本书是写给普通人的因果逻辑门书，旨在帮助读者培养严谨的思维方式，在不借助任何专业知识的前提下，准确定位问题。主要内容包括：认识原因，对原因的理解和运用，如何只通过观察找到原因，大数据集与原因的关系，因果关系相关实验，如何利用因果关系来制定有效的干预措施，研究因果关系的意义。 本书适合所有对探究事件真相感兴趣的读者，无须统计学等专业背景。

　　本书是朱熹四十岁后与弟子日常问答的语录类编。学习儒学绕不朱子，《朱子语类》是所有儒学爱好者都可以读懂的经典门书。 　　全书分门别类完整记录了朱熹的哲学体系。从世界本原到人生哲学，再到格物致知、知行相须等为学力行的方法，*后逐一讲解《四书六经》。书中全是口语对谈，还原真实语境，带你重返朱子讲学现场。即通俗易懂，又直抵原意。 　　《朱子语类》宋本已佚。本版本选取明成化九年（1473年）陈炜刻本为底本，参考了现有的古籍整理成果，以简体横排标本的形式呈现。

本书聚焦于马克思主义信仰领域的重大理论问题，围绕作者在“日常生活”“文化自信”“理论和理论工作者的责任与使命”“信仰”等主题展论述，重在解决真懂真信马克思主义的问题。全书重申并强调了马克思主义理论工作者要自信、自强、自尊，不断加强自身的理论修养和对实际问题的研究，增强自尊的资本和自信的底气；同时要关注社会现实，不断推马克思主义中国化、时代化和大众化的程。本书体现了作者对马克思主义理论研究强烈的担当意识、宏阔的思想境界、深厚的理论功底和不懈的探索精神；行文流畅、深浅出，既具有理论厚度又具有可读性。

西方哲学的普遍性是指西方哲学家所阐述的作为世界本质的普遍性。本书认为西方哲学的普遍性作为本体论的对象通过决定人性乃至人的普遍价值观构成了人类之根，因而也决定着人应该如何活着（人是什么、人从哪儿来和人应该到哪儿去）。本书通过传统形而上学、康德形而上学、海德格尔哲学和德里达哲学四个节来探讨西方哲学的寻根之路，认为此一寻根之路从哲学之内看表现为西方哲学普遍性沦落的过程，而从哲学之外看则决定着西方社会价值观从一元走向多元的过程，其中，前一过程构成了后一过程的形而上学根据。西方社会价值观从一元走向多元的历程是一个不可逆的社会步历程，但它也导致了西方社会在精神家园方面之无家可归的消极后果。本书认为，基于形而上学的根据理清这一历程的必然性和内在逻辑是正确评价这一历程并正确探求人类（西方）价值观未来发展方向的基础。

一个多世纪以来，由马克思亮的唯物史观的思想火炬，驱散了人们认识世界的迷雾，至今依然保持着强大的生命力。 本书有力地论证了马克思主义于世界、于中国之生命力，即不同于思想史上其他重要的哲学体系，马克思及其思想不是止步于解释世界,而是强调改变世界，为世界不同国家的发展指明路径和方法；而马克思关于世界历史的理解，恰恰成为中国探索社会发展道路问题的关键。 本书注重梳理马克思思想的演过程，通过对马克思经典著作中的哲学、政治经济学概念的思辨阐释，重新发现19世纪70年代后马克思思想发生的重大变化：在肯定世界历史统一性的同时，马克思科学地预见到社会发展的多样性、历史条件的差异性，会推动世界各国形成自己独特的发展道路。 全书文风精悍、结构丰富、论证严谨，为我们重新“走近马克思”提供权威指导。

本书紧紧围绕马克思主义与中国实际相结合的历史程，以流畅生动的语言、大量翔实的史料、深系统的分析，从马克思主义传中国的东方欲晓，到中国共产党人历经艰难困苦提出和探索马克思主义与中国实际相结合的苦难辉煌，从新中国成立后艰辛探索社会主义道路的风雨前行，到党的十一届三中全会以后我国全面行改革放的关键抉择，从中国特色社会主义道路的确立，到中华民族伟大复兴中国梦的实现，勾勒出了一条清晰的马克思主义中国化百年流变的雄关漫道。本书是一本集理论性、史料性和可读性于一体的阐述马克思主义中国化历史程的理论读物。

本书采用诸如知识语境、道德形而上学和审美形而上学这样比较边缘的概念，而并未沿着通常的知识论、伦理学和美学的“方便法门”来阐释道家的形而上学。作者依据“形而上者谓之道”的古训把道家的“道论”，具体说就是关于“无”的核心理论，归纳为“形而上学”，进而从物理学入手探讨形而上学的原因。

Cartea de fa??, pe care cititorul o ?ine acum ?n m?n?, reprezint? o form? – literar vorbind, foarte complex?, fiindc? ea evolueaz? pe mai multe voci narative, dintre care doar unele ?i apar?in ?n mod direct autoarei – de exorcism. Geniul inimii e r?spunsul unui poet la o experien?? personal? plenitudinar?, ?n care bucuria ?i suferin?a se ?ntrep?trund reciproc pentru a exprima, ?mpreun? ?i tensionat, starea de gra?ie. Exist? o voce a experien?ei biografice ?n aceast? carte scris? febril, o alta de martor sau de participant la istorie, tot a?a cum exist? o voce a puterii ?i una a victimei. Deasupra tuturor st?, ?ns?, nu neap?rat triumf?toare, dar lucid-cerebral?, chemarea celor dou? credin?e pentru care merit? s? tr?ie?ti ?i s?-?i rememorezi via?a atunci c?nd ai ajuns cu ea la r?sp?ntie: credin?a ?n cultura modelelor care te-au precedat ?i credin?a deloc ingenu?, ci ivit? din cunoa?tere, ?n sacralitatea profund? a celor tr?ite ?i ?n transcenden??. (?tefan Borbély) A considera un text drept ?carte a ilumin?rilor mele“ ?i a a?eza ca titlu al primei p?r?i a volumului sintagma Povestea subteranei ne plaseaz? sub semnul aproape imposibil al drumului c?tre Sine, al cuprinderii, al denud?rii ?i al efortului de a ?n?elege un obiect al c?rui adev?r se va afla ?ntotdeauna ?n proximitatea pe?terii lui Platon. E un demers perpetuat, dar niciodat? epuizat ?i aproape exclus din plasma comunic?rii, care – ?n situa?ia ?romanului“ Aurei Christi – nu are coresponden?e, nu se apropie de experien?a budhist?, nici de prerogativele ocultismului de New Age, ci ne aduce ?n vecin?tatea ?ndemnului de pe frontispiciul templului lui Apollo din Delphi, preluat apoi, ca solu?ie ?ntre a fi ?i a p?rea, de c?tre Socrate: ?Cunoa?te-te pe tine ?nsu?i!“. Po?i ?nt?lni, pe acest drum, ?i acel daimonion care a str?juit g?ndirea aceluia?i ?n?elept atenian ca alt? fa?? a ?subteranelor“ fiin?ei, acolo unde lumina se ?ngem?neaz? cu ?ntunericul, stare ?poetizat?“ de Goethe, dar pr?bu?it? ?n tragic de Dostoievski. E o cobor?re spre ?n?elegere prin cuprindere ?i, implicit, prin atingerea nelimitatului. (Mircea Braga) Cartea Aurei Christi Geniul inimii pare o st?nc? masiv?, singuratic?, ?ntr-un peisaj ?mioritic“. Geniul inimii are originalitate ?i for??. Prima parte e liric?, a doua (?ntr-un fel) – o comedie negru-satiric?, a treia – predominant epic-narativ?. Prima parte este excelent?; mi-am ?nsemnat un num?r de poezii memorabile. A doua, ?n centrul ei mai ales, are sec?iuni, pasaje extrem de interesant-pl?cute-amuzante, ?n pofida tonului, uneori, foiletonistic. A treia e impresionant? ?n ansamblu, armonios-coerent?, de o sinceritate sf??ietoare. ?n tot volumul, istoricul, religiosul, subiectivul se leag? foarte frumos ?ntre ele. Nu-mi plac laudele la adresa lui Nietzsche! De fapt, cum se leag? acest autor de Biblie, de Evanghelii?! Aura Christi poate fi m?ndr? de o realizare major?, cu totul original?. Probabil, nu l-a citit pe romanticul britanic Wordsworth; dar el e cel care a scris (sau a ?nceput s? scrie) o memorabil? autobiografie ?n versuri. Pu?ini l-au continuat. Am putea spune c? Aura se num?r? printre cei pu?ini. (Virgil Nemoianu)

The present publication is intended to supply a recognised deficiency in our literature—a library edition of the Essays of Montaigne. This great French writer deserves to be regarded as a classic, not only in the land of his birth, but in all countries and in all literatures. His Essays, which are at once the most celebrated and the most permanent of his productions, form a magazine out of which such minds as those of Bacon and Shakespeare did not disdain to help themselves; and, indeed, as Hallam observes, the Frenchman's literary importance largely results from the share which his mind had in influencing other minds, coeval and subsequent. But, at the same time, estimating the value and rank of the essayist, we are not to leave out of the account the drawbacks and the circumstances of the period: the imperfect state of education, the comparative scarcity of books, and the limited opportunities of intellectual intercourse. Montaigne freely borrowed of others, and he has found men willing to borrow of him as freely. We need not wonder at the reputation which he with seeming facility achieved. He was, without being aware of it, the leader of a new school in letters and morals. His book was different from all others which were at that date in the world. It diverted the ancient currents of thought into new channels. It told its readers, with unexampled frankness, what its writer's opinion was about men and things, and threw what must have been a strange kind of new light on many matters but darkly understood. Above all, the essayist uncased himself, and made his intellectual and physical organism public property. He took the world into his confidence on all subjects. His essays were a sort of literary anatomy, where we get a diagnosis of the writer's mind, made by himself at different levels and under a large variety of operating influences. Of all egotists, Montaigne, if not the greatest, was the most fascinating, because, perhaps, he was the least affected and most truthful. What he did, and what he had professed to do, was to dissect his mind, and show us, as best he could, how it was made, and what relation it bore to external objects. He investigated his mental structure as a schoolboy pulls his watch to pieces, to examine the mechanism of the works; and the result, accompanied by illustrations abounding with originality and force, he delivered to his fellow-men in a book. W. C. H. KENSINGTON, November 1877. THE LIFE OF MONTAIGNE The author of the Essays was born, as he informs us himself, between eleven and twelve o'clock in the day, the last of February 1533, at the chateau of St. Michel de Montaigne. His father, Pierre Eyquem, esquire, was successively first Jurat of the town of Bordeaux (1530), Under-Mayor 1536, Jurat for the second time in 1540, Procureur in 1546, and at length Mayor from 1553 to 1556. He was a man of austere probity, who had "a particular regard for honour and for propriety in his person and attire . . . a mighty good faith in his speech, and a conscience and a religious feeling inclining to superstition, rather than to the other extreme. Between 1556 and 1563 an important incident occurred in the life of Montaigne, in the commencement of his romantic friendship with Etienne de la Boetie, whom he had met, as he tells us, by pure chance at some festive celebration in the town. From their very first interview the two found themselves drawn irresistibly close to one another, and during six years this alliance was foremost in the heart of Montaigne, as it was afterwards in his memory, when death had severed it.

DAVID HUME (1711 – 1776) was a Scottish philosopher, historian, economist, and essayist known especially for his philosophical empiricism and skepticism. He was one of the most important figures in the history of Western philosophy and the Scottish Enlightenment. Hume is often grouped with John Locke, George Berkeley, and a handful of others as a British Empiricist. Beginning with his A Treatise of Human Nature (1739), Hume strove to create a total naturalistic "science of man" that examined the psychological basis of human nature. In stark opposition to the rationalists who preceded him, most notably Descartes, he concluded that desire rather than reason governed human behaviour, saying: "REASON IS, and OUGHT ONLY to BE the SLAVE of the PASSIONS". A prominent figure in the sceptical philosophical tradition and a strong empiricist, he argued against the existence of innate ideas, concluding instead that humans have knowledge only of things they directly experience.. NOTHING is more usual and more natural for those, who pretend to discover anything new to the world in philosophy and the sciences, than to insinuate the praises of their own systems, by decrying all those, which have been advanced before them. And indeed were they content with lamenting that ignorance, which we still lie under in the most important questions, that can come before the tribunal of human reason, there are few, who have an acquaintance with the sciences, that would not readily agree with them. It is easy for one of judgment and learning, to perceive the weak foundation even of those systems, which have obtained the greatest credit, and have carried their pretensions highest to accurate and profound reasoning. Principles taken upon trust, consequences lamely deduced from them, want of coherence in the parts, and of evidence in the whole, these are every where to be met with in the systems of the most eminent philosophers, and seem to have drawn disgrace upon philosophy itself. Nor is there required such profound knowledge to discover the present imperfect condition of the sciences, but even the rabble without doors may, judge from the noise and clamour, which they hear, that all goes not well within. There is nothing which is not the subject of debate, and in which men of learning are not of contrary opinions. The most trivial question escapes not our controversy, and in the most momentous we are not able to give any certain decision. Disputes are multiplied, as if every thing was uncertain; and these disputes are managed with the greatest warmth, as if every thing was certain. Amidst all this bustle it is not reason, which carries the prize, but eloquence; and no man needs ever despair of gaining proselytes to the most extravagant hypothesis, who has art enough to represent it in any favourable colours. The victory is not gained by the men at arms, who manage the pike and the sword; but by the trumpeters, drummers, and musicians of the army. From hence in my opinion arises that common prejudice against metaphysical reasonings of all kinds, even amongst those, who profess themselves scholars, and have a just value for every other part of literature. By metaphysical reasonings, they do not understand those on any particular branch of science, but every kind of argument, which is any way abstruse, and requires some attention to be comprehended. We have so often lost our labour in such researches, that we commonly reject them without hesitation, and resolve, if we must for ever be a prey to errors and delusions, that they shall at least be natural and entertaining. And indeed nothing but the most determined scepticism, along with a great degree of indolence, can justify this aversion to metaphysics. For if truth be at all within the reach of human capacity, it is certain it must lie very deep and abstruse: and to hope we shall arrive at it without pains, while the greatest geniuses have failed with the utmost pains..

Ralph Waldo Emerson, was born at Boston in 1803 into a distinguished family of New England Unitarian ministers. His was the eighth generation to enter the ministry in a dynasty that reached back to the earliest days of Puritan America. Despite the death of his father when Emerson was only eleven, he was able to be educated at Boston Latin School and then Harvard, from which he graduated in 1821. After several years of reluctant school teaching, he returned to the Harvard Divinity School, entering the Unitarian ministry during a period of robust ecclesiastic debate. By 1829 Emerson was married and well on his way to a promising career in the church through his appointment to an important congregation in Boston. However, his career in the ministry did not last long. Following the death of his first wife, Ellen, his private religious doubts led him to announce his resignation to his congregation, claiming he was unable to preach a doctrine he no longer believed and that "to be a good minister it was necessary to leave the ministry."With the modest legacy left him from his first wife, Emerson was able to devote himself to study and travel. In Europe he met many of the important Romantic writers whose ideas on art, philosophy, and literature were transforming the writing of the Nineteenth Century. He also continued to explore his own ideas in a series of voluminous journals which he had kept from his earliest youth and from which virtually all of his literary creation would be generated. Taking up residence in Concord, Massachusetts, Emerson devoted himself to study, writing and a series of public lectures in the growing lyceum movement. From these lyceum addresses Emerson developed and then in 1836 published his most important work, Nature. Its publication also coincided with his organizing role in the Transcendental Club, a group of leading New England educators, clergy, and intellectuals interested in idealistic religion, philosophy, and literature.

The Prince (Italian: Il Principe) is a political treatise by the Italian diplomat, historian and political theorist Niccolò Machiavelli. From correspondence a version appears to have been distributed in 1513, using a Latin title, De Principatibus (About Principalities). But the printed version was not published until 1532, five years after Machiavelli's death. This was done with the permission of the Medici pope Clement VII, but "long before then, in fact since the first appearance of the Prince in manuscript, controversy had swirled about his writings" Although it was written as if it were a traditional work in the Mirror of Princes style, it is generally agreed that it was especially innovative, and not only because it was written in Italian rather than Latin. The Prince is sometimes claimed to be one of the first works of modern philosophy, in which the effective truth is taken to be more important than any abstract ideal. It was also in direct conflict with the dominant Catholic and scholastic doctrines of the time concerning how to consider politics and ethics. Although it is relatively short, the treatise is the most remembered of his works and the one most responsible for bringing "Machiavellian" into wide usage as a pejorative term. It also helped make "Old Nick" an English term for the devil, and even contributed to the modern negative connotations of the words "politics" and "politician" in western countries. In terms of subject matter it overlaps with the much longer Discourses on Livy, which was written a few years later. In its use of examples who were politically active Italians who perpetrated criminal deeds for politics, another lesser-known work by Machiavelli which The Prince has been compared to is the Life of Castruccio Castracani. The descriptions within The Prince have the general theme of accepting that ends of princes, such as glory, and indeed survival, can justify the use of immoral means to achieve those ends.

"A megsemmisülés rejtélyes sz?vege egyszerre filozófiai traktátus, misztikus beavatás és poszthumán próza. A kortárs irodalomban egyre inkább feler?s?dik ez a nem-antropocentrikus hang, mely nem emberi sorsokat akar elbeszélni, hanem a nyelv és az ember k?z?s hiányt?rténetére mutat rá. ?Mennyien kapaszkodtak a létbe, mint egy végtelen fa t?rzsébe” - írja Horváth Márk és Lovász ?dám, hiszen az emberi állapot csak a társadalmi, nyelvi és metafizikai katasztrófa terében értelmezhet?. Apokaliptikus (neo)romantika és abszurd k?ltészet. Az utolsó ember kézik?nyve a túlélés lehetetlenségér?l."Nemes Z. Márió Az Idegenre hárult a sors ajándéka, hogy els?ként az utolsó emberek k?zu?l végignézze minden ku?ls?dleges k?telék pusztulását, és bizalmát lelkébe, s?t a lelkén is túlra helyezze, minden emberit maga m?g?tt hagyva. Minden ház gerendái k?z?tt barátságok és szerelmek jól táplált holttestei indultak oszlásnak, míg csak a csont fehérlett ki a vízb?l. Mint rég elhagyott kik?t?k tornyai, olyan hívogatóak voltak ezek a csontok az új kor embere számára.

"Wilde è profetico sin dalle prima righe, quando denuncia la prevalenza dell’emozione sulla razionalità, male principe del nostro tempo, e poi del pietismo sull’emancipazione, male di tanta politica di pseudo sinistra" (dall'Introduzione di Alfredo Sgarlato). Wilde: ?perché la vita raggiunga la sua più elevata perfezione, ci vuole qualche cosa di più. Ciò che ci vuole è l'individualismo?, ?Utopia? Una carta geografica del mondo in cui non sia segnato il paese dell'Utopia, non varrebbe la pena d'essere guardata, perché vi mancherebbe il paese in cui l'Umanità atterra ogni giorno. Ma non appena v'è sbarcata, ella guarda più lontano, scorge una terra ancora più bella, e spiega di nuovo le vele. Progredire significa realizzare l'Utopia?. SOMMARIO: Introduzione (di Alfredo Sgarlato) - Postfazione. Breve biblio-nota ai testi e alla traduzione (di Fabrizio Pinna) - OSCAR WILDE Società e libertà: elogio dell'individualismo - APPENDICE I Oscar Wilde, Rapporti fra il socialismo e l'individualismo (di Luigi Fabbri, 1913) - APPENDICE II The Soul of Man under Socialism (1891). LA COLLANA IN/DEFINIZIONI

O que somos?De onde viemos?!Para onde vamos? A que caminhos a vida nos leva? Essas e outras quest?es aflitivas e de todos os tempos nos s?o solucionadas por León Denis neste opúsculo. Filho da dor, Denis sabe, como você também, o quanto viver, muitas vezes é sofrer. E por isso apresenta, de modo t?o leve a solu??o espírita, racional, para o problema do existir. Mais do que um livro de Filosofia espírita, você tem em m?os palavras de consolo e estímulo para que cada trope?o do caminho seja compreendido e por assim dizer, aproveitado! Venha acompanhar-nos nesta viagem e descubra, em rápidos parágrafos os porquês de sua vida, da nossa vida, do planeta, do Universo.? Aos poucos, entenderemos com a lógica espírita como tudo esta em seu devido lugar.

Dignità o miseria della natura umana? ?C'è un principio supposto prevalere tra molti che è del tutto incompatibile con ogni virtù o senso morale [...] Questo principio è che ogni benevolenza è mera ipocrisia, l'amicizia un inganno, lo spirito pubblico una farsa, la fedeltà un trucco per procurare fiducia e confidenza; e mentre tutti noi, in fondo, perseguiamo solo il nostro interesse privato, indossiamo questi bei travestimenti in modo da abbassare le difese degli altri ed esporli maggiormente alle nostre astuzie e macchinazioni?... Le meditazioni senza tempo di uno dei più grandi filosofi europei. SOMMARIO: Introduzione e avvertenza ai testi / Nota bibliografica: una mappa degli studi (di Fabrizio Pinna) - David Hume: Dignità o miseria della natura umana? / L'Amore di Sé. APPENDICE: Of the Dignity or Meanness of Human Nature; Of Self-love; My Own Life & Letter from Adam Smith, LL. D. to William Strahan, Esq.; Of the Reason of Animals; Of the Immortality of the Soul; Of Superstition and Enthusiasm; Of some Verbal Disputes. LE COLLANE IN/DEFINIZIONI & CON(TRO)TESTI

Human reason, in one sphere of its cognition, is called upon to consider questions, which it cannot decline, as they are presented by its own nature, but which it cannot answer, as they transcend every faculty of the mind. It falls into this difficulty without any fault of its own. It begins with principles, which cannot be dispensed with in the field of experience, and the truth and sufficiency of which are, at the same time, insured by experience. With these principles it rises, in obedience to the laws of its own nature, to ever higher and more remote conditions. But it quickly discovers that, in this way, its labours must remain ever incomplete, because new questions never cease to present themselves; and thus it finds itself compelled to have recourse to principles which transcend the region of experience, while they are regarded by common sense without distrust. It thus falls into confusion and contradictions, from which it conjectures the presence of latent errors, which, however, it is unable to discover, because the principles it employs, transcending the limits of experience, cannot be tested by that criterion. The arena of these endless contests is called Metaphysic.Time was, when she was the queen of all the sciences; and, if we take the will for the deed, she certainly deserves, so far as regards the high importance of her object-matter, this title of honour. Now, it is the fashion of the time to heap contempt and scorn upon her; and the matron mourns, forlorn and forsaken, like Hecuba: At first, her gover Modo maxima rerum, Tot generis, natisque potens... Nunc trahor exul, inops. —Ovid, Metamorphoses. xiii under the administration of the dogmatists, was an absolute despotism. But, as the legislative continued to show traces of the ancient barbaric rule, her empire gradually broke up, and intestine wars introduced the reign of anarchy; while the sceptics, like nomadic tribes, who hate a permanent habitation and settled mode of living, attacked from time to time those who had organized themselves into civil communities. But their number was, very happily, small; and thus they could not entirely put a stop to the exertions of those who persisted in raising new edifices, although on no settled or uniform plan. In recent times the hope dawned upon us of seeing those disputes settled, and the legitimacy of her claims established by a kind of physiology of the human understanding—that of the celebrated Locke. But it was found that—although it was affirmed that this so-called queen could not refer her descent to any higher source than that of common experience, a circumstance which necessarily brought suspicion on her claims—as this genealogy was incorrect, she persisted in the advancement of her claims to sovereignty. Thus metaphysics necessarily fell back into the antiquated and rotten constitution of dogmatism, and again became obnoxious to the contempt from which efforts had been made to save it. At present, as all methods, according to the general persuasion, have been tried in vain, there reigns nought but weariness and complete indifferentism—the mother of chaos and night in the scientific world, but at the same time the source of, or at least the prelude to, the re-creation and reinstallation of a science, when it has fallen into confusion, obscurity, and disuse from ill directed effort. I do not mean by this a criticism of books and systems, but a critical inquiry into the faculty of reason, with reference to the cognitions to which it strives to attain without the aid of experience; in other words, the solution of the question regarding the possibility or impossibility of metaphysics, and the determination of the origin, as well as of the extent and limits of this science. All this must be done on the basis of principles. ABOUT AUTHOR: That all our knowledge begins with experience there can be no doubt. For how is it possible that the faculty of cognition should be awakened into exercise otherwise than by means of objects which affect our senses, and partly of themselves produce representations, partly rouse our powers of understanding into activity, to compare to connect, or to separate these, and so to convert the raw material of our sensuous impressions into a knowledge of objects, which is called experience? In respect of time, therefore, no knowledge of ours is antecedent to experience, but begins with it. But, though all our knowledge begins with experience, it by no means follows that all arises out of experience. For, on the contrary, it is quite possible that our empirical knowledge is a compound of that which we receive through impressions, and that which the faculty of cognition supplies from itself (sensuous impressions giving merely the occasion), an addition which we cannot distinguish from the original element given by sense, till long practice has made us attentive to, and skilful in separating it. It is, therefore, a question which requires close investigation, and not to b

Volumul red? circuitului public, pentru prima oar? ?n limba rom?n?, trei din operele g?nditorului atenian. Este vorba de Scrisori (?n num?r de treisprezece, deosebit de importante pentru cunoa?terea g?ndirii platoniciene, dar ?i pentru ?n?elegerea epocii ?i a personalit??ilor cu care a venit ?n contact filosoful), Dialoguri suspecte (Minos, Rivalii, Theages, Hipparhos, Clitofon) ?i Dialoguri apocrife (Axiohos, Despre drept, Despre virtute, Demodocus, Sisyfos, Eryxias).Traducerea apara?ine lui ?tefan Bezdechi, care a realizat ?i aparatul critic al Scrisorilor (introducere ?i note).

　　《精神现象学》为德国古典哲学大师黑格尔阐述其哲学观和方法论原则的部纲领性巨著。黑格尔自认此书为其哲学体系的导言。马克思誉《精神现象学》为“黑格尔哲学的真正起源和秘密”和“黑格尔哲学的圣经”。黑格尔通过此书提出，精神现象学是关于意识到达“*知识”或“科学”（即哲学）的道路的科学，它为个体提供了一把攀登*知识的“梯子”。中译本由贺麟、王玖兴合译，分上、下卷先后于1962年和1979年由商务印书馆出版。上卷1979年再版时曾修订译文，以与下卷译名统一，本次整理出版“贺麟全集”版，对勘再版所作修改，择其重要者，以编注形式留存上卷初版原貌。

　　在《迟到民族与激思想》中，作者以《德国思想的他者视角》篇，从著名学者卡尔·曼海姆、马丁·格莱芬哈根、库尔特·伦克的研究成果出发，考察了有关保守主义的不同定义，揭示了德国保守主义思想的发生语境，分析了德国保守主义的思想结构，发掘其背后隐藏的思想关联、社会关联，特别是政治关联，揭示出德国作为后发现代化国家的激思想；从宏观上勾画出德国保守主义的发展脉络。

　　施米特称，“德国问题”乃为“20世纪重大问题”之样板 　　立足新兴民族国家的政治处境，自编政论集，为现代性问题展思想斗争 ??? 　　《论断与概念》是施米特生前自编过的两部政论集之一，包含讲演、书评、法庭陈词等，涉及范围广泛，如公法、政治思想史、国际和国内政治，立足于德国作为新兴民族国家的政治处境。施米特从作为现代性问题的“德国问题”出发，纵横捭阖，针对国内政治思想的混乱，尤其针对帝国主义对德国的压迫，展了思想上的政治斗争。施米特称“德国问题”为“20世纪重大问题”的样板，此书对于中国学人思考“中国问题”应有诸多启发。