F?r? a propune o terminologie aristotelic? bine precizat? pe teritoriul limbii rom?ne, transpunerea de fa?? reprezint? un moment important ?n raportarea rom?neasc? la opera Stagiritului.Traducere de ?tefan Bezdechi efectuat? dup? textul grec publicat de W. Christ ?n colec?ia ?Teubner“, Lipsca, 1906. Pentru realizarea ei au fost utilizate urm?toarele surse:Die Metaphysik des Aristoteles, traducere ?n limba german? de J. R. V. Kirchmann, ap?rut? ?n dou? volume ?i prev?zut? cu note ample ?n colec?ia ?Philosophische Bibliothek“, numerele 38 ?i 39, la Berlin, ?n 1871;Aristoteles, Metaphysik, traducere ?n limba german? de Adolf Lasson, ?n care cele patrusprezece c?r?i ale Metafizicii sunt a?ezate ?ntr-o r?nduial? mai logic? dec?t a?a cum au fost transmise ?n originalul grec, traducere ap?rut? ?n 1924, la Jena;Aristote, Métaphysique, traducere ?n limba francez? de J. Tricot, cu o prefa?? de A. Diés, ap?rut? ?n colec?ia ?Bibliothèque des textes philosophiques“, J. Vrin, la Paris, ?n 1933.La marginea textului a fost trecut? pagina?ia edi?iei Bekker, dup? care se fac ?n mod obi?nuit cita?iile din opera lui Aristotel.Confruntarea traducerii a fost f?cut? de prof. Aram M. Frenkian.

Volumul cuprinde dou? din cele mai reprezentative lucr?ri ?n care filosoful german ??i expune concep?ia moral?: ?ntemeierea metafizicii moravurilor (1785) ?i Critica ra?iunii practice (1788). ?n ?ntemeierea metafizicii moravurilor Immanuel Kant expune principiile moralit??ii, iar ?n Critica ra?iunii practice ??i construie?te propriul s?u sistem etic, ceea ce face ca aceasta s? fie considerat?, dup? Critica ra?iunii pure, a doua sa oper? fundamental?.?ntre cele dou? lucr?ri este o at?t de str?ns? leg?tur?, ?nc?t cunoa?terea numai a uneia din ele ne-ar oferi o imagine incomplet? asupra concep?iei sale morale.Immanuel Kant a avansat idei etice ?i ?n alte opere ulterioare (Religia ?n limitele ra?iunii – 1793 sau Metafizica moravurilor – 1797), dar numai ?n cele reunite ?n acest volum se ocup? de problemele teoretice ale moralit??ii.Traducerea a fost f?cut? dup? edi?ia german? din 1956 (Leipzig, Hrsg. Von Raymund Schimidt).

Cartea de fa??, pe care cititorul o ?ine acum ?n m?n?, reprezint? o form? – literar vorbind, foarte complex?, fiindc? ea evolueaz? pe mai multe voci narative, dintre care doar unele ?i apar?in ?n mod direct autoarei – de exorcism. Geniul inimii e r?spunsul unui poet la o experien?? personal? plenitudinar?, ?n care bucuria ?i suferin?a se ?ntrep?trund reciproc pentru a exprima, ?mpreun? ?i tensionat, starea de gra?ie. Exist? o voce a experien?ei biografice ?n aceast? carte scris? febril, o alta de martor sau de participant la istorie, tot a?a cum exist? o voce a puterii ?i una a victimei. Deasupra tuturor st?, ?ns?, nu neap?rat triumf?toare, dar lucid-cerebral?, chemarea celor dou? credin?e pentru care merit? s? tr?ie?ti ?i s?-?i rememorezi via?a atunci c?nd ai ajuns cu ea la r?sp?ntie: credin?a ?n cultura modelelor care te-au precedat ?i credin?a deloc ingenu?, ci ivit? din cunoa?tere, ?n sacralitatea profund? a celor tr?ite ?i ?n transcenden??. (?tefan Borbély) A considera un text drept ?carte a ilumin?rilor mele“ ?i a a?eza ca titlu al primei p?r?i a volumului sintagma Povestea subteranei ne plaseaz? sub semnul aproape imposibil al drumului c?tre Sine, al cuprinderii, al denud?rii ?i al efortului de a ?n?elege un obiect al c?rui adev?r se va afla ?ntotdeauna ?n proximitatea pe?terii lui Platon. E un demers perpetuat, dar niciodat? epuizat ?i aproape exclus din plasma comunic?rii, care – ?n situa?ia ?romanului“ Aurei Christi – nu are coresponden?e, nu se apropie de experien?a budhist?, nici de prerogativele ocultismului de New Age, ci ne aduce ?n vecin?tatea ?ndemnului de pe frontispiciul templului lui Apollo din Delphi, preluat apoi, ca solu?ie ?ntre a fi ?i a p?rea, de c?tre Socrate: ?Cunoa?te-te pe tine ?nsu?i!“. Po?i ?nt?lni, pe acest drum, ?i acel daimonion care a str?juit g?ndirea aceluia?i ?n?elept atenian ca alt? fa?? a ?subteranelor“ fiin?ei, acolo unde lumina se ?ngem?neaz? cu ?ntunericul, stare ?poetizat?“ de Goethe, dar pr?bu?it? ?n tragic de Dostoievski. E o cobor?re spre ?n?elegere prin cuprindere ?i, implicit, prin atingerea nelimitatului. (Mircea Braga) Cartea Aurei Christi Geniul inimii pare o st?nc? masiv?, singuratic?, ?ntr-un peisaj ?mioritic“. Geniul inimii are originalitate ?i for??. Prima parte e liric?, a doua (?ntr-un fel) – o comedie negru-satiric?, a treia – predominant epic-narativ?. Prima parte este excelent?; mi-am ?nsemnat un num?r de poezii memorabile. A doua, ?n centrul ei mai ales, are sec?iuni, pasaje extrem de interesant-pl?cute-amuzante, ?n pofida tonului, uneori, foiletonistic. A treia e impresionant? ?n ansamblu, armonios-coerent?, de o sinceritate sf??ietoare. ?n tot volumul, istoricul, religiosul, subiectivul se leag? foarte frumos ?ntre ele. Nu-mi plac laudele la adresa lui Nietzsche! De fapt, cum se leag? acest autor de Biblie, de Evanghelii?! Aura Christi poate fi m?ndr? de o realizare major?, cu totul original?. Probabil, nu l-a citit pe romanticul britanic Wordsworth; dar el e cel care a scris (sau a ?nceput s? scrie) o memorabil? autobiografie ?n versuri. Pu?ini l-au continuat. Am putea spune c? Aura se num?r? printre cei pu?ini. (Virgil Nemoianu)

DAVID HUME (1711 – 1776) was a Scottish philosopher, historian, economist, and essayist known especially for his philosophical empiricism and skepticism. He was one of the most important figures in the history of Western philosophy and the Scottish Enlightenment. Hume is often grouped with John Locke, George Berkeley, and a handful of others as a British Empiricist. Beginning with his A Treatise of Human Nature (1739), Hume strove to create a total naturalistic "science of man" that examined the psychological basis of human nature. In stark opposition to the rationalists who preceded him, most notably Descartes, he concluded that desire rather than reason governed human behaviour, saying: "REASON IS, and OUGHT ONLY to BE the SLAVE of the PASSIONS". A prominent figure in the sceptical philosophical tradition and a strong empiricist, he argued against the existence of innate ideas, concluding instead that humans have knowledge only of things they directly experience.. NOTHING is more usual and more natural for those, who pretend to discover anything new to the world in philosophy and the sciences, than to insinuate the praises of their own systems, by decrying all those, which have been advanced before them. And indeed were they content with lamenting that ignorance, which we still lie under in the most important questions, that can come before the tribunal of human reason, there are few, who have an acquaintance with the sciences, that would not readily agree with them. It is easy for one of judgment and learning, to perceive the weak foundation even of those systems, which have obtained the greatest credit, and have carried their pretensions highest to accurate and profound reasoning. Principles taken upon trust, consequences lamely deduced from them, want of coherence in the parts, and of evidence in the whole, these are every where to be met with in the systems of the most eminent philosophers, and seem to have drawn disgrace upon philosophy itself. Nor is there required such profound knowledge to discover the present imperfect condition of the sciences, but even the rabble without doors may, judge from the noise and clamour, which they hear, that all goes not well within. There is nothing which is not the subject of debate, and in which men of learning are not of contrary opinions. The most trivial question escapes not our controversy, and in the most momentous we are not able to give any certain decision. Disputes are multiplied, as if every thing was uncertain; and these disputes are managed with the greatest warmth, as if every thing was certain. Amidst all this bustle it is not reason, which carries the prize, but eloquence; and no man needs ever despair of gaining proselytes to the most extravagant hypothesis, who has art enough to represent it in any favourable colours. The victory is not gained by the men at arms, who manage the pike and the sword; but by the trumpeters, drummers, and musicians of the army. From hence in my opinion arises that common prejudice against metaphysical reasonings of all kinds, even amongst those, who profess themselves scholars, and have a just value for every other part of literature. By metaphysical reasonings, they do not understand those on any particular branch of science, but every kind of argument, which is any way abstruse, and requires some attention to be comprehended. We have so often lost our labour in such researches, that we commonly reject them without hesitation, and resolve, if we must for ever be a prey to errors and delusions, that they shall at least be natural and entertaining. And indeed nothing but the most determined scepticism, along with a great degree of indolence, can justify this aversion to metaphysics. For if truth be at all within the reach of human capacity, it is certain it must lie very deep and abstruse: and to hope we shall arrive at it without pains, while the greatest geniuses have failed with the utmost pains..

Ralph Waldo Emerson, was born at Boston in 1803 into a distinguished family of New England Unitarian ministers. His was the eighth generation to enter the ministry in a dynasty that reached back to the earliest days of Puritan America. Despite the death of his father when Emerson was only eleven, he was able to be educated at Boston Latin School and then Harvard, from which he graduated in 1821. After several years of reluctant school teaching, he returned to the Harvard Divinity School, entering the Unitarian ministry during a period of robust ecclesiastic debate. By 1829 Emerson was married and well on his way to a promising career in the church through his appointment to an important congregation in Boston. However, his career in the ministry did not last long. Following the death of his first wife, Ellen, his private religious doubts led him to announce his resignation to his congregation, claiming he was unable to preach a doctrine he no longer believed and that "to be a good minister it was necessary to leave the ministry."With the modest legacy left him from his first wife, Emerson was able to devote himself to study and travel. In Europe he met many of the important Romantic writers whose ideas on art, philosophy, and literature were transforming the writing of the Nineteenth Century. He also continued to explore his own ideas in a series of voluminous journals which he had kept from his earliest youth and from which virtually all of his literary creation would be generated. Taking up residence in Concord, Massachusetts, Emerson devoted himself to study, writing and a series of public lectures in the growing lyceum movement. From these lyceum addresses Emerson developed and then in 1836 published his most important work, Nature. Its publication also coincided with his organizing role in the Transcendental Club, a group of leading New England educators, clergy, and intellectuals interested in idealistic religion, philosophy, and literature.

The Prince (Italian: Il Principe) is a political treatise by the Italian diplomat, historian and political theorist Niccolò Machiavelli. From correspondence a version appears to have been distributed in 1513, using a Latin title, De Principatibus (About Principalities). But the printed version was not published until 1532, five years after Machiavelli's death. This was done with the permission of the Medici pope Clement VII, but "long before then, in fact since the first appearance of the Prince in manuscript, controversy had swirled about his writings" Although it was written as if it were a traditional work in the Mirror of Princes style, it is generally agreed that it was especially innovative, and not only because it was written in Italian rather than Latin. The Prince is sometimes claimed to be one of the first works of modern philosophy, in which the effective truth is taken to be more important than any abstract ideal. It was also in direct conflict with the dominant Catholic and scholastic doctrines of the time concerning how to consider politics and ethics. Although it is relatively short, the treatise is the most remembered of his works and the one most responsible for bringing "Machiavellian" into wide usage as a pejorative term. It also helped make "Old Nick" an English term for the devil, and even contributed to the modern negative connotations of the words "politics" and "politician" in western countries. In terms of subject matter it overlaps with the much longer Discourses on Livy, which was written a few years later. In its use of examples who were politically active Italians who perpetrated criminal deeds for politics, another lesser-known work by Machiavelli which The Prince has been compared to is the Life of Castruccio Castracani. The descriptions within The Prince have the general theme of accepting that ends of princes, such as glory, and indeed survival, can justify the use of immoral means to achieve those ends.

Human reason, in one sphere of its cognition, is called upon to consider questions, which it cannot decline, as they are presented by its own nature, but which it cannot answer, as they transcend every faculty of the mind. It falls into this difficulty without any fault of its own. It begins with principles, which cannot be dispensed with in the field of experience, and the truth and sufficiency of which are, at the same time, insured by experience. With these principles it rises, in obedience to the laws of its own nature, to ever higher and more remote conditions. But it quickly discovers that, in this way, its labours must remain ever incomplete, because new questions never cease to present themselves; and thus it finds itself compelled to have recourse to principles which transcend the region of experience, while they are regarded by common sense without distrust. It thus falls into confusion and contradictions, from which it conjectures the presence of latent errors, which, however, it is unable to discover, because the principles it employs, transcending the limits of experience, cannot be tested by that criterion. The arena of these endless contests is called Metaphysic.Time was, when she was the queen of all the sciences; and, if we take the will for the deed, she certainly deserves, so far as regards the high importance of her object-matter, this title of honour. Now, it is the fashion of the time to heap contempt and scorn upon her; and the matron mourns, forlorn and forsaken, like Hecuba: At first, her gover Modo maxima rerum, Tot generis, natisque potens... Nunc trahor exul, inops. —Ovid, Metamorphoses. xiii under the administration of the dogmatists, was an absolute despotism. But, as the legislative continued to show traces of the ancient barbaric rule, her empire gradually broke up, and intestine wars introduced the reign of anarchy; while the sceptics, like nomadic tribes, who hate a permanent habitation and settled mode of living, attacked from time to time those who had organized themselves into civil communities. But their number was, very happily, small; and thus they could not entirely put a stop to the exertions of those who persisted in raising new edifices, although on no settled or uniform plan. In recent times the hope dawned upon us of seeing those disputes settled, and the legitimacy of her claims established by a kind of physiology of the human understanding—that of the celebrated Locke. But it was found that—although it was affirmed that this so-called queen could not refer her descent to any higher source than that of common experience, a circumstance which necessarily brought suspicion on her claims—as this genealogy was incorrect, she persisted in the advancement of her claims to sovereignty. Thus metaphysics necessarily fell back into the antiquated and rotten constitution of dogmatism, and again became obnoxious to the contempt from which efforts had been made to save it. At present, as all methods, according to the general persuasion, have been tried in vain, there reigns nought but weariness and complete indifferentism—the mother of chaos and night in the scientific world, but at the same time the source of, or at least the prelude to, the re-creation and reinstallation of a science, when it has fallen into confusion, obscurity, and disuse from ill directed effort. I do not mean by this a criticism of books and systems, but a critical inquiry into the faculty of reason, with reference to the cognitions to which it strives to attain without the aid of experience; in other words, the solution of the question regarding the possibility or impossibility of metaphysics, and the determination of the origin, as well as of the extent and limits of this science. All this must be done on the basis of principles. ABOUT AUTHOR: That all our knowledge begins with experience there can be no doubt. For how is it possible that the faculty of cognition should be awakened into exercise otherwise than by means of objects which affect our senses, and partly of themselves produce representations, partly rouse our powers of understanding into activity, to compare to connect, or to separate these, and so to convert the raw material of our sensuous impressions into a knowledge of objects, which is called experience? In respect of time, therefore, no knowledge of ours is antecedent to experience, but begins with it. But, though all our knowledge begins with experience, it by no means follows that all arises out of experience. For, on the contrary, it is quite possible that our empirical knowledge is a compound of that which we receive through impressions, and that which the faculty of cognition supplies from itself (sensuous impressions giving merely the occasion), an addition which we cannot distinguish from the original element given by sense, till long practice has made us attentive to, and skilful in separating it. It is, therefore, a question which requires close investigation, and not to b

The present publication is intended to supply a recognised deficiency in our literature—a library edition of the Essays of Montaigne. This great French writer deserves to be regarded as a classic, not only in the land of his birth, but in all countries and in all literatures. His Essays, which are at once the most celebrated and the most permanent of his productions, form a magazine out of which such minds as those of Bacon and Shakespeare did not disdain to help themselves; and, indeed, as Hallam observes, the Frenchman's literary importance largely results from the share which his mind had in influencing other minds, coeval and subsequent. But, at the same time, estimating the value and rank of the essayist, we are not to leave out of the account the drawbacks and the circumstances of the period: the imperfect state of education, the comparative scarcity of books, and the limited opportunities of intellectual intercourse. Montaigne freely borrowed of others, and he has found men willing to borrow of him as freely. We need not wonder at the reputation which he with seeming facility achieved. He was, without being aware of it, the leader of a new school in letters and morals. His book was different from all others which were at that date in the world. It diverted the ancient currents of thought into new channels. It told its readers, with unexampled frankness, what its writer's opinion was about men and things, and threw what must have been a strange kind of new light on many matters but darkly understood. Above all, the essayist uncased himself, and made his intellectual and physical organism public property. He took the world into his confidence on all subjects. His essays were a sort of literary anatomy, where we get a diagnosis of the writer's mind, made by himself at different levels and under a large variety of operating influences. Of all egotists, Montaigne, if not the greatest, was the most fascinating, because, perhaps, he was the least affected and most truthful. What he did, and what he had professed to do, was to dissect his mind, and show us, as best he could, how it was made, and what relation it bore to external objects. He investigated his mental structure as a schoolboy pulls his watch to pieces, to examine the mechanism of the works; and the result, accompanied by illustrations abounding with originality and force, he delivered to his fellow-men in a book. W. C. H. KENSINGTON, November 1877. THE LIFE OF MONTAIGNE The author of the Essays was born, as he informs us himself, between eleven and twelve o'clock in the day, the last of February 1533, at the chateau of St. Michel de Montaigne. His father, Pierre Eyquem, esquire, was successively first Jurat of the town of Bordeaux (1530), Under-Mayor 1536, Jurat for the second time in 1540, Procureur in 1546, and at length Mayor from 1553 to 1556. He was a man of austere probity, who had "a particular regard for honour and for propriety in his person and attire . . . a mighty good faith in his speech, and a conscience and a religious feeling inclining to superstition, rather than to the other extreme. Between 1556 and 1563 an important incident occurred in the life of Montaigne, in the commencement of his romantic friendship with Etienne de la Boetie, whom he had met, as he tells us, by pure chance at some festive celebration in the town. From their very first interview the two found themselves drawn irresistibly close to one another, and during six years this alliance was foremost in the heart of Montaigne, as it was afterwards in his memory, when death had severed it.

"A megsemmisülés rejtélyes sz?vege egyszerre filozófiai traktátus, misztikus beavatás és poszthumán próza. A kortárs irodalomban egyre inkább feler?s?dik ez a nem-antropocentrikus hang, mely nem emberi sorsokat akar elbeszélni, hanem a nyelv és az ember k?z?s hiányt?rténetére mutat rá. ?Mennyien kapaszkodtak a létbe, mint egy végtelen fa t?rzsébe” - írja Horváth Márk és Lovász ?dám, hiszen az emberi állapot csak a társadalmi, nyelvi és metafizikai katasztrófa terében értelmezhet?. Apokaliptikus (neo)romantika és abszurd k?ltészet. Az utolsó ember kézik?nyve a túlélés lehetetlenségér?l."Nemes Z. Márió Az Idegenre hárult a sors ajándéka, hogy els?ként az utolsó emberek k?zu?l végignézze minden ku?ls?dleges k?telék pusztulását, és bizalmát lelkébe, s?t a lelkén is túlra helyezze, minden emberit maga m?g?tt hagyva. Minden ház gerendái k?z?tt barátságok és szerelmek jól táplált holttestei indultak oszlásnak, míg csak a csont fehérlett ki a vízb?l. Mint rég elhagyott kik?t?k tornyai, olyan hívogatóak voltak ezek a csontok az új kor embere számára.

Bogged down by an endless onslaught of stumbling blocks and disasters that keep pushing you farther away from fulfilling your purpose and achieving your goals? ? This book could radically change all that. ? This simple, clear, and highly practical step-by-step guide will show you: ? How to manage all the problems and disasters that come your way while still making progress on all your goals—short-term and long-term—without sacrificing the important things in life. How to turn obstacles into an advantage that will propel you along the path to fulfilling your goals and achieving your purpose. How to shift your thinking so that all you see are opportunities that will open doors to great possibilities you may have never imagined before.

《道德经说什么》是一本人人看得懂、用得上的《道德经》经典解读本。罗大伦博士把其中的智慧总结提炼成通俗易懂的语言，结合其中流传千年的智慧，助您解决生活中常见的各种实际问题。罗博士在书中告诉我们，每个人的人生不过是在“有”和“无”之间寻找平衡，不要因为自己暂时处于一个不好的状态而觉得焦虑，只要好好遵循天道去做，把自己的位置放低，把心放空，把名利看轻，把事做成，把身体照顾好，这样的人才能得道。

　　《黑格尔早期神学著作》（“贺麟全集”第八卷）是著名哲学家、翻译家贺麟的重要译著之一，以八十岁高龄自诺尔编黑格尔著《早期神学著作》的德文原版翻译而成，并参考诺克斯与克朗纳的英译本。本书也是身为译介黑格尔至中国人的贺麟先生，生前后一部黑格尔相关译著。其中收黑格尔著《民众宗教和基督教》《耶稣传》《基督教的权威性》《基督教的精神及其命运》及《1800年体系残篇》等五篇论文，是了解和研究黑格尔早期神学思想的手资料。

　　《精神现象学》为德国古典哲学大师黑格尔阐述其哲学观和方法论原则的部纲领性巨著。黑格尔自认此书为其哲学体系的导言。马克思誉《精神现象学》为“黑格尔哲学的真正起源和秘密”和“黑格尔哲学的圣经”。黑格尔通过此书提出，精神现象学是关于意识到达“*知识”或“科学”（即哲学）的道路的科学，它为个体提供了一把攀登*知识的“梯子”。中译本由贺麟、王玖兴合译，分上、下卷先后于1962年和1979年由商务印书馆出版。上卷1979年再版时曾修订译文，以与下卷译名统一，本次整理出版“贺麟全集”版，对勘再版所作修改，择其重要者，以编注形式留存上卷初版原貌。

　　在《迟到民族与激思想》中，作者以《德国思想的他者视角》篇，从著名学者卡尔·曼海姆、马丁·格莱芬哈根、库尔特·伦克的研究成果出发，考察了有关保守主义的不同定义，揭示了德国保守主义思想的发生语境，分析了德国保守主义的思想结构，发掘其背后隐藏的思想关联、社会关联，特别是政治关联，揭示出德国作为后发现代化国家的激思想；从宏观上勾画出德国保守主义的发展脉络。

作者张汝伦先生在广泛阅读西方大家、名家解读《存在与时间》的诸多文本和专著基础上，用中国古人注疏经典的办法，逐节逐段解读，力图将这样一部晦涩、复杂的作品的文本意义和背后复杂的深意都揭示出来。

　　《黑格尔黑格尔学述》收贺麟于1930年代编译的近代西方新黑格尔主义者的经典黑格尔研究——尔德的《黑格尔》与鲁一士的《黑格尔学述》，二书均能将黑格尔学说体会融化并以清晰流利的文字叙述出来，可谓姊妹关系，互相发明，互相弥补，而又各有所长。尔德注重叙述黑格尔的生活、性格、时代风气、文化背景，特别是政治和宗教背景，以及黑格尔的逻辑学说；鲁一士则着重阐述黑格尔之精神现象学。本书是将黑格尔及其学说译介至中国的人——贺麟对“黑格尔学”发生兴趣之始，贺麟以朱熹太极观会通黑格尔的“*理念”，对于中西比较哲学研究居功甚伟。作为贺麟重要译著收“全集”的《黑格尔》及《黑格尔学述》均为建国后首度整理出版，对于了解哲学家和翻译家贺麟意义非凡。

【内容简介】 本选题分类结集叶秀山先生全部已经出版的专著，在学术期刊上发表的所有论文，以及部分笔记、札记、书信和讲演录，共11卷。本选题代表了当代中国哲学的高度，是哲学专业学 习者和研究者的重要学习和参考用书。第五卷包括《说“写字”》《中西智慧的贯通》《哲学作为创造性的智慧》三本作者专著和自选集。

【内容简介】 本选题分类结集叶秀山先生全部已经出版的专著，在学术期刊上发表的所有论文，以及部分笔记、札记、书信和讲演录，共11卷。本选题代表了当代中国哲学的高度，是哲学专业学习者和研究者的重要学习和参考用书。第六卷包括《西方哲学史卷·总论》《中国社会科学院学术委员文库·叶秀山文集》《哲学要义》这三本作者著作。

【内容简介】 本选题分类结集叶秀山先生全部已经出版的专著，在学术期刊上发表的所有论文，以及部分笔记、札记、书信和讲演录，共11卷。本全集代表了当代中国哲学的高度，是哲学专业学 习者和研究者的重要学习和参考用书。第九卷包括《启蒙与自由》《“知己”的学问》《在，成于思》这三本作者专著和自选集，分别探讨了康德哲学、黑格尔哲学、德国古典哲学以 及中西哲学的会通问题，揭示了康德、黑格尔乃至德国古典哲学的意义和价值，论述精严，见解的当，学术价值高。

　　本书是对《省心杂言》的释评，书中全面周详地阐述了立身处世以及人际关系的一系列准则，对现实生活工作学习都极具借鉴意义。

本书通过对创新实践范畴的剖析，从马克思立足于实践观实现了对传统哲学的革命这一事实出发，把实践一步划分为常规实践和创新实践，并指出了创新实践更能体现实践的“自由的自觉的活动”这一人的本质存在方式，正如马克思通过确立实践存在论构建了历史存在论的唯物史观一样，当今时代迫切需要在创新实践基础上一步确立创新实践存在论的唯物史观。在此基础上比较系统地阐述了创新实践与人的本质论、创新实践与历史动力论、创新实践与人民价值论、创新实践与发展本质论等基本问题，力求在创新实践的基础上推以实践生成论为基础的唯物史观的发展，期望助推学界更加深理解马克思实践唯物主义的深邃思想，充分彰显唯物史观的时代意义，深探索唯物史观的当今理论形态。