Tr?s?turi fundamentale ale unei concep?ii moderne despre lume?Cum se comport? filosofia c? art? fa?? de libertatea omului, ce este aceast? libertate, ?i dac? am ajuns s? ne ?mp?rt??im din ea, sau putem ajunge la acest lucru: iat? problema fundamental? a scrierii mele. Toate celelalte expuneri ?tiin?ifice au fost f?cute numai pentru ca, ?n cele din urm?, s? arunc?m ?i mai mult? lumin? asupra unei probleme care, dup? p?rerea mea, prezint? cea mai mare importan?? pentru om. ?n aceste pagini vrem s? d?m o filosofie a libert??ii.“ – Rudolf Steiner

Cartea de fa??, pe care cititorul o ?ine acum ?n m?n?, reprezint? o form? – literar vorbind, foarte complex?, fiindc? ea evolueaz? pe mai multe voci narative, dintre care doar unele ?i apar?in ?n mod direct autoarei – de exorcism. Geniul inimii e r?spunsul unui poet la o experien?? personal? plenitudinar?, ?n care bucuria ?i suferin?a se ?ntrep?trund reciproc pentru a exprima, ?mpreun? ?i tensionat, starea de gra?ie. Exist? o voce a experien?ei biografice ?n aceast? carte scris? febril, o alta de martor sau de participant la istorie, tot a?a cum exist? o voce a puterii ?i una a victimei. Deasupra tuturor st?, ?ns?, nu neap?rat triumf?toare, dar lucid-cerebral?, chemarea celor dou? credin?e pentru care merit? s? tr?ie?ti ?i s?-?i rememorezi via?a atunci c?nd ai ajuns cu ea la r?sp?ntie: credin?a ?n cultura modelelor care te-au precedat ?i credin?a deloc ingenu?, ci ivit? din cunoa?tere, ?n sacralitatea profund? a celor tr?ite ?i ?n transcenden??. (?tefan Borbély) A considera un text drept ?carte a ilumin?rilor mele“ ?i a a?eza ca titlu al primei p?r?i a volumului sintagma Povestea subteranei ne plaseaz? sub semnul aproape imposibil al drumului c?tre Sine, al cuprinderii, al denud?rii ?i al efortului de a ?n?elege un obiect al c?rui adev?r se va afla ?ntotdeauna ?n proximitatea pe?terii lui Platon. E un demers perpetuat, dar niciodat? epuizat ?i aproape exclus din plasma comunic?rii, care – ?n situa?ia ?romanului“ Aurei Christi – nu are coresponden?e, nu se apropie de experien?a budhist?, nici de prerogativele ocultismului de New Age, ci ne aduce ?n vecin?tatea ?ndemnului de pe frontispiciul templului lui Apollo din Delphi, preluat apoi, ca solu?ie ?ntre a fi ?i a p?rea, de c?tre Socrate: ?Cunoa?te-te pe tine ?nsu?i!“. Po?i ?nt?lni, pe acest drum, ?i acel daimonion care a str?juit g?ndirea aceluia?i ?n?elept atenian ca alt? fa?? a ?subteranelor“ fiin?ei, acolo unde lumina se ?ngem?neaz? cu ?ntunericul, stare ?poetizat?“ de Goethe, dar pr?bu?it? ?n tragic de Dostoievski. E o cobor?re spre ?n?elegere prin cuprindere ?i, implicit, prin atingerea nelimitatului. (Mircea Braga) Cartea Aurei Christi Geniul inimii pare o st?nc? masiv?, singuratic?, ?ntr-un peisaj ?mioritic“. Geniul inimii are originalitate ?i for??. Prima parte e liric?, a doua (?ntr-un fel) – o comedie negru-satiric?, a treia – predominant epic-narativ?. Prima parte este excelent?; mi-am ?nsemnat un num?r de poezii memorabile. A doua, ?n centrul ei mai ales, are sec?iuni, pasaje extrem de interesant-pl?cute-amuzante, ?n pofida tonului, uneori, foiletonistic. A treia e impresionant? ?n ansamblu, armonios-coerent?, de o sinceritate sf??ietoare. ?n tot volumul, istoricul, religiosul, subiectivul se leag? foarte frumos ?ntre ele. Nu-mi plac laudele la adresa lui Nietzsche! De fapt, cum se leag? acest autor de Biblie, de Evanghelii?! Aura Christi poate fi m?ndr? de o realizare major?, cu totul original?. Probabil, nu l-a citit pe romanticul britanic Wordsworth; dar el e cel care a scris (sau a ?nceput s? scrie) o memorabil? autobiografie ?n versuri. Pu?ini l-au continuat. Am putea spune c? Aura se num?r? printre cei pu?ini. (Virgil Nemoianu)

The present publication is intended to supply a recognised deficiency in our literature—a library edition of the Essays of Montaigne. This great French writer deserves to be regarded as a classic, not only in the land of his birth, but in all countries and in all literatures. His Essays, which are at once the most celebrated and the most permanent of his productions, form a magazine out of which such minds as those of Bacon and Shakespeare did not disdain to help themselves; and, indeed, as Hallam observes, the Frenchman's literary importance largely results from the share which his mind had in influencing other minds, coeval and subsequent. But, at the same time, estimating the value and rank of the essayist, we are not to leave out of the account the drawbacks and the circumstances of the period: the imperfect state of education, the comparative scarcity of books, and the limited opportunities of intellectual intercourse. Montaigne freely borrowed of others, and he has found men willing to borrow of him as freely. We need not wonder at the reputation which he with seeming facility achieved. He was, without being aware of it, the leader of a new school in letters and morals. His book was different from all others which were at that date in the world. It diverted the ancient currents of thought into new channels. It told its readers, with unexampled frankness, what its writer's opinion was about men and things, and threw what must have been a strange kind of new light on many matters but darkly understood. Above all, the essayist uncased himself, and made his intellectual and physical organism public property. He took the world into his confidence on all subjects. His essays were a sort of literary anatomy, where we get a diagnosis of the writer's mind, made by himself at different levels and under a large variety of operating influences. Of all egotists, Montaigne, if not the greatest, was the most fascinating, because, perhaps, he was the least affected and most truthful. What he did, and what he had professed to do, was to dissect his mind, and show us, as best he could, how it was made, and what relation it bore to external objects. He investigated his mental structure as a schoolboy pulls his watch to pieces, to examine the mechanism of the works; and the result, accompanied by illustrations abounding with originality and force, he delivered to his fellow-men in a book. W. C. H. KENSINGTON, November 1877. THE LIFE OF MONTAIGNE The author of the Essays was born, as he informs us himself, between eleven and twelve o'clock in the day, the last of February 1533, at the chateau of St. Michel de Montaigne. His father, Pierre Eyquem, esquire, was successively first Jurat of the town of Bordeaux (1530), Under-Mayor 1536, Jurat for the second time in 1540, Procureur in 1546, and at length Mayor from 1553 to 1556. He was a man of austere probity, who had "a particular regard for honour and for propriety in his person and attire . . . a mighty good faith in his speech, and a conscience and a religious feeling inclining to superstition, rather than to the other extreme. Between 1556 and 1563 an important incident occurred in the life of Montaigne, in the commencement of his romantic friendship with Etienne de la Boetie, whom he had met, as he tells us, by pure chance at some festive celebration in the town. From their very first interview the two found themselves drawn irresistibly close to one another, and during six years this alliance was foremost in the heart of Montaigne, as it was afterwards in his memory, when death had severed it.

Human reason, in one sphere of its cognition, is called upon to consider questions, which it cannot decline, as they are presented by its own nature, but which it cannot answer, as they transcend every faculty of the mind. It falls into this difficulty without any fault of its own. It begins with principles, which cannot be dispensed with in the field of experience, and the truth and sufficiency of which are, at the same time, insured by experience. With these principles it rises, in obedience to the laws of its own nature, to ever higher and more remote conditions. But it quickly discovers that, in this way, its labours must remain ever incomplete, because new questions never cease to present themselves; and thus it finds itself compelled to have recourse to principles which transcend the region of experience, while they are regarded by common sense without distrust. It thus falls into confusion and contradictions, from which it conjectures the presence of latent errors, which, however, it is unable to discover, because the principles it employs, transcending the limits of experience, cannot be tested by that criterion. The arena of these endless contests is called Metaphysic.Time was, when she was the queen of all the sciences; and, if we take the will for the deed, she certainly deserves, so far as regards the high importance of her object-matter, this title of honour. Now, it is the fashion of the time to heap contempt and scorn upon her; and the matron mourns, forlorn and forsaken, like Hecuba: At first, her gover Modo maxima rerum, Tot generis, natisque potens... Nunc trahor exul, inops. —Ovid, Metamorphoses. xiii under the administration of the dogmatists, was an absolute despotism. But, as the legislative continued to show traces of the ancient barbaric rule, her empire gradually broke up, and intestine wars introduced the reign of anarchy; while the sceptics, like nomadic tribes, who hate a permanent habitation and settled mode of living, attacked from time to time those who had organized themselves into civil communities. But their number was, very happily, small; and thus they could not entirely put a stop to the exertions of those who persisted in raising new edifices, although on no settled or uniform plan. In recent times the hope dawned upon us of seeing those disputes settled, and the legitimacy of her claims established by a kind of physiology of the human understanding—that of the celebrated Locke. But it was found that—although it was affirmed that this so-called queen could not refer her descent to any higher source than that of common experience, a circumstance which necessarily brought suspicion on her claims—as this genealogy was incorrect, she persisted in the advancement of her claims to sovereignty. Thus metaphysics necessarily fell back into the antiquated and rotten constitution of dogmatism, and again became obnoxious to the contempt from which efforts had been made to save it. At present, as all methods, according to the general persuasion, have been tried in vain, there reigns nought but weariness and complete indifferentism—the mother of chaos and night in the scientific world, but at the same time the source of, or at least the prelude to, the re-creation and reinstallation of a science, when it has fallen into confusion, obscurity, and disuse from ill directed effort. I do not mean by this a criticism of books and systems, but a critical inquiry into the faculty of reason, with reference to the cognitions to which it strives to attain without the aid of experience; in other words, the solution of the question regarding the possibility or impossibility of metaphysics, and the determination of the origin, as well as of the extent and limits of this science. All this must be done on the basis of principles. ABOUT AUTHOR: That all our knowledge begins with experience there can be no doubt. For how is it possible that the faculty of cognition should be awakened into exercise otherwise than by means of objects which affect our senses, and partly of themselves produce representations, partly rouse our powers of understanding into activity, to compare to connect, or to separate these, and so to convert the raw material of our sensuous impressions into a knowledge of objects, which is called experience? In respect of time, therefore, no knowledge of ours is antecedent to experience, but begins with it. But, though all our knowledge begins with experience, it by no means follows that all arises out of experience. For, on the contrary, it is quite possible that our empirical knowledge is a compound of that which we receive through impressions, and that which the faculty of cognition supplies from itself (sensuous impressions giving merely the occasion), an addition which we cannot distinguish from the original element given by sense, till long practice has made us attentive to, and skilful in separating it. It is, therefore, a question which requires close investigation, and not to b

"A megsemmisülés rejtélyes sz?vege egyszerre filozófiai traktátus, misztikus beavatás és poszthumán próza. A kortárs irodalomban egyre inkább feler?s?dik ez a nem-antropocentrikus hang, mely nem emberi sorsokat akar elbeszélni, hanem a nyelv és az ember k?z?s hiányt?rténetére mutat rá. ?Mennyien kapaszkodtak a létbe, mint egy végtelen fa t?rzsébe” - írja Horváth Márk és Lovász ?dám, hiszen az emberi állapot csak a társadalmi, nyelvi és metafizikai katasztrófa terében értelmezhet?. Apokaliptikus (neo)romantika és abszurd k?ltészet. Az utolsó ember kézik?nyve a túlélés lehetetlenségér?l."Nemes Z. Márió Az Idegenre hárult a sors ajándéka, hogy els?ként az utolsó emberek k?zu?l végignézze minden ku?ls?dleges k?telék pusztulását, és bizalmát lelkébe, s?t a lelkén is túlra helyezze, minden emberit maga m?g?tt hagyva. Minden ház gerendái k?z?tt barátságok és szerelmek jól táplált holttestei indultak oszlásnak, míg csak a csont fehérlett ki a vízb?l. Mint rég elhagyott kik?t?k tornyai, olyan hívogatóak voltak ezek a csontok az új kor embere számára.

"Wilde è profetico sin dalle prima righe, quando denuncia la prevalenza dell’emozione sulla razionalità, male principe del nostro tempo, e poi del pietismo sull’emancipazione, male di tanta politica di pseudo sinistra" (dall'Introduzione di Alfredo Sgarlato). Wilde: ?perché la vita raggiunga la sua più elevata perfezione, ci vuole qualche cosa di più. Ciò che ci vuole è l'individualismo?, ?Utopia? Una carta geografica del mondo in cui non sia segnato il paese dell'Utopia, non varrebbe la pena d'essere guardata, perché vi mancherebbe il paese in cui l'Umanità atterra ogni giorno. Ma non appena v'è sbarcata, ella guarda più lontano, scorge una terra ancora più bella, e spiega di nuovo le vele. Progredire significa realizzare l'Utopia?. SOMMARIO: Introduzione (di Alfredo Sgarlato) - Postfazione. Breve biblio-nota ai testi e alla traduzione (di Fabrizio Pinna) - OSCAR WILDE Società e libertà: elogio dell'individualismo - APPENDICE I Oscar Wilde, Rapporti fra il socialismo e l'individualismo (di Luigi Fabbri, 1913) - APPENDICE II The Soul of Man under Socialism (1891). LA COLLANA IN/DEFINIZIONI

DAVID HUME (1711 – 1776) was a Scottish philosopher, historian, economist, and essayist known especially for his philosophical empiricism and skepticism. He was one of the most important figures in the history of Western philosophy and the Scottish Enlightenment. Hume is often grouped with John Locke, George Berkeley, and a handful of others as a British Empiricist. Beginning with his A Treatise of Human Nature (1739), Hume strove to create a total naturalistic "science of man" that examined the psychological basis of human nature. In stark opposition to the rationalists who preceded him, most notably Descartes, he concluded that desire rather than reason governed human behaviour, saying: "REASON IS, and OUGHT ONLY to BE the SLAVE of the PASSIONS". A prominent figure in the sceptical philosophical tradition and a strong empiricist, he argued against the existence of innate ideas, concluding instead that humans have knowledge only of things they directly experience.. NOTHING is more usual and more natural for those, who pretend to discover anything new to the world in philosophy and the sciences, than to insinuate the praises of their own systems, by decrying all those, which have been advanced before them. And indeed were they content with lamenting that ignorance, which we still lie under in the most important questions, that can come before the tribunal of human reason, there are few, who have an acquaintance with the sciences, that would not readily agree with them. It is easy for one of judgment and learning, to perceive the weak foundation even of those systems, which have obtained the greatest credit, and have carried their pretensions highest to accurate and profound reasoning. Principles taken upon trust, consequences lamely deduced from them, want of coherence in the parts, and of evidence in the whole, these are every where to be met with in the systems of the most eminent philosophers, and seem to have drawn disgrace upon philosophy itself. Nor is there required such profound knowledge to discover the present imperfect condition of the sciences, but even the rabble without doors may, judge from the noise and clamour, which they hear, that all goes not well within. There is nothing which is not the subject of debate, and in which men of learning are not of contrary opinions. The most trivial question escapes not our controversy, and in the most momentous we are not able to give any certain decision. Disputes are multiplied, as if every thing was uncertain; and these disputes are managed with the greatest warmth, as if every thing was certain. Amidst all this bustle it is not reason, which carries the prize, but eloquence; and no man needs ever despair of gaining proselytes to the most extravagant hypothesis, who has art enough to represent it in any favourable colours. The victory is not gained by the men at arms, who manage the pike and the sword; but by the trumpeters, drummers, and musicians of the army. From hence in my opinion arises that common prejudice against metaphysical reasonings of all kinds, even amongst those, who profess themselves scholars, and have a just value for every other part of literature. By metaphysical reasonings, they do not understand those on any particular branch of science, but every kind of argument, which is any way abstruse, and requires some attention to be comprehended. We have so often lost our labour in such researches, that we commonly reject them without hesitation, and resolve, if we must for ever be a prey to errors and delusions, that they shall at least be natural and entertaining. And indeed nothing but the most determined scepticism, along with a great degree of indolence, can justify this aversion to metaphysics. For if truth be at all within the reach of human capacity, it is certain it must lie very deep and abstruse: and to hope we shall arrive at it without pains, while the greatest geniuses have failed with the utmost pains..

Ralph Waldo Emerson, was born at Boston in 1803 into a distinguished family of New England Unitarian ministers. His was the eighth generation to enter the ministry in a dynasty that reached back to the earliest days of Puritan America. Despite the death of his father when Emerson was only eleven, he was able to be educated at Boston Latin School and then Harvard, from which he graduated in 1821. After several years of reluctant school teaching, he returned to the Harvard Divinity School, entering the Unitarian ministry during a period of robust ecclesiastic debate. By 1829 Emerson was married and well on his way to a promising career in the church through his appointment to an important congregation in Boston. However, his career in the ministry did not last long. Following the death of his first wife, Ellen, his private religious doubts led him to announce his resignation to his congregation, claiming he was unable to preach a doctrine he no longer believed and that "to be a good minister it was necessary to leave the ministry."With the modest legacy left him from his first wife, Emerson was able to devote himself to study and travel. In Europe he met many of the important Romantic writers whose ideas on art, philosophy, and literature were transforming the writing of the Nineteenth Century. He also continued to explore his own ideas in a series of voluminous journals which he had kept from his earliest youth and from which virtually all of his literary creation would be generated. Taking up residence in Concord, Massachusetts, Emerson devoted himself to study, writing and a series of public lectures in the growing lyceum movement. From these lyceum addresses Emerson developed and then in 1836 published his most important work, Nature. Its publication also coincided with his organizing role in the Transcendental Club, a group of leading New England educators, clergy, and intellectuals interested in idealistic religion, philosophy, and literature.

本书简要辑录了儒学四书原著中论述为人处世的基本道德和伦理的主要内容，并用白话直译。为了原汁原味地保留儒学原著的本意，也为了节约篇幅，本书不注释，不分析，不评，完全由读者自己阅读和领会原著的原意，并身体力行。本书简明扼要，便于携带，可置案头、床头，茶余饭后，随时随地可以检阅。

      该书原是梁于1902年3-12月、1904年9-12月时在《新民丛报》上陆续发表的一些文章，后由北京大学中文系夏晓红教授从该报及《饮冰室文集》等出版物中整理而成（具体见“导读”）。但这些文章上下连缀成体系，可以组成小册子，并非简单的文集。       梁启超这个小册子的写作背景乃是在“改良派”遭受重大之后的“新民”理论；一步，梁又以“新学术”为“新民”（两处“新”均为动词）之利器，而撰写此书作为具体实践。具体而言，这个小册子采用了当时新式的章节体，并引探究原因、引文化地理学等思路及研究方法，来书写学术史；在思想上，则刻意突出了主张学术自由、赞美文化交融的两条主线。

《儒学小史》是北大哲学系教授干春松面向大众读者普及儒学发展历程的令人倍感亲切的一部小书。此书以历时性结构组织全书章节，全面梳理儒学从先秦时期直至现代的发展历史。作者从儒家学派的特始着手，探讨分析不同时期“儒”的定位，在下来的每一章节内均概括提炼出不同历史时期儒学发展的几个关键问题与角度展论述，如先秦儒学中“仁”和“礼”的精神、孟子与荀子的学说，汉代儒学发展的关键人物董仲舒、魏晋玄学与儒学的关系、宋明理学、清代汉学与宋学等，并以较大篇幅着重对现代新儒学之概念、儒学发展的新方向以及新儒学谱系行了阐释。全书结构简洁，脉络清晰，不仅全方位地描述了儒家思想的内涵，勾勒出一幅儒学生发、演变的历史全景，更体现了作者对儒学分期的独特思考与对儒学使命的殷切关注。

《中论》，又称《中观论》或《正观论》，与《百论》《十二门论》合称三论宗据以立宗的“三论”，撰成时间约相当于三国魏明帝时，题为龙树著，后秦鸠摩罗什译，四卷。本书系印度中观派对部派小乘佛教及其他学派行破斥而显示自宗的论战性著作，主要内容是阐发“八不缘起”和“实相涅槃”，以及诸法皆空义理的大乘中观学说。????本书据《大正藏》所收鸠摩罗什译本，逐偈讲解，疏通文意，阐明义理，并对一些关键性的佛教术语做了重阐释。

《一切特立独行的人都意味着强大》是一部诺贝尔文学奖得主、法国著名作家加缪关于人生哲学的散文集。 《一切特立独行的人都意味着强大》一书涵盖了加缪整个创作过程中具有重要意义的作品，作者创作这些作品都是取材于周围的生活与人物，从细微之处着手，以日常生活为出发讲述出人生的哲理。 《一切特立独行的人都意味着强大》一书风格多变，情感丰富，有愉悦温馨，也有沉重忧郁，有优美绝伦，也有凄凉悲怆，大悲大喜在书中尽情泼洒，使读者在阅读过程中能够感受到作者真挚、热烈、浓郁的情感。 《一切特立独行的人都意味着强大》一书可以比作是一本心情日记，它详细记录了作者心中的阴晴冷暖，酸甜苦辣，书中的主旨是生活，通过对自然风光的描写，让人对身边的人和事处处充满了热爱，让人们在这个喧闹、繁杂的世界中感受到自然的美好和生活的美妙，享受着生活的乐趣，使人对未来有一个美好的向往。

本书是梁启超先生治清学史的代表著作。作者以时代为经，把有清一代学术思潮之流转分为启蒙期（生）、全盛期（住）、蜕分期（异）、衰落期（灭）四个时期，备述其要；又以人物为纬，对清代各时期的重要学派和代表人物的学术成就、学术观、主要著述、师承关系等提纲挈领、择要发挥，堪为了解清代学术思想的门经典。

本套装所收录书目，都与“生命的认知”有关。修行、参禅、养生这些主题，经过个体实践，终都要归结到对个体生命的认知中去。这也是南怀瑾先生一生中一直关注、参研的主题。他以过来人的经验，将自己亲身体认所凝结的智慧贡献于读者，期望对世人有所帮助。

作为儒家“五经”之首、道家“三玄”之一的《易经》，自成书以来，注释解说者层出不穷，但想要学习《易经》的普通读者，却依然茫然不得头绪。针对这种情况，南怀瑾先生开讲《易经》。《易经杂说》《易经系传别讲》二书，既不把《易经》看作高深莫测、隐藏玄奥的天书，又否定了近代不少学者“迷信、混乱”的断语，不轻易引申，不牵强附会，以还原《易经》的本初意义为主旨，以树立端正的人生态度、传授博大的人生智慧为目的，非学究或术士者可拟。

《老子》《庄子》是道家学术思想的源头和代表作，二者对普通读者来说，也常有一种难以言说的神秘和难解之感。南怀瑾先生讲《老》《庄》，不斤斤于个别语译，游乎经史子集之中，不论出世入世，评比精义，更以禅宗的方式，随说随破，提示其出入禅道的旨意，可以说是与《老》《庄》气质接近的讲解。

本书是一部探讨中国文明起源的著作，作者潜心研究中国历史、哲学和文化多年，力求洞悉中国文明的内在脉络。作者聚焦于中国文明起源过程中的理性要素，通过追溯这个时期理性要素的形态，试图还原中国文明*初的萌发过程。本书沿着中国古代思想观念发展的路，回溯发端，探究这个时期决定历史走向的观念是怎样的，历史是怎样被这种观念所决定的，以及这种观念的来源和后续发展，以此来逐渐揭中国文明起源发展的印记和规律。

部分是形而上学的视角，梳理知识的本质和缘起，介绍帕拉图的"知识就是回忆”、康德形而上学的理论。 第二部分是逻辑学的视角，逻辑是知识的骨骼，知识就是用逻辑工具去统摄经验材料。梳理逻辑工具，帮助读者很快理解知识、发现知识、构建知识体系。从亚里士多德的论证开始，沿着形式逻辑、先验逻辑、数理逻辑、辩证逻辑、和纯粹逻辑的脉络，展现知识的结构和骨骼。 第三部分是理性批判主义的视角，从皮浪的"不做任何决定，悬置判断”开始，沿着怀疑主义、哥白尼革命和波普尔科学证伪的脉络，展现知识的不断肯定、否定和否定之否定的辩证发展规律。

此书从戏曲的产生始论述戏曲与儒学之缘，以宏观视角论述元明清三代戏曲与儒学的关系，并分别从戏曲编演、内容、人物、结构等方面作详细阐述。提出了较为新颖的观：儒学基本上不是阻碍而是促戏曲发展的因素。为儒学和戏曲研究提供了一种新的思路。

本书是作者关于当代国外马克思主义及后马克思思潮哲学文本研究的多卷本论著《文本的深度耕犁》的第二卷，其内容主要是对西方后马克思哲学思潮中经典文献的文本学研究。在本卷中，作者以文本学的深度解读模式分别批判性地解读了阿多诺的《否定的辩证法》、德波的《景观社会》、鲍德里亚的《生产之镜》、德里达的《马克思的幽灵》和齐泽克的《意识形态的崇高对象》等重要论著。