忍是一种能力，一种修养，一种韬略“凡事忍耐，多想自己缺，增益其所不能；照顾大局，只要不妨大的原则，多多原谅人家。忍耐*难，但作为一个政治家，必须练习忍耐。”——*在1944年时对“忍耐”所做的一段精辟的剖析。君子忍人之所不能忍，容人之所不能容，处人之所不能处。——马南邨

立德修身的恒言警句为学立业的至理名言《小窗幽记》为陈眉公所著的修身处世格言，条条都是人生的回味和处世的领悟，体现了儒家修身、齐家、治国、平天下的积极人生态度，又兼容了佛家超凡脱俗和道家清静无为的智慧，历来被称为修身养性、提升自我修养的佳作。

Tr?s?turi fundamentale ale unei concep?ii moderne despre lume?Cum se comport? filosofia c? art? fa?? de libertatea omului, ce este aceast? libertate, ?i dac? am ajuns s? ne ?mp?rt??im din ea, sau putem ajunge la acest lucru: iat? problema fundamental? a scrierii mele. Toate celelalte expuneri ?tiin?ifice au fost f?cute numai pentru ca, ?n cele din urm?, s? arunc?m ?i mai mult? lumin? asupra unei probleme care, dup? p?rerea mea, prezint? cea mai mare importan?? pentru om. ?n aceste pagini vrem s? d?m o filosofie a libert??ii.“ – Rudolf Steiner

F?r? a propune o terminologie aristotelic? bine precizat? pe teritoriul limbii rom?ne, transpunerea de fa?? reprezint? un moment important ?n raportarea rom?neasc? la opera Stagiritului.Traducere de ?tefan Bezdechi efectuat? dup? textul grec publicat de W. Christ ?n colec?ia ?Teubner“, Lipsca, 1906. Pentru realizarea ei au fost utilizate urm?toarele surse:Die Metaphysik des Aristoteles, traducere ?n limba german? de J. R. V. Kirchmann, ap?rut? ?n dou? volume ?i prev?zut? cu note ample ?n colec?ia ?Philosophische Bibliothek“, numerele 38 ?i 39, la Berlin, ?n 1871;Aristoteles, Metaphysik, traducere ?n limba german? de Adolf Lasson, ?n care cele patrusprezece c?r?i ale Metafizicii sunt a?ezate ?ntr-o r?nduial? mai logic? dec?t a?a cum au fost transmise ?n originalul grec, traducere ap?rut? ?n 1924, la Jena;Aristote, Métaphysique, traducere ?n limba francez? de J. Tricot, cu o prefa?? de A. Diés, ap?rut? ?n colec?ia ?Bibliothèque des textes philosophiques“, J. Vrin, la Paris, ?n 1933.La marginea textului a fost trecut? pagina?ia edi?iei Bekker, dup? care se fac ?n mod obi?nuit cita?iile din opera lui Aristotel.Confruntarea traducerii a fost f?cut? de prof. Aram M. Frenkian.

Volumul cuprinde dou? din cele mai reprezentative lucr?ri ?n care filosoful german ??i expune concep?ia moral?: ?ntemeierea metafizicii moravurilor (1785) ?i Critica ra?iunii practice (1788). ?n ?ntemeierea metafizicii moravurilor Immanuel Kant expune principiile moralit??ii, iar ?n Critica ra?iunii practice ??i construie?te propriul s?u sistem etic, ceea ce face ca aceasta s? fie considerat?, dup? Critica ra?iunii pure, a doua sa oper? fundamental?.?ntre cele dou? lucr?ri este o at?t de str?ns? leg?tur?, ?nc?t cunoa?terea numai a uneia din ele ne-ar oferi o imagine incomplet? asupra concep?iei sale morale.Immanuel Kant a avansat idei etice ?i ?n alte opere ulterioare (Religia ?n limitele ra?iunii – 1793 sau Metafizica moravurilor – 1797), dar numai ?n cele reunite ?n acest volum se ocup? de problemele teoretice ale moralit??ii.Traducerea a fost f?cut? dup? edi?ia german? din 1956 (Leipzig, Hrsg. Von Raymund Schimidt).

Human reason, in one sphere of its cognition, is called upon to consider questions, which it cannot decline, as they are presented by its own nature, but which it cannot answer, as they transcend every faculty of the mind. It falls into this difficulty without any fault of its own. It begins with principles, which cannot be dispensed with in the field of experience, and the truth and sufficiency of which are, at the same time, insured by experience. With these principles it rises, in obedience to the laws of its own nature, to ever higher and more remote conditions. But it quickly discovers that, in this way, its labours must remain ever incomplete, because new questions never cease to present themselves; and thus it finds itself compelled to have recourse to principles which transcend the region of experience, while they are regarded by common sense without distrust. It thus falls into confusion and contradictions, from which it conjectures the presence of latent errors, which, however, it is unable to discover, because the principles it employs, transcending the limits of experience, cannot be tested by that criterion. The arena of these endless contests is called Metaphysic.Time was, when she was the queen of all the sciences; and, if we take the will for the deed, she certainly deserves, so far as regards the high importance of her object-matter, this title of honour. Now, it is the fashion of the time to heap contempt and scorn upon her; and the matron mourns, forlorn and forsaken, like Hecuba: At first, her gover Modo maxima rerum, Tot generis, natisque potens... Nunc trahor exul, inops. —Ovid, Metamorphoses. xiii under the administration of the dogmatists, was an absolute despotism. But, as the legislative continued to show traces of the ancient barbaric rule, her empire gradually broke up, and intestine wars introduced the reign of anarchy; while the sceptics, like nomadic tribes, who hate a permanent habitation and settled mode of living, attacked from time to time those who had organized themselves into civil communities. But their number was, very happily, small; and thus they could not entirely put a stop to the exertions of those who persisted in raising new edifices, although on no settled or uniform plan. In recent times the hope dawned upon us of seeing those disputes settled, and the legitimacy of her claims established by a kind of physiology of the human understanding—that of the celebrated Locke. But it was found that—although it was affirmed that this so-called queen could not refer her descent to any higher source than that of common experience, a circumstance which necessarily brought suspicion on her claims—as this genealogy was incorrect, she persisted in the advancement of her claims to sovereignty. Thus metaphysics necessarily fell back into the antiquated and rotten constitution of dogmatism, and again became obnoxious to the contempt from which efforts had been made to save it. At present, as all methods, according to the general persuasion, have been tried in vain, there reigns nought but weariness and complete indifferentism—the mother of chaos and night in the scientific world, but at the same time the source of, or at least the prelude to, the re-creation and reinstallation of a science, when it has fallen into confusion, obscurity, and disuse from ill directed effort. I do not mean by this a criticism of books and systems, but a critical inquiry into the faculty of reason, with reference to the cognitions to which it strives to attain without the aid of experience; in other words, the solution of the question regarding the possibility or impossibility of metaphysics, and the determination of the origin, as well as of the extent and limits of this science. All this must be done on the basis of principles. ABOUT AUTHOR: That all our knowledge begins with experience there can be no doubt. For how is it possible that the faculty of cognition should be awakened into exercise otherwise than by means of objects which affect our senses, and partly of themselves produce representations, partly rouse our powers of understanding into activity, to compare to connect, or to separate these, and so to convert the raw material of our sensuous impressions into a knowledge of objects, which is called experience? In respect of time, therefore, no knowledge of ours is antecedent to experience, but begins with it. But, though all our knowledge begins with experience, it by no means follows that all arises out of experience. For, on the contrary, it is quite possible that our empirical knowledge is a compound of that which we receive through impressions, and that which the faculty of cognition supplies from itself (sensuous impressions giving merely the occasion), an addition which we cannot distinguish from the original element given by sense, till long practice has made us attentive to, and skilful in separating it. It is, therefore, a question which requires close investigation, and not to b

"A megsemmisülés rejtélyes sz?vege egyszerre filozófiai traktátus, misztikus beavatás és poszthumán próza. A kortárs irodalomban egyre inkább feler?s?dik ez a nem-antropocentrikus hang, mely nem emberi sorsokat akar elbeszélni, hanem a nyelv és az ember k?z?s hiányt?rténetére mutat rá. ?Mennyien kapaszkodtak a létbe, mint egy végtelen fa t?rzsébe” - írja Horváth Márk és Lovász ?dám, hiszen az emberi állapot csak a társadalmi, nyelvi és metafizikai katasztrófa terében értelmezhet?. Apokaliptikus (neo)romantika és abszurd k?ltészet. Az utolsó ember kézik?nyve a túlélés lehetetlenségér?l."Nemes Z. Márió Az Idegenre hárult a sors ajándéka, hogy els?ként az utolsó emberek k?zu?l végignézze minden ku?ls?dleges k?telék pusztulását, és bizalmát lelkébe, s?t a lelkén is túlra helyezze, minden emberit maga m?g?tt hagyva. Minden ház gerendái k?z?tt barátságok és szerelmek jól táplált holttestei indultak oszlásnak, míg csak a csont fehérlett ki a vízb?l. Mint rég elhagyott kik?t?k tornyai, olyan hívogatóak voltak ezek a csontok az új kor embere számára.

N

DAVID HUME (1711 – 1776) was a Scottish philosopher, historian, economist, and essayist known especially for his philosophical empiricism and skepticism. He was one of the most important figures in the history of Western philosophy and the Scottish Enlightenment. Hume is often grouped with John Locke, George Berkeley, and a handful of others as a British Empiricist. Beginning with his A Treatise of Human Nature (1739), Hume strove to create a total naturalistic "science of man" that examined the psychological basis of human nature. In stark opposition to the rationalists who preceded him, most notably Descartes, he concluded that desire rather than reason governed human behaviour, saying: "REASON IS, and OUGHT ONLY to BE the SLAVE of the PASSIONS". A prominent figure in the sceptical philosophical tradition and a strong empiricist, he argued against the existence of innate ideas, concluding instead that humans have knowledge only of things they directly experience.. NOTHING is more usual and more natural for those, who pretend to discover anything new to the world in philosophy and the sciences, than to insinuate the praises of their own systems, by decrying all those, which have been advanced before them. And indeed were they content with lamenting that ignorance, which we still lie under in the most important questions, that can come before the tribunal of human reason, there are few, who have an acquaintance with the sciences, that would not readily agree with them. It is easy for one of judgment and learning, to perceive the weak foundation even of those systems, which have obtained the greatest credit, and have carried their pretensions highest to accurate and profound reasoning. Principles taken upon trust, consequences lamely deduced from them, want of coherence in the parts, and of evidence in the whole, these are every where to be met with in the systems of the most eminent philosophers, and seem to have drawn disgrace upon philosophy itself. Nor is there required such profound knowledge to discover the present imperfect condition of the sciences, but even the rabble without doors may, judge from the noise and clamour, which they hear, that all goes not well within. There is nothing which is not the subject of debate, and in which men of learning are not of contrary opinions. The most trivial question escapes not our controversy, and in the most momentous we are not able to give any certain decision. Disputes are multiplied, as if every thing was uncertain; and these disputes are managed with the greatest warmth, as if every thing was certain. Amidst all this bustle it is not reason, which carries the prize, but eloquence; and no man needs ever despair of gaining proselytes to the most extravagant hypothesis, who has art enough to represent it in any favourable colours. The victory is not gained by the men at arms, who manage the pike and the sword; but by the trumpeters, drummers, and musicians of the army. From hence in my opinion arises that common prejudice against metaphysical reasonings of all kinds, even amongst those, who profess themselves scholars, and have a just value for every other part of literature. By metaphysical reasonings, they do not understand those on any particular branch of science, but every kind of argument, which is any way abstruse, and requires some attention to be comprehended. We have so often lost our labour in such researches, that we commonly reject them without hesitation, and resolve, if we must for ever be a prey to errors and delusions, that they shall at least be natural and entertaining. And indeed nothing but the most determined scepticism, along with a great degree of indolence, can justify this aversion to metaphysics. For if truth be at all within the reach of human capacity, it is certain it must lie very deep and abstruse: and to hope we shall arrive at it without pains, while the greatest geniuses have failed with the utmost pains..

"Wilde è profetico sin dalle prima righe, quando denuncia la prevalenza dell’emozione sulla razionalità, male principe del nostro tempo, e poi del pietismo sull’emancipazione, male di tanta politica di pseudo sinistra" (dall'Introduzione di Alfredo Sgarlato). Wilde: ?perché la vita raggiunga la sua più elevata perfezione, ci vuole qualche cosa di più. Ciò che ci vuole è l'individualismo?, ?Utopia? Una carta geografica del mondo in cui non sia segnato il paese dell'Utopia, non varrebbe la pena d'essere guardata, perché vi mancherebbe il paese in cui l'Umanità atterra ogni giorno. Ma non appena v'è sbarcata, ella guarda più lontano, scorge una terra ancora più bella, e spiega di nuovo le vele. Progredire significa realizzare l'Utopia?. SOMMARIO: Introduzione (di Alfredo Sgarlato) - Postfazione. Breve biblio-nota ai testi e alla traduzione (di Fabrizio Pinna) - OSCAR WILDE Società e libertà: elogio dell'individualismo - APPENDICE I Oscar Wilde, Rapporti fra il socialismo e l'individualismo (di Luigi Fabbri, 1913) - APPENDICE II The Soul of Man under Socialism (1891). LA COLLANA IN/DEFINIZIONI

The present publication is intended to supply a recognised deficiency in our literature—a library edition of the Essays of Montaigne. This great French writer deserves to be regarded as a classic, not only in the land of his birth, but in all countries and in all literatures. His Essays, which are at once the most celebrated and the most permanent of his productions, form a magazine out of which such minds as those of Bacon and Shakespeare did not disdain to help themselves; and, indeed, as Hallam observes, the Frenchman's literary importance largely results from the share which his mind had in influencing other minds, coeval and subsequent. But, at the same time, estimating the value and rank of the essayist, we are not to leave out of the account the drawbacks and the circumstances of the period: the imperfect state of education, the comparative scarcity of books, and the limited opportunities of intellectual intercourse. Montaigne freely borrowed of others, and he has found men willing to borrow of him as freely. We need not wonder at the reputation which he with seeming facility achieved. He was, without being aware of it, the leader of a new school in letters and morals. His book was different from all others which were at that date in the world. It diverted the ancient currents of thought into new channels. It told its readers, with unexampled frankness, what its writer's opinion was about men and things, and threw what must have been a strange kind of new light on many matters but darkly understood. Above all, the essayist uncased himself, and made his intellectual and physical organism public property. He took the world into his confidence on all subjects. His essays were a sort of literary anatomy, where we get a diagnosis of the writer's mind, made by himself at different levels and under a large variety of operating influences. Of all egotists, Montaigne, if not the greatest, was the most fascinating, because, perhaps, he was the least affected and most truthful. What he did, and what he had professed to do, was to dissect his mind, and show us, as best he could, how it was made, and what relation it bore to external objects. He investigated his mental structure as a schoolboy pulls his watch to pieces, to examine the mechanism of the works; and the result, accompanied by illustrations abounding with originality and force, he delivered to his fellow-men in a book. W. C. H. KENSINGTON, November 1877. THE LIFE OF MONTAIGNE The author of the Essays was born, as he informs us himself, between eleven and twelve o'clock in the day, the last of February 1533, at the chateau of St. Michel de Montaigne. His father, Pierre Eyquem, esquire, was successively first Jurat of the town of Bordeaux (1530), Under-Mayor 1536, Jurat for the second time in 1540, Procureur in 1546, and at length Mayor from 1553 to 1556. He was a man of austere probity, who had "a particular regard for honour and for propriety in his person and attire . . . a mighty good faith in his speech, and a conscience and a religious feeling inclining to superstition, rather than to the other extreme. Between 1556 and 1563 an important incident occurred in the life of Montaigne, in the commencement of his romantic friendship with Etienne de la Boetie, whom he had met, as he tells us, by pure chance at some festive celebration in the town. From their very first interview the two found themselves drawn irresistibly close to one another, and during six years this alliance was foremost in the heart of Montaigne, as it was afterwards in his memory, when death had severed it.

本卷比较系统地分析和研究了从1976年粉碎“四人帮”、结束十年“文化大革命”，到1992年初邓小平发表南方谈话期间，以邓小平为核心的党的第二代中央领导集体，在领导当代中国的改革放和社会主义现代化建设实践中，拨乱反正，解放思想，把马克思主义基本原理与中国实际和时代特征相结合，围绕建设和发展中国特色社会主义这一主题，创中国特色社会主义道路，不断实现马克思主义中国化的历史程；论述了在不断总结实践经验的基础上形成的马克思主义中国化的理论成果——邓小平理论的主要内容和历史地位；分析了这一时期马克思主义中国化的基本经验。

1949年10月至1976年10月，是马克思主义中国化历史程中承前启后的重要时期。1956年社会主义改造基本完成，中国从新民主主义社会社会主义初级阶段，成功实现了中国历*深刻*伟大的社会变革。中国共产党沿着马克思主义基本原理与中国实际“第二次结合”这条主线，围绕“什么是社会主义，怎样建设社会主义”这一时代主题，始了全新的探索历程，其中，既有凯歌行的峥嵘岁月，也有挫折失误的曲折历程，取得了独创性理论成果和巨大成就，为当代中国一切发展步奠定了根本政治前提和制度基础，为新的历史时期创中国特色社会主义提供了宝贵经验、理论准备、物质基础。本书全面阐述了这一时期中国共产党人探索中国社会主义革命和建设道路的曲折历程与经验教训，系统展示了以*为核心的党的*代中央领导集体探索中国社会主义道路、马克思主义基本原理与中国实际“第二次结合”程中的理论成果。

《禅宗与道家》全书分为两编。上编为“禅宗与佛学”，对佛教产生的历史背景，大小乘佛教的基本教义，禅宗的传承，奠定后世禅宗思想基础的六祖惠能的事迹，禅宗的语录、公案、机锋和棒喝，参禅的方法，禅学与理学的关系，禅宗对唐诗、宋词、元曲、明清小说的影响，以及闻名遐迩的丛林制度等，作了精湛的论述。下编为“道家与道教”，对隐士和方士的由来，养神、服气、饵药、祀祷的派分，老庄之学，齐燕之风，阴阳五行，神仙丹道，道教的形成与演化，以及道家与道教对古代天文、历算、地理（堪舆）、物理、化学、医药等自然科学的贡献等，作了深有见地的剖析。

王国宝主编的《大爱妈祖（妈祖信仰在宁波）》是一本专题介绍宁波地区及其周边妈祖神迹的书籍，字里行间饱含妈祖大爱，从头至尾诠释宁波内涵，既有别于学术论著，又具有史料价值，信息量大，可读性强，出版后可谓惟贤惟德，益人益智。

　　本书分为五章，对古代印度的社会与宗教；佛教创始人释迦牟尼的生平事迹；汉代至清代佛教的兴衰变迁；二十世纪中国佛教的现状与思考；以及亚洲和欧美各国的佛教概况等，作了简明扼要的叙述。书末所附的《禅宗丛林制度与中国社会》，是了解佛教丛林制度的宝贵资料。

《儒学小史》是北大哲学系教授干春松面向大众读者普及儒学发展历程的令人倍感亲切的一部小书。此书以历时性结构组织全书章节，全面梳理儒学从先秦时期直至现代的发展历史。作者从儒家学派的特始着手，探讨分析不同时期“儒”的定位，在下来的每一章节内均概括提炼出不同历史时期儒学发展的几个关键问题与角度展论述，如先秦儒学中“仁”和“礼”的精神、孟子与荀子的学说，汉代儒学发展的关键人物董仲舒、魏晋玄学与儒学的关系、宋明理学、清代汉学与宋学等，并以较大篇幅着重对现代新儒学之概念、儒学发展的新方向以及新儒学谱系行了阐释。全书结构简洁，脉络清晰，不仅全方位地描述了儒家思想的内涵，勾勒出一幅儒学生发、演变的历史全景，更体现了作者对儒学分期的独特思考与对儒学使命的殷切关注。

本套装所收录书目，都与“生命的认知”有关。修行、参禅、养生这些主题，经过个体实践，终都要归结到对个体生命的认知中去。这也是南怀瑾先生一生中一直关注、参研的主题。他以过来人的经验，将自己亲身体认所凝结的智慧贡献于读者，期望对世人有所帮助。

《一切特立独行的人都意味着强大》是一部诺贝尔文学奖得主、法国著名作家加缪关于人生哲学的散文集。 《一切特立独行的人都意味着强大》一书涵盖了加缪整个创作过程中具有重要意义的作品，作者创作这些作品都是取材于周围的生活与人物，从细微之处着手，以日常生活为出发讲述出人生的哲理。 《一切特立独行的人都意味着强大》一书风格多变，情感丰富，有愉悦温馨，也有沉重忧郁，有优美绝伦，也有凄凉悲怆，大悲大喜在书中尽情泼洒，使读者在阅读过程中能够感受到作者真挚、热烈、浓郁的情感。 《一切特立独行的人都意味着强大》一书可以比作是一本心情日记，它详细记录了作者心中的阴晴冷暖，酸甜苦辣，书中的主旨是生活，通过对自然风光的描写，让人对身边的人和事处处充满了热爱，让人们在这个喧闹、繁杂的世界中感受到自然的美好和生活的美妙，享受着生活的乐趣，使人对未来有一个美好的向往。

本书是梁启超先生治清学史的代表著作。作者以时代为经，把有清一代学术思潮之流转分为启蒙期（生）、全盛期（住）、蜕分期（异）、衰落期（灭）四个时期，备述其要；又以人物为纬，对清代各时期的重要学派和代表人物的学术成就、学术观、主要著述、师承关系等提纲挈领、择要发挥，堪为了解清代学术思想的门经典。

《老子》《庄子》是道家学术思想的源头和代表作，二者对普通读者来说，也常有一种难以言说的神秘和难解之感。南怀瑾先生讲《老》《庄》，不斤斤于个别语译，游乎经史子集之中，不论出世入世，评比精义，更以禅宗的方式，随说随破，提示其出入禅道的旨意，可以说是与《老》《庄》气质接近的讲解。