate the praises of their own systems, by decrying all those, which have been advanced before them. And indeed were they content with lamenting that ignorance, which we still lie under in the most important questions, that can come before the tribunal of human reason, there are few, who have an acquaintance with the sciences, that would not readily agree with them. It is easy for one of judgment and learning, to perceive the weak foundation even of those systems, which have obtained the greatest credit, and have carried their pretensions highest to accurate and profound reasoning. Principles taken upon trust, consequences lamely deduced from them, want of coherence in the parts, and of evidence in the whole, these are every where to be met with in the systems of the most eminent philosophers, and seem to have drawn disgrace upon philosophy itself. Nor is there required such profound knowledge to discover the present imperfect condition of the sciences, but even the rabble without doors may, judge from the noise and clamour, which they hear, that all goes not well within. There is nothing which is not the subject of debate, and in which men of learning are not of contrary opinions. The most trivial question escapes not our controversy, and in the most momentous we are not able to give any certain decision. Disputes are multiplied, as if every thing was uncertain; and these disputes are managed with the greatest warmth, as if every thing was certain. Amidst all this bustle it is not reason, which carries the prize, but eloquence; and no man needs ever despair of gaining proselytes to the most extravagant hypothesis, who has art enough to represent it in any favourable colours. The victory is not gained by the men at arms, who manage the pike and the sword; but by the trumpeters, drummers, and musicians of the army. From hence in my opinion arises that common prejudice against metaphysical reasonings of all kinds, even amongst those, who profess themselves scholars, and have a just value for every other part of literature. By metaphysical reasonings, they do not understand those on any particular branch of science, but every kind of argument, which is any way abstruse, and requires some attention to be comprehended. We have so often lost our labour in such researches, that we commonly reject them without hesitation, and resolve, if we must for ever be a prey to errors and delusions, that they shall at least be natural and entertaining. And indeed nothing but the most determined scepticism, along with a great degree of indolence, can justify this aversion to metaphysics. For if truth be at all within the reach of human capacity, it is certain it must lie very deep and abstruse: and to hope we shall arrive at it without pains, while the greatest geniuses have failed with the utmost pains..

 本书是别尔嘉耶夫*代表性的著作之一。诚如作者所言，本书要解“人”这个“*的迷”，作者将现实的各个方面纳其视域，对存在、上帝、自然、宇宙、社会、文明、自我、权利、国家、战争、民族主义、美感、艺术等等行了全面的剖析。他始终坚持，自由高于存在，精神高于自然，主体高于客体，个性高于共相-普遍的事物，爱高于规律。和那些动辄喜欢建立体系而对现实世界关心甚少的学院派哲学家相比，别尔嘉耶夫的思想中常常交织着两项因素：他既用学者的眼光看待个性、自由、创造等字眼，同时又有着悲天悯人的胸怀，对那些在现实世界中遭受苦难的*下层人的生活保有深切的同情，两者互相交织，相辅相成，使得本书在严峻的理性之外处处闪耀着人性的光辉。别尔嘉耶夫的文笔简练流畅，他惯于用简单的语言表达复杂的思想，本书既是作者对人的创造、生命和历史意义的探索，又是对整个世界的哲学沉思。

 本书是爱尔维修的代表作之一。《论精神》在1758年出版后，书中蕴含的无神论思想和对宗教伦理的批判令当时专制的教廷恐慌不已，被列为禁书。但与此同时，该书却在欧洲广受欢迎，短期内即被译成英文、意大利文和德文。在本书中，爱尔维修继承了洛克唯物主义的感觉论，以人的肉体感受性为基石，建立了以“自爱”为核心的功利主义伦理学。他的思想明，认为追求个人的利益和幸福这种趋乐避苦的“自爱”感情是人所共有的，正是这种人所共有的普遍情感推动着社会的步。此外，他在书中还猛烈抨封建专制制度，并公揭露宗教在保护封建制度中的作用。全书警句迭出，行文通俗，并穿插了大量有趣晓畅的比喻和例子来阐释严肃的社会议题和哲学思想，这深刻反映出爱尔维修不仅是一位伟大的思想家，而且还是一位精于修辞的文学家。

《论语》《孟子》《大学》《中庸》经汉、唐至宋，理学家朱熹将之合为一体，遂有《四书》之名。朱熹等理学家对《四书》行编排、训释、诠解，使其逐渐具备了单篇所无法比拟的理论力量。本书系统地论述了《四书》学的渊源及在两宋时期的演变与发展，探讨了宋代《四书》学与理学思潮发展之间的内在联系，着重从经典诠释学的角度阐发了朱熹《四书》学的诠释方法、学术成就与思想贡献，并从儒家的人文信仰、实践工夫的角度探讨了朱熹《四书》学的学术成就与思想特色，试图通过上述分析，揭示儒家思想及其知识形态的历史特质与文化特色。

本书系统阐述了经典马克思主义社会学理论的基本立场、方法原则、历史演化和理论贡献。对马克思恩格斯论述的市民社会，异化劳动，群众史观，实践立场，分工、交往与社会发展，阶级斗争与共产主义运动，人的解放，国家与社会治理，社会矛盾运动与发展道路，家庭、私有制和国家起源等一系列马克思主义社会学的重要理论做了深评析，对马克思恩格斯晚年论述的人类学思想和历史唯物主义观也做了深考察和充分阐释。

儒家的仁义思想不只是由仁而义，还包括由义而仁，前者是孟子的“居仁由义”，是由道德而政治，后者是荀子的“处仁以义”，是由政治而道德，二者结合才是完整的仁义观。传统四书不足以反映儒学的完整面貌，不足以体现仁义的精神内涵，故需要有新的经典体系出现，这就是本书所提出的《论语》、《礼记》、《孟子》与《荀子》，合称“新四书”。在“新四书”中，孟荀既相互对立，又存在相互补充的可能与需要。孟子人性论更准确地理解应该是以善为性论，有利于突出道德主体，说明人的道德实践；荀子人性论并非传统所认为的性恶论，而是性恶心善说，适合说明礼义、制度的建立，易于解释人的政治实践。统合孟荀，方可创新儒学。

本书面向青年讲述马克思主义，在重温青年马克思的思想历程和人生之旅中激励青年，在解读马克思主义与世界青年和中国青年的历史渊源中启发青年，在讲好马克思主义中国化的理论与实践中引领青年。 本书分为上、中、下三篇。上篇从马克思的青年时期、马克思和恩格斯论青年、马克思主义的理论特质和历史使命等方面解读马克思的青年观；中篇重阐释青年在马克思主义的世界传播和发展以及马克思主义中国化的壮阔历史中所发挥的重要作用；下篇重解读21世纪马克思主义与新时代青年观，在新时代的历史方位中思考青年的使命担当与价值引领，强调马克思主义信仰对青年的思想引领。 本书蕴含宽广的视域和细腻的笔触，展现了马克思主义的发展与青年的成长奋斗相互交织的壮阔历程，既有严谨的学术探索，又有鲜活的时代特征和问题意识，体现了青年学者坚持和发展马克思主义的理论自觉和时代担当。

后现代主义是20世纪60年代左右产生于西方发达国家的泛文化思潮, 涉及哲学、艺术、文学、历史学、政治学、社会学、伦理学等诸多领域，自20世纪80年代传我国，在我国文化领域产生了重要影响。本著作把后现代主义作为一种重要的文化现象，从其产生背景、思想渊源、理论实质、社会影响以及发展走向等方面对其加以全面分析，以期把握其精神实质并为我国当代文化建设寻找有益资源。全书分上篇、中篇和下篇三个部分。上篇主要对后现代主义的产生背景、理论特征、价值取向以及它对中国文化建设的影响等行了总体论述评价；中篇重研究了后现代主义主要代表人物利奥塔、德里达、福柯、伽达默尔和鲍德里亚等的核心观；下篇研究了一些著名思想家对后现代主义的评论，这对整体把握后现代主义无疑是一个必要的补充。

假设你在桥上，目睹电车即将撞上轨道上的五个人，拯救他们的*办法，就是把站在你身旁的一个人推下去，你会怎么选择？ 　　假设博物馆里每一幅画都是相同的红色画布，只有画名和简介不同，策展人说每幅画想传达的意念也有所不同，你可以要求退钱吗？ 　　假设村里的理发师只能帮不自己刮胡子的村民刮胡子，不能帮会自己刮胡子的村民刮胡子，他自己的胡子要由谁来帮他刮？ 　　以上问题都是哲学家精心设计的"思想实验"，因为哲学无法用科学实验来检验其正确性，于是哲学家在脑中设计出具体的假设情境，测试哲学理论是否符合我们对于相关概念的理解，以找出人生根本问题的答案。苏格拉底、柏拉图、萨特、加缪、尼采……众多伟大的哲学家都曾设计过思想实验。新锐哲学家伊夫·博萨尔特精选其中*经典的55则，用清晰易懂的方式加以阐述、推演，引领读者探讨*令人彷徨的人生11大主题。