De numele lui Sigmund Freud (1856-1929) se leag? poate cea mai controversat? teorie din filosofia culturii ultimelor secole: psihanaliza. ?nceput? ca ?ntreprindere psihoterapeutic?, prima cur? – din punct de vedere istoric – ?n care rolul terapeutic revenea exclusiv cuv?ntului, psihanaliza a fost condus? de Freud ?n mod firesc ?i ?n direc?ia descoperirii resorturilor abisale ale culturii.Disconfort ?n cultur? (1930) este o lucrare de maturitate ?n care p?rintele psihanalizei investigheaz? mecanismele care men?in coeziunea social?, respectiv contraponderea lor, manifestat? prin senza?ia de disconfort care ?nso?e?te mai mult sau mai pu?in evident fiin?a social?.?Supraeul unui epoci culturale are o origine asem?n?toare cu a celui individual; se sprijin? pe impresia pe care au l?sat-o mari personalit??i conduc?toare, oameni de o for?? spiritual? cople?itoare sau cei la care una dintre tendin?ele umane a g?sit configura?ia cea mai puternic? ?i mai pur?, de aceea adesea ?i cea mai unilateral?.“ - Sigmund Freud

O analiz? aplicat? a operei unuia dintre cei mai controversa?i g?nditori germani, supranumit monahul de la Sils-Maria; o lectur? ?n filigran a modului nietzschean de abordare a c?torva concepte dificile, interpretate la modul catastrofic: supraomul, ve?nica ?ntoarcere a aceluia?i, anti-Christul. Lucrarea se situeaz? ?n buna ?i prestigioas? tradi?ie a marilor creatori care comenteaz? textele fundamentale ale omenirii dintr-un unghi specific.

Nietzsche este, poate, cea mai ilustr? victim? a aventurii socratice a cunoa?terii de sine. Via?a nu posed? fenomene originale, ci numai unele repetitive, care prin reluarea lor ve?nic identic? ??i tocesc conturul lor original. Cadrul repeti?iei nu este via?a, c?ci via?a ?ns??i este un fenomen de repeti?ie. Omul este condamnat s? tr?iasc? ?ntr-un plictisitor ?ir de repeti?ii ?i relu?ri din care nu poate evada. Nu exist? fenomene absolut unice, care s? nu fie repetitive ?i, probabil, la fel este ?i cu oamenii. To?i au mai fost nu o dat?, ci de nenum?rate ori ?n trecut ?i vor mai fi de nenum?rate ori ?n viitor. Tot ce trebuia ?i putea s? se produc? s-a produs deja. Restul este doar monoton? repeti?ie: ve?nic? revenire a aceluia?i. Eterna ?ntoarcere exprim? nu devenirea heraclitean? f?r? repaos, ci marile linii de stabilitate din cadrul existen?ei. Prin ea, Nietzsche vrea s? eternizeze trec?torul, socotind timpul ca etern, etern? ?ntoarcere, adic? schimbare ?i stabilitate. Ecce homo este ?i exerci?iul acestui impas al g?ndirii lui Nietzsche. Prin aceasta ?ns? Nietzsche ?i-a adus contribu?ia la instaurarea unui nou ?idol“ al lumii moderne dup? ce aceasta a denun?at prezen?a ?idolilor“ de tot felul ?n spa?iul ei de con?tiin??. (Vasile Musc?)??ntruc?t, ?n scurt timp, va trebui s? m? adresez omenirii cu cea mai grea solicitare care i-a fost prezentat? vreodat?, mi se pare imperios necesar s? spun cine sunt. ?n principiu, ar trebui s? se ?tie: c?ci nu m-am l?sat ?neatestat?. Dar discrepan?a dintre m?re?ia misiunii mele ?i micimea contemporanilor mei ?i-a g?sit expresia ?n faptul c? nici nu am fost auzit, nici nu am fost v?zut. Tr?iesc pe propriul meu credit, s? fie poate o simpl? prejudecat? faptul c? tr?iesc?... Este de ajuns s? stau de vorb? cu vreun ?om cultivat?, care vine vara ?n Engadina de Sus, ca s? m? conving c? nu tr?iesc... ?n aceste ?mprejur?ri, este o ?ndatorire ?mpotriva c?reia obi?nuin?a mea ?i, mai mult chiar dec?t aceasta, m?ndria instinctelor mele, se revolt?, anume aceea de a spune: Auzi?i-m?! c?ci eu sunt cutare ?i cutare. ?nainte de toate, nu cumva s? m? confunda?i!“ (Friedrich Nietzsche)

n Filosofia meritului autorul folosete metoda fenomenologic pentru a prezenta evoluia instituiilor socio-morale care reglementeaz meritele; autorul propune n acest scop concepte originale, cum sunt ideonomia (sistemul de idei care fundamenteaz teoretic un sistem de apreciere a meritului); socionomia (sistemul de reguli care legitimeaz social un merit specific unei comuniti) i politonomia (sistemul de norme prin care se instituionalizeaz juridic meritul politic).Tratatul de Filosofie a meritului este structurat n trei pri corespunztor celor trei domenii existeniale n care se manifest fiina uman, spiritual, social, politic. Lucrarea prezint n extenso criteriile, principiile i formele de manifestare a meritului, premisele constituirii sistemelor sociale de apreciere a meritului, natura bio-psihic i socio-moral a meritelor precum i caracterul normativ al meritelor politico-juridice. Prima parte abordeaz sfera meritele cu caracter antropologic, antroponomic i antropocratic. Partea a doua prezint n extenso meritele cu caracter sociologic, socionomic i sociocratic i partea a treia analizeaz formele de manifestare a meritului din perspectiva politologiei, a politonomiei i a politocraiei. n fiecare capitol se regsesc argumente logice, etimologice i sociologice care justific aprecierea unor atribute i caliti umane ca merite individuale. Fiecare din cele douzeciiapte de capitole explic un tip de merit din tripl perspectiv: ideal social i politic.

Tr?s?turi fundamentale ale unei concep?ii moderne despre lume?Cum se comport? filosofia c? art? fa?? de libertatea omului, ce este aceast? libertate, ?i dac? am ajuns s? ne ?mp?rt??im din ea, sau putem ajunge la acest lucru: iat? problema fundamental? a scrierii mele. Toate celelalte expuneri ?tiin?ifice au fost f?cute numai pentru ca, ?n cele din urm?, s? arunc?m ?i mai mult? lumin? asupra unei probleme care, dup? p?rerea mea, prezint? cea mai mare importan?? pentru om. ?n aceste pagini vrem s? d?m o filosofie a libert??ii.“ – Rudolf Steiner

F?r? a propune o terminologie aristotelic? bine precizat? pe teritoriul limbii rom?ne, transpunerea de fa?? reprezint? un moment important ?n raportarea rom?neasc? la opera Stagiritului.Traducere de ?tefan Bezdechi efectuat? dup? textul grec publicat de W. Christ ?n colec?ia ?Teubner“, Lipsca, 1906. Pentru realizarea ei au fost utilizate urm?toarele surse:Die Metaphysik des Aristoteles, traducere ?n limba german? de J. R. V. Kirchmann, ap?rut? ?n dou? volume ?i prev?zut? cu note ample ?n colec?ia ?Philosophische Bibliothek“, numerele 38 ?i 39, la Berlin, ?n 1871;Aristoteles, Metaphysik, traducere ?n limba german? de Adolf Lasson, ?n care cele patrusprezece c?r?i ale Metafizicii sunt a?ezate ?ntr-o r?nduial? mai logic? dec?t a?a cum au fost transmise ?n originalul grec, traducere ap?rut? ?n 1924, la Jena;Aristote, Métaphysique, traducere ?n limba francez? de J. Tricot, cu o prefa?? de A. Diés, ap?rut? ?n colec?ia ?Bibliothèque des textes philosophiques“, J. Vrin, la Paris, ?n 1933.La marginea textului a fost trecut? pagina?ia edi?iei Bekker, dup? care se fac ?n mod obi?nuit cita?iile din opera lui Aristotel.Confruntarea traducerii a fost f?cut? de prof. Aram M. Frenkian.

Volumul cuprinde dou? din cele mai reprezentative lucr?ri ?n care filosoful german ??i expune concep?ia moral?: ?ntemeierea metafizicii moravurilor (1785) ?i Critica ra?iunii practice (1788). ?n ?ntemeierea metafizicii moravurilor Immanuel Kant expune principiile moralit??ii, iar ?n Critica ra?iunii practice ??i construie?te propriul s?u sistem etic, ceea ce face ca aceasta s? fie considerat?, dup? Critica ra?iunii pure, a doua sa oper? fundamental?.?ntre cele dou? lucr?ri este o at?t de str?ns? leg?tur?, ?nc?t cunoa?terea numai a uneia din ele ne-ar oferi o imagine incomplet? asupra concep?iei sale morale.Immanuel Kant a avansat idei etice ?i ?n alte opere ulterioare (Religia ?n limitele ra?iunii – 1793 sau Metafizica moravurilor – 1797), dar numai ?n cele reunite ?n acest volum se ocup? de problemele teoretice ale moralit??ii.Traducerea a fost f?cut? dup? edi?ia german? din 1956 (Leipzig, Hrsg. Von Raymund Schimidt).

Critica ra?iunii pure, tradus? de Nicolae Bagdasar ?i Elena Moisuc ?n 1969, a ajuns la cea de-a treia edi?ie. Cu acest prilej, profesorul dr. Ilie P?rvu, de la Facultatea de Filosofie a Universit??ii din Bucure?ti a ?ngrijit noua opera?ie de editare, fiind astfel corectate unele erori de tipar ?i unele inconsecven?e terminologice. Totodat?, exist? un motiv ?n plus pentru ca studen?ii care posed? edi?ia a II-a a traducerii, ap?rut? ?n 1995, s? apeleze ?i la cea de-a treia edi?ie: ?n aceasta din urm? au fost indicate diferen?ele dintre edi?ia I german? (din 1781) ?i edi?ia a II-a (din 1787).

Volumul red? circuitului public, pentru prima oar? ?n limba rom?n?, trei din operele g?nditorului atenian. Este vorba de Scrisori (?n num?r de treisprezece, deosebit de importante pentru cunoa?terea g?ndirii platoniciene, dar ?i pentru ?n?elegerea epocii ?i a personalit??ilor cu care a venit ?n contact filosoful), Dialoguri suspecte (Minos, Rivalii, Theages, Hipparhos, Clitofon) ?i Dialoguri apocrife (Axiohos, Despre drept, Despre virtute, Demodocus, Sisyfos, Eryxias).Traducerea apara?ine lui ?tefan Bezdechi, care a realizat ?i aparatul critic al Scrisorilor (introducere ?i note).

A fi rom?n? ?E o ru?ine!“, exclama Cioran. ?n ce m?sur? filosoful de la Paris avea dreptate? Ce ?nseamn? ?a fi rom?n“ ?ntr-o fals? tranzi?ie care aparent nu se mai termin?? La aceste ?i multe alte ?ntreb?ri ?ncearc? s? r?spund? scriitorul Ionel Necula ?n opus-ul de fa??, care ?nsumeaz? analize ale r?sturn?rilor sociale evidente, ?nregistrate ?n ultimii ?aptesprezece ani. Nu ?ntotdeauna comod, spiritul coroziv al autorului ??i spune cuv?ntul, av?nd uneori accente incendiare.

"A megsemmisülés rejtélyes sz?vege egyszerre filozófiai traktátus, misztikus beavatás és poszthumán próza. A kortárs irodalomban egyre inkább feler?s?dik ez a nem-antropocentrikus hang, mely nem emberi sorsokat akar elbeszélni, hanem a nyelv és az ember k?z?s hiányt?rténetére mutat rá. ?Mennyien kapaszkodtak a létbe, mint egy végtelen fa t?rzsébe” - írja Horváth Márk és Lovász ?dám, hiszen az emberi állapot csak a társadalmi, nyelvi és metafizikai katasztrófa terében értelmezhet?. Apokaliptikus (neo)romantika és abszurd k?ltészet. Az utolsó ember kézik?nyve a túlélés lehetetlenségér?l."Nemes Z. Márió Az Idegenre hárult a sors ajándéka, hogy els?ként az utolsó emberek k?zu?l végignézze minden ku?ls?dleges k?telék pusztulását, és bizalmát lelkébe, s?t a lelkén is túlra helyezze, minden emberit maga m?g?tt hagyva. Minden ház gerendái k?z?tt barátságok és szerelmek jól táplált holttestei indultak oszlásnak, míg csak a csont fehérlett ki a vízb?l. Mint rég elhagyott kik?t?k tornyai, olyan hívogatóak voltak ezek a csontok az új kor embere számára.

Human reason, in one sphere of its cognition, is called upon to consider questions, which it cannot decline, as they are presented by its own nature, but which it cannot answer, as they transcend every faculty of the mind. It falls into this difficulty without any fault of its own. It begins with principles, which cannot be dispensed with in the field of experience, and the truth and sufficiency of which are, at the same time, insured by experience. With these principles it rises, in obedience to the laws of its own nature, to ever higher and more remote conditions. But it quickly discovers that, in this way, its labours must remain ever incomplete, because new questions never cease to present themselves; and thus it finds itself compelled to have recourse to principles which transcend the region of experience, while they are regarded by common sense without distrust. It thus falls into confusion and contradictions, from which it conjectures the presence of latent errors, which, however, it is unable to discover, because the principles it employs, transcending the limits of experience, cannot be tested by that criterion. The arena of these endless contests is called Metaphysic.Time was, when she was the queen of all the sciences; and, if we take the will for the deed, she certainly deserves, so far as regards the high importance of her object-matter, this title of honour. Now, it is the fashion of the time to heap contempt and scorn upon her; and the matron mourns, forlorn and forsaken, like Hecuba: At first, her gover Modo maxima rerum, Tot generis, natisque potens... Nunc trahor exul, inops. —Ovid, Metamorphoses. xiii under the administration of the dogmatists, was an absolute despotism. But, as the legislative continued to show traces of the ancient barbaric rule, her empire gradually broke up, and intestine wars introduced the reign of anarchy; while the sceptics, like nomadic tribes, who hate a permanent habitation and settled mode of living, attacked from time to time those who had organized themselves into civil communities. But their number was, very happily, small; and thus they could not entirely put a stop to the exertions of those who persisted in raising new edifices, although on no settled or uniform plan. In recent times the hope dawned upon us of seeing those disputes settled, and the legitimacy of her claims established by a kind of physiology of the human understanding—that of the celebrated Locke. But it was found that—although it was affirmed that this so-called queen could not refer her descent to any higher source than that of common experience, a circumstance which necessarily brought suspicion on her claims—as this genealogy was incorrect, she persisted in the advancement of her claims to sovereignty. Thus metaphysics necessarily fell back into the antiquated and rotten constitution of dogmatism, and again became obnoxious to the contempt from which efforts had been made to save it. At present, as all methods, according to the general persuasion, have been tried in vain, there reigns nought but weariness and complete indifferentism—the mother of chaos and night in the scientific world, but at the same time the source of, or at least the prelude to, the re-creation and reinstallation of a science, when it has fallen into confusion, obscurity, and disuse from ill directed effort. I do not mean by this a criticism of books and systems, but a critical inquiry into the faculty of reason, with reference to the cognitions to which it strives to attain without the aid of experience; in other words, the solution of the question regarding the possibility or impossibility of metaphysics, and the determination of the origin, as well as of the extent and limits of this science. All this must be done on the basis of principles. ABOUT AUTHOR: That all our knowledge begins with experience there can be no doubt. For how is it possible that the faculty of cognition should be awakened into exercise otherwise than by means of objects which affect our senses, and partly of themselves produce representations, partly rouse our powers of understanding into activity, to compare to connect, or to separate these, and so to convert the raw material of our sensuous impressions into a knowledge of objects, which is called experience? In respect of time, therefore, no knowledge of ours is antecedent to experience, but begins with it. But, though all our knowledge begins with experience, it by no means follows that all arises out of experience. For, on the contrary, it is quite possible that our empirical knowledge is a compound of that which we receive through impressions, and that which the faculty of cognition supplies from itself (sensuous impressions giving merely the occasion), an addition which we cannot distinguish from the original element given by sense, till long practice has made us attentive to, and skilful in separating it. It is, therefore, a question which requires close investigation, and not to b

The present publication is intended to supply a recognised deficiency in our literature—a library edition of the Essays of Montaigne. This great French writer deserves to be regarded as a classic, not only in the land of his birth, but in all countries and in all literatures. His Essays, which are at once the most celebrated and the most permanent of his productions, form a magazine out of which such minds as those of Bacon and Shakespeare did not disdain to help themselves; and, indeed, as Hallam observes, the Frenchman's literary importance largely results from the share which his mind had in influencing other minds, coeval and subsequent. But, at the same time, estimating the value and rank of the essayist, we are not to leave out of the account the drawbacks and the circumstances of the period: the imperfect state of education, the comparative scarcity of books, and the limited opportunities of intellectual intercourse. Montaigne freely borrowed of others, and he has found men willing to borrow of him as freely. We need not wonder at the reputation which he with seeming facility achieved. He was, without being aware of it, the leader of a new school in letters and morals. His book was different from all others which were at that date in the world. It diverted the ancient currents of thought into new channels. It told its readers, with unexampled frankness, what its writer's opinion was about men and things, and threw what must have been a strange kind of new light on many matters but darkly understood. Above all, the essayist uncased himself, and made his intellectual and physical organism public property. He took the world into his confidence on all subjects. His essays were a sort of literary anatomy, where we get a diagnosis of the writer's mind, made by himself at different levels and under a large variety of operating influences. Of all egotists, Montaigne, if not the greatest, was the most fascinating, because, perhaps, he was the least affected and most truthful. What he did, and what he had professed to do, was to dissect his mind, and show us, as best he could, how it was made, and what relation it bore to external objects. He investigated his mental structure as a schoolboy pulls his watch to pieces, to examine the mechanism of the works; and the result, accompanied by illustrations abounding with originality and force, he delivered to his fellow-men in a book. W. C. H. KENSINGTON, November 1877. THE LIFE OF MONTAIGNE The author of the Essays was born, as he informs us himself, between eleven and twelve o'clock in the day, the last of February 1533, at the chateau of St. Michel de Montaigne. His father, Pierre Eyquem, esquire, was successively first Jurat of the town of Bordeaux (1530), Under-Mayor 1536, Jurat for the second time in 1540, Procureur in 1546, and at length Mayor from 1553 to 1556. He was a man of austere probity, who had "a particular regard for honour and for propriety in his person and attire . . . a mighty good faith in his speech, and a conscience and a religious feeling inclining to superstition, rather than to the other extreme. Between 1556 and 1563 an important incident occurred in the life of Montaigne, in the commencement of his romantic friendship with Etienne de la Boetie, whom he had met, as he tells us, by pure chance at some festive celebration in the town. From their very first interview the two found themselves drawn irresistibly close to one another, and during six years this alliance was foremost in the heart of Montaigne, as it was afterwards in his memory, when death had severed it.

"Wilde è profetico sin dalle prima righe, quando denuncia la prevalenza dell’emozione sulla razionalità, male principe del nostro tempo, e poi del pietismo sull’emancipazione, male di tanta politica di pseudo sinistra" (dall'Introduzione di Alfredo Sgarlato). Wilde: ?perché la vita raggiunga la sua più elevata perfezione, ci vuole qualche cosa di più. Ciò che ci vuole è l'individualismo?, ?Utopia? Una carta geografica del mondo in cui non sia segnato il paese dell'Utopia, non varrebbe la pena d'essere guardata, perché vi mancherebbe il paese in cui l'Umanità atterra ogni giorno. Ma non appena v'è sbarcata, ella guarda più lontano, scorge una terra ancora più bella, e spiega di nuovo le vele. Progredire significa realizzare l'Utopia?. SOMMARIO: Introduzione (di Alfredo Sgarlato) - Postfazione. Breve biblio-nota ai testi e alla traduzione (di Fabrizio Pinna) - OSCAR WILDE Società e libertà: elogio dell'individualismo - APPENDICE I Oscar Wilde, Rapporti fra il socialismo e l'individualismo (di Luigi Fabbri, 1913) - APPENDICE II The Soul of Man under Socialism (1891). LA COLLANA IN/DEFINIZIONI

DAVID HUME (1711 – 1776) was a Scottish philosopher, historian, economist, and essayist known especially for his philosophical empiricism and skepticism. He was one of the most important figures in the history of Western philosophy and the Scottish Enlightenment. Hume is often grouped with John Locke, George Berkeley, and a handful of others as a British Empiricist. Beginning with his A Treatise of Human Nature (1739), Hume strove to create a total naturalistic "science of man" that examined the psychological basis of human nature. In stark opposition to the rationalists who preceded him, most notably Descartes, he concluded that desire rather than reason governed human behaviour, saying: "REASON IS, and OUGHT ONLY to BE the SLAVE of the PASSIONS". A prominent figure in the sceptical philosophical tradition and a strong empiricist, he argued against the existence of innate ideas, concluding instead that humans have knowledge only of things they directly experience.. NOTHING is more usual and more natural for those, who pretend to discover anything new to the world in philosophy and the sciences, than to insinuate the praises of their own systems, by decrying all those, which have been advanced before them. And indeed were they content with lamenting that ignorance, which we still lie under in the most important questions, that can come before the tribunal of human reason, there are few, who have an acquaintance with the sciences, that would not readily agree with them. It is easy for one of judgment and learning, to perceive the weak foundation even of those systems, which have obtained the greatest credit, and have carried their pretensions highest to accurate and profound reasoning. Principles taken upon trust, consequences lamely deduced from them, want of coherence in the parts, and of evidence in the whole, these are every where to be met with in the systems of the most eminent philosophers, and seem to have drawn disgrace upon philosophy itself. Nor is there required such profound knowledge to discover the present imperfect condition of the sciences, but even the rabble without doors may, judge from the noise and clamour, which they hear, that all goes not well within. There is nothing which is not the subject of debate, and in which men of learning are not of contrary opinions. The most trivial question escapes not our controversy, and in the most momentous we are not able to give any certain decision. Disputes are multiplied, as if every thing was uncertain; and these disputes are managed with the greatest warmth, as if every thing was certain. Amidst all this bustle it is not reason, which carries the prize, but eloquence; and no man needs ever despair of gaining proselytes to the most extravagant hypothesis, who has art enough to represent it in any favourable colours. The victory is not gained by the men at arms, who manage the pike and the sword; but by the trumpeters, drummers, and musicians of the army. From hence in my opinion arises that common prejudice against metaphysical reasonings of all kinds, even amongst those, who profess themselves scholars, and have a just value for every other part of literature. By metaphysical reasonings, they do not understand those on any particular branch of science, but every kind of argument, which is any way abstruse, and requires some attention to be comprehended. We have so often lost our labour in such researches, that we commonly reject them without hesitation, and resolve, if we must for ever be a prey to errors and delusions, that they shall at least be natural and entertaining. And indeed nothing but the most determined scepticism, along with a great degree of indolence, can justify this aversion to metaphysics. For if truth be at all within the reach of human capacity, it is certain it must lie very deep and abstruse: and to hope we shall arrive at it without pains, while the greatest geniuses have failed with the utmost pains..

Ralph Waldo Emerson, was born at Boston in 1803 into a distinguished family of New England Unitarian ministers. His was the eighth generation to enter the ministry in a dynasty that reached back to the earliest days of Puritan America. Despite the death of his father when Emerson was only eleven, he was able to be educated at Boston Latin School and then Harvard, from which he graduated in 1821. After several years of reluctant school teaching, he returned to the Harvard Divinity School, entering the Unitarian ministry during a period of robust ecclesiastic debate. By 1829 Emerson was married and well on his way to a promising career in the church through his appointment to an important congregation in Boston. However, his career in the ministry did not last long. Following the death of his first wife, Ellen, his private religious doubts led him to announce his resignation to his congregation, claiming he was unable to preach a doctrine he no longer believed and that "to be a good minister it was necessary to leave the ministry."With the modest legacy left him from his first wife, Emerson was able to devote himself to study and travel. In Europe he met many of the important Romantic writers whose ideas on art, philosophy, and literature were transforming the writing of the Nineteenth Century. He also continued to explore his own ideas in a series of voluminous journals which he had kept from his earliest youth and from which virtually all of his literary creation would be generated. Taking up residence in Concord, Massachusetts, Emerson devoted himself to study, writing and a series of public lectures in the growing lyceum movement. From these lyceum addresses Emerson developed and then in 1836 published his most important work, Nature. Its publication also coincided with his organizing role in the Transcendental Club, a group of leading New England educators, clergy, and intellectuals interested in idealistic religion, philosophy, and literature.

Cartea de fa??, pe care cititorul o ?ine acum ?n m?n?, reprezint? o form? – literar vorbind, foarte complex?, fiindc? ea evolueaz? pe mai multe voci narative, dintre care doar unele ?i apar?in ?n mod direct autoarei – de exorcism. Geniul inimii e r?spunsul unui poet la o experien?? personal? plenitudinar?, ?n care bucuria ?i suferin?a se ?ntrep?trund reciproc pentru a exprima, ?mpreun? ?i tensionat, starea de gra?ie. Exist? o voce a experien?ei biografice ?n aceast? carte scris? febril, o alta de martor sau de participant la istorie, tot a?a cum exist? o voce a puterii ?i una a victimei. Deasupra tuturor st?, ?ns?, nu neap?rat triumf?toare, dar lucid-cerebral?, chemarea celor dou? credin?e pentru care merit? s? tr?ie?ti ?i s?-?i rememorezi via?a atunci c?nd ai ajuns cu ea la r?sp?ntie: credin?a ?n cultura modelelor care te-au precedat ?i credin?a deloc ingenu?, ci ivit? din cunoa?tere, ?n sacralitatea profund? a celor tr?ite ?i ?n transcenden??. (?tefan Borbély) A considera un text drept ?carte a ilumin?rilor mele“ ?i a a?eza ca titlu al primei p?r?i a volumului sintagma Povestea subteranei ne plaseaz? sub semnul aproape imposibil al drumului c?tre Sine, al cuprinderii, al denud?rii ?i al efortului de a ?n?elege un obiect al c?rui adev?r se va afla ?ntotdeauna ?n proximitatea pe?terii lui Platon. E un demers perpetuat, dar niciodat? epuizat ?i aproape exclus din plasma comunic?rii, care – ?n situa?ia ?romanului“ Aurei Christi – nu are coresponden?e, nu se apropie de experien?a budhist?, nici de prerogativele ocultismului de New Age, ci ne aduce ?n vecin?tatea ?ndemnului de pe frontispiciul templului lui Apollo din Delphi, preluat apoi, ca solu?ie ?ntre a fi ?i a p?rea, de c?tre Socrate: ?Cunoa?te-te pe tine ?nsu?i!“. Po?i ?nt?lni, pe acest drum, ?i acel daimonion care a str?juit g?ndirea aceluia?i ?n?elept atenian ca alt? fa?? a ?subteranelor“ fiin?ei, acolo unde lumina se ?ngem?neaz? cu ?ntunericul, stare ?poetizat?“ de Goethe, dar pr?bu?it? ?n tragic de Dostoievski. E o cobor?re spre ?n?elegere prin cuprindere ?i, implicit, prin atingerea nelimitatului. (Mircea Braga) Cartea Aurei Christi Geniul inimii pare o st?nc? masiv?, singuratic?, ?ntr-un peisaj ?mioritic“. Geniul inimii are originalitate ?i for??. Prima parte e liric?, a doua (?ntr-un fel) – o comedie negru-satiric?, a treia – predominant epic-narativ?. Prima parte este excelent?; mi-am ?nsemnat un num?r de poezii memorabile. A doua, ?n centrul ei mai ales, are sec?iuni, pasaje extrem de interesant-pl?cute-amuzante, ?n pofida tonului, uneori, foiletonistic. A treia e impresionant? ?n ansamblu, armonios-coerent?, de o sinceritate sf??ietoare. ?n tot volumul, istoricul, religiosul, subiectivul se leag? foarte frumos ?ntre ele. Nu-mi plac laudele la adresa lui Nietzsche! De fapt, cum se leag? acest autor de Biblie, de Evanghelii?! Aura Christi poate fi m?ndr? de o realizare major?, cu totul original?. Probabil, nu l-a citit pe romanticul britanic Wordsworth; dar el e cel care a scris (sau a ?nceput s? scrie) o memorabil? autobiografie ?n versuri. Pu?ini l-au continuat. Am putea spune c? Aura se num?r? printre cei pu?ini. (Virgil Nemoianu)

M. Lévy-Bruhl then explains that, whilst recognising the entire coherence of Comte’s collective labours, he proposes to confine his present study to the earlier and principal work, the Philosophy, which in M. Lévy-Bruhl’s opinion is the dominant and more fruitful composition.??This he regards as the representative work of the nineteenth century, as shown by the intellectual history of the period. He points to its influence on thought in England, in Europe, and in America. It will surprise many persons to learn that in M. Lévy-Bruhl’s opinion two eminent French writers, who assuredly neither were, nor were supposed to be, Positivists, “have done more for the diffusion of the ideas and method of Comte than Littré and all the other Positivists together.” ??These two are Taine and Renan, much as they differed from Comte’s actual scheme and doctrines. Renan indeed spoke of Comte as destined to prove one of the typical names of the century. The present writer remembers Renan saying to him with a most genial welcome, “I too am a believer in the religion of humanity.” ??Professor Lévy-Bruhl followed up his History of Modern Philosophy in France by a substantial work on the philosophy of Auguste Comte. It forms a volume of the Bibliothèque de Philosophie Contemporaine, which has already devoted four other works to the Positive Philosophy. It is as well to premise that this treatise dealt solely with the philosophy, not with the polity, or any part of the religious scheme of Comte. Professor Lévy-Bruhl writes as a student, but not as an adherent of Auguste Comte. His entire work is rather an exposition, not a refutation, or a criticism, or an advocacy of Comte’s philosophical system. But it may be said at once that no one abroad or at home, certainly neither Mill, nor Lewes, nor Spencer, nor Caird, has so truly grasped and assimilated Comte’s ideas as M. Lévy-Bruhl has done.??In his Introduction M. Lévy-Bruhl very clearly states the scope of his work, and his own general attitude. He traces the origin of Comte’s philosophy in the mental effervescence of the first generation of the present century towards a reorganisation of society, after the upheaval left by the Revolution and its consequences. He correctly states the relation of St. Simon to Comte as being that of an initial stimulus. ??The cardinal difference between Comte and all the socialists and founders of social and religious Utopias consisted in this, that Comte saw the necessity of a new system of philosophy as the indispensable preliminary to any reorganisation of society.

●从未有哪个时代像今天一样，科学让人类社会以肉眼可见的速度向前演化。这场两千多年的长程奔跑似乎来到了冲刺阶段，不断有人做出世界末日的预言，那么，科学*终带给我们的究竟是生存还是毁灭？科学研究的目的究竟是什么？科学能告诉我们*真理吗？ 带着这样的终极关怀，《人人都该懂的科学哲学》首先讲述了科学脱离哲学、独立成长的过程，然后以智慧设计论、弦理论、占星术、有神论、社会建构主义、女性主义等充满争议的问题为例，辨析了科学的定义、方法和目的，科学和社会的关系。伟大的科学哲学家亚里士多德、笛卡儿、休谟、培根、波普尔、库恩等纷纷出场，上演了一场绵亘数千年的*辩论。 面对未来的挑战，无论人类能否破解“公地悲剧”、实现星际殖民、活到长生不老，杰弗里·戈勒姆以科学哲学的视角安慰我们：“当生命终结，人类文化仍然存在，只不过是存在于过去。希望它永远存在就太过分了，无异于希望巴黎时时处处是春天。” ●《人人都该懂的科学哲学》属于湛庐文化重磅推出的“新核心素养”系列图书之一。本系列图书致力于推广通识阅读，扩展读者的阅读面，培养批判性思考的能力。其中涵盖了哲学、心理学、法律、艺术、物理学、生物科技等诸多人文科学和自然科学的知识，其中《人人都该懂的科学哲学》的内容涵盖了科学哲学的核心思想，让你一本书了解科学哲学的核心智慧。

The Prince (Italian: Il Principe) is a political treatise by the Italian diplomat, historian and political theorist Niccolò Machiavelli. From correspondence a version appears to have been distributed in 1513, using a Latin title, De Principatibus (About Principalities). But the printed version was not published until 1532, five years after Machiavelli's death. This was done with the permission of the Medici pope Clement VII, but "long before then, in fact since the first appearance of the Prince in manuscript, controversy had swirled about his writings" Although it was written as if it were a traditional work in the Mirror of Princes style, it is generally agreed that it was especially innovative, and not only because it was written in Italian rather than Latin. The Prince is sometimes claimed to be one of the first works of modern philosophy, in which the effective truth is taken to be more important than any abstract ideal. It was also in direct conflict with the dominant Catholic and scholastic doctrines of the time concerning how to consider politics and ethics. Although it is relatively short, the treatise is the most remembered of his works and the one most responsible for bringing "Machiavellian" into wide usage as a pejorative term. It also helped make "Old Nick" an English term for the devil, and even contributed to the modern negative connotations of the words "politics" and "politician" in western countries. In terms of subject matter it overlaps with the much longer Discourses on Livy, which was written a few years later. In its use of examples who were politically active Italians who perpetrated criminal deeds for politics, another lesser-known work by Machiavelli which The Prince has been compared to is the Life of Castruccio Castracani. The descriptions within The Prince have the general theme of accepting that ends of princes, such as glory, and indeed survival, can justify the use of immoral means to achieve those ends.

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