Volumul cuprinde dou? din cele mai reprezentative lucr?ri ?n care filosoful german ??i expune concep?ia moral?: ?ntemeierea metafizicii moravurilor (1785) ?i Critica ra?iunii practice (1788). ?n ?ntemeierea metafizicii moravurilor Immanuel Kant expune principiile moralit??ii, iar ?n Critica ra?iunii practice ??i construie?te propriul s?u sistem etic, ceea ce face ca aceasta s? fie considerat?, dup? Critica ra?iunii pure, a doua sa oper? fundamental?.?ntre cele dou? lucr?ri este o at?t de str?ns? leg?tur?, ?nc?t cunoa?terea numai a uneia din ele ne-ar oferi o imagine incomplet? asupra concep?iei sale morale.Immanuel Kant a avansat idei etice ?i ?n alte opere ulterioare (Religia ?n limitele ra?iunii – 1793 sau Metafizica moravurilor – 1797), dar numai ?n cele reunite ?n acest volum se ocup? de problemele teoretice ale moralit??ii.Traducerea a fost f?cut? dup? edi?ia german? din 1956 (Leipzig, Hrsg. Von Raymund Schimidt).

Cartea de fa??, pe care cititorul o ?ine acum ?n m?n?, reprezint? o form? – literar vorbind, foarte complex?, fiindc? ea evolueaz? pe mai multe voci narative, dintre care doar unele ?i apar?in ?n mod direct autoarei – de exorcism. Geniul inimii e r?spunsul unui poet la o experien?? personal? plenitudinar?, ?n care bucuria ?i suferin?a se ?ntrep?trund reciproc pentru a exprima, ?mpreun? ?i tensionat, starea de gra?ie. Exist? o voce a experien?ei biografice ?n aceast? carte scris? febril, o alta de martor sau de participant la istorie, tot a?a cum exist? o voce a puterii ?i una a victimei. Deasupra tuturor st?, ?ns?, nu neap?rat triumf?toare, dar lucid-cerebral?, chemarea celor dou? credin?e pentru care merit? s? tr?ie?ti ?i s?-?i rememorezi via?a atunci c?nd ai ajuns cu ea la r?sp?ntie: credin?a ?n cultura modelelor care te-au precedat ?i credin?a deloc ingenu?, ci ivit? din cunoa?tere, ?n sacralitatea profund? a celor tr?ite ?i ?n transcenden??. (?tefan Borbély) A considera un text drept ?carte a ilumin?rilor mele“ ?i a a?eza ca titlu al primei p?r?i a volumului sintagma Povestea subteranei ne plaseaz? sub semnul aproape imposibil al drumului c?tre Sine, al cuprinderii, al denud?rii ?i al efortului de a ?n?elege un obiect al c?rui adev?r se va afla ?ntotdeauna ?n proximitatea pe?terii lui Platon. E un demers perpetuat, dar niciodat? epuizat ?i aproape exclus din plasma comunic?rii, care – ?n situa?ia ?romanului“ Aurei Christi – nu are coresponden?e, nu se apropie de experien?a budhist?, nici de prerogativele ocultismului de New Age, ci ne aduce ?n vecin?tatea ?ndemnului de pe frontispiciul templului lui Apollo din Delphi, preluat apoi, ca solu?ie ?ntre a fi ?i a p?rea, de c?tre Socrate: ?Cunoa?te-te pe tine ?nsu?i!“. Po?i ?nt?lni, pe acest drum, ?i acel daimonion care a str?juit g?ndirea aceluia?i ?n?elept atenian ca alt? fa?? a ?subteranelor“ fiin?ei, acolo unde lumina se ?ngem?neaz? cu ?ntunericul, stare ?poetizat?“ de Goethe, dar pr?bu?it? ?n tragic de Dostoievski. E o cobor?re spre ?n?elegere prin cuprindere ?i, implicit, prin atingerea nelimitatului. (Mircea Braga) Cartea Aurei Christi Geniul inimii pare o st?nc? masiv?, singuratic?, ?ntr-un peisaj ?mioritic“. Geniul inimii are originalitate ?i for??. Prima parte e liric?, a doua (?ntr-un fel) – o comedie negru-satiric?, a treia – predominant epic-narativ?. Prima parte este excelent?; mi-am ?nsemnat un num?r de poezii memorabile. A doua, ?n centrul ei mai ales, are sec?iuni, pasaje extrem de interesant-pl?cute-amuzante, ?n pofida tonului, uneori, foiletonistic. A treia e impresionant? ?n ansamblu, armonios-coerent?, de o sinceritate sf??ietoare. ?n tot volumul, istoricul, religiosul, subiectivul se leag? foarte frumos ?ntre ele. Nu-mi plac laudele la adresa lui Nietzsche! De fapt, cum se leag? acest autor de Biblie, de Evanghelii?! Aura Christi poate fi m?ndr? de o realizare major?, cu totul original?. Probabil, nu l-a citit pe romanticul britanic Wordsworth; dar el e cel care a scris (sau a ?nceput s? scrie) o memorabil? autobiografie ?n versuri. Pu?ini l-au continuat. Am putea spune c? Aura se num?r? printre cei pu?ini. (Virgil Nemoianu)

Critica ra?iunii pure, tradus? de Nicolae Bagdasar ?i Elena Moisuc ?n 1969, a ajuns la cea de-a treia edi?ie. Cu acest prilej, profesorul dr. Ilie P?rvu, de la Facultatea de Filosofie a Universit??ii din Bucure?ti a ?ngrijit noua opera?ie de editare, fiind astfel corectate unele erori de tipar ?i unele inconsecven?e terminologice. Totodat?, exist? un motiv ?n plus pentru ca studen?ii care posed? edi?ia a II-a a traducerii, ap?rut? ?n 1995, s? apeleze ?i la cea de-a treia edi?ie: ?n aceasta din urm? au fost indicate diferen?ele dintre edi?ia I german? (din 1781) ?i edi?ia a II-a (din 1787).

A fi rom?n? ?E o ru?ine!“, exclama Cioran. ?n ce m?sur? filosoful de la Paris avea dreptate? Ce ?nseamn? ?a fi rom?n“ ?ntr-o fals? tranzi?ie care aparent nu se mai termin?? La aceste ?i multe alte ?ntreb?ri ?ncearc? s? r?spund? scriitorul Ionel Necula ?n opus-ul de fa??, care ?nsumeaz? analize ale r?sturn?rilor sociale evidente, ?nregistrate ?n ultimii ?aptesprezece ani. Nu ?ntotdeauna comod, spiritul coroziv al autorului ??i spune cuv?ntul, av?nd uneori accente incendiare.

"A megsemmisülés rejtélyes sz?vege egyszerre filozófiai traktátus, misztikus beavatás és poszthumán próza. A kortárs irodalomban egyre inkább feler?s?dik ez a nem-antropocentrikus hang, mely nem emberi sorsokat akar elbeszélni, hanem a nyelv és az ember k?z?s hiányt?rténetére mutat rá. ?Mennyien kapaszkodtak a létbe, mint egy végtelen fa t?rzsébe” - írja Horváth Márk és Lovász ?dám, hiszen az emberi állapot csak a társadalmi, nyelvi és metafizikai katasztrófa terében értelmezhet?. Apokaliptikus (neo)romantika és abszurd k?ltészet. Az utolsó ember kézik?nyve a túlélés lehetetlenségér?l."Nemes Z. Márió Az Idegenre hárult a sors ajándéka, hogy els?ként az utolsó emberek k?zu?l végignézze minden ku?ls?dleges k?telék pusztulását, és bizalmát lelkébe, s?t a lelkén is túlra helyezze, minden emberit maga m?g?tt hagyva. Minden ház gerendái k?z?tt barátságok és szerelmek jól táplált holttestei indultak oszlásnak, míg csak a csont fehérlett ki a vízb?l. Mint rég elhagyott kik?t?k tornyai, olyan hívogatóak voltak ezek a csontok az új kor embere számára.

The present publication is intended to supply a recognised deficiency in our literature—a library edition of the Essays of Montaigne. This great French writer deserves to be regarded as a classic, not only in the land of his birth, but in all countries and in all literatures. His Essays, which are at once the most celebrated and the most permanent of his productions, form a magazine out of which such minds as those of Bacon and Shakespeare did not disdain to help themselves; and, indeed, as Hallam observes, the Frenchman's literary importance largely results from the share which his mind had in influencing other minds, coeval and subsequent. But, at the same time, estimating the value and rank of the essayist, we are not to leave out of the account the drawbacks and the circumstances of the period: the imperfect state of education, the comparative scarcity of books, and the limited opportunities of intellectual intercourse. Montaigne freely borrowed of others, and he has found men willing to borrow of him as freely. We need not wonder at the reputation which he with seeming facility achieved. He was, without being aware of it, the leader of a new school in letters and morals. His book was different from all others which were at that date in the world. It diverted the ancient currents of thought into new channels. It told its readers, with unexampled frankness, what its writer's opinion was about men and things, and threw what must have been a strange kind of new light on many matters but darkly understood. Above all, the essayist uncased himself, and made his intellectual and physical organism public property. He took the world into his confidence on all subjects. His essays were a sort of literary anatomy, where we get a diagnosis of the writer's mind, made by himself at different levels and under a large variety of operating influences. Of all egotists, Montaigne, if not the greatest, was the most fascinating, because, perhaps, he was the least affected and most truthful. What he did, and what he had professed to do, was to dissect his mind, and show us, as best he could, how it was made, and what relation it bore to external objects. He investigated his mental structure as a schoolboy pulls his watch to pieces, to examine the mechanism of the works; and the result, accompanied by illustrations abounding with originality and force, he delivered to his fellow-men in a book. W. C. H. KENSINGTON, November 1877. THE LIFE OF MONTAIGNE The author of the Essays was born, as he informs us himself, between eleven and twelve o'clock in the day, the last of February 1533, at the chateau of St. Michel de Montaigne. His father, Pierre Eyquem, esquire, was successively first Jurat of the town of Bordeaux (1530), Under-Mayor 1536, Jurat for the second time in 1540, Procureur in 1546, and at length Mayor from 1553 to 1556. He was a man of austere probity, who had "a particular regard for honour and for propriety in his person and attire . . . a mighty good faith in his speech, and a conscience and a religious feeling inclining to superstition, rather than to the other extreme. Between 1556 and 1563 an important incident occurred in the life of Montaigne, in the commencement of his romantic friendship with Etienne de la Boetie, whom he had met, as he tells us, by pure chance at some festive celebration in the town. From their very first interview the two found themselves drawn irresistibly close to one another, and during six years this alliance was foremost in the heart of Montaigne, as it was afterwards in his memory, when death had severed it.

Human reason, in one sphere of its cognition, is called upon to consider questions, which it cannot decline, as they are presented by its own nature, but which it cannot answer, as they transcend every faculty of the mind. It falls into this difficulty without any fault of its own. It begins with principles, which cannot be dispensed with in the field of experience, and the truth and sufficiency of which are, at the same time, insured by experience. With these principles it rises, in obedience to the laws of its own nature, to ever higher and more remote conditions. But it quickly discovers that, in this way, its labours must remain ever incomplete, because new questions never cease to present themselves; and thus it finds itself compelled to have recourse to principles which transcend the region of experience, while they are regarded by common sense without distrust. It thus falls into confusion and contradictions, from which it conjectures the presence of latent errors, which, however, it is unable to discover, because the principles it employs, transcending the limits of experience, cannot be tested by that criterion. The arena of these endless contests is called Metaphysic.Time was, when she was the queen of all the sciences; and, if we take the will for the deed, she certainly deserves, so far as regards the high importance of her object-matter, this title of honour. Now, it is the fashion of the time to heap contempt and scorn upon her; and the matron mourns, forlorn and forsaken, like Hecuba: At first, her gover Modo maxima rerum, Tot generis, natisque potens... Nunc trahor exul, inops. —Ovid, Metamorphoses. xiii under the administration of the dogmatists, was an absolute despotism. But, as the legislative continued to show traces of the ancient barbaric rule, her empire gradually broke up, and intestine wars introduced the reign of anarchy; while the sceptics, like nomadic tribes, who hate a permanent habitation and settled mode of living, attacked from time to time those who had organized themselves into civil communities. But their number was, very happily, small; and thus they could not entirely put a stop to the exertions of those who persisted in raising new edifices, although on no settled or uniform plan. In recent times the hope dawned upon us of seeing those disputes settled, and the legitimacy of her claims established by a kind of physiology of the human understanding—that of the celebrated Locke. But it was found that—although it was affirmed that this so-called queen could not refer her descent to any higher source than that of common experience, a circumstance which necessarily brought suspicion on her claims—as this genealogy was incorrect, she persisted in the advancement of her claims to sovereignty. Thus metaphysics necessarily fell back into the antiquated and rotten constitution of dogmatism, and again became obnoxious to the contempt from which efforts had been made to save it. At present, as all methods, according to the general persuasion, have been tried in vain, there reigns nought but weariness and complete indifferentism—the mother of chaos and night in the scientific world, but at the same time the source of, or at least the prelude to, the re-creation and reinstallation of a science, when it has fallen into confusion, obscurity, and disuse from ill directed effort. I do not mean by this a criticism of books and systems, but a critical inquiry into the faculty of reason, with reference to the cognitions to which it strives to attain without the aid of experience; in other words, the solution of the question regarding the possibility or impossibility of metaphysics, and the determination of the origin, as well as of the extent and limits of this science. All this must be done on the basis of principles. ABOUT AUTHOR: That all our knowledge begins with experience there can be no doubt. For how is it possible that the faculty of cognition should be awakened into exercise otherwise than by means of objects which affect our senses, and partly of themselves produce representations, partly rouse our powers of understanding into activity, to compare to connect, or to separate these, and so to convert the raw material of our sensuous impressions into a knowledge of objects, which is called experience? In respect of time, therefore, no knowledge of ours is antecedent to experience, but begins with it. But, though all our knowledge begins with experience, it by no means follows that all arises out of experience. For, on the contrary, it is quite possible that our empirical knowledge is a compound of that which we receive through impressions, and that which the faculty of cognition supplies from itself (sensuous impressions giving merely the occasion), an addition which we cannot distinguish from the original element given by sense, till long practice has made us attentive to, and skilful in separating it. It is, therefore, a question which requires close investigation, and not to b

Ralph Waldo Emerson, was born at Boston in 1803 into a distinguished family of New England Unitarian ministers. His was the eighth generation to enter the ministry in a dynasty that reached back to the earliest days of Puritan America. Despite the death of his father when Emerson was only eleven, he was able to be educated at Boston Latin School and then Harvard, from which he graduated in 1821. After several years of reluctant school teaching, he returned to the Harvard Divinity School, entering the Unitarian ministry during a period of robust ecclesiastic debate. By 1829 Emerson was married and well on his way to a promising career in the church through his appointment to an important congregation in Boston. However, his career in the ministry did not last long. Following the death of his first wife, Ellen, his private religious doubts led him to announce his resignation to his congregation, claiming he was unable to preach a doctrine he no longer believed and that "to be a good minister it was necessary to leave the ministry."With the modest legacy left him from his first wife, Emerson was able to devote himself to study and travel. In Europe he met many of the important Romantic writers whose ideas on art, philosophy, and literature were transforming the writing of the Nineteenth Century. He also continued to explore his own ideas in a series of voluminous journals which he had kept from his earliest youth and from which virtually all of his literary creation would be generated. Taking up residence in Concord, Massachusetts, Emerson devoted himself to study, writing and a series of public lectures in the growing lyceum movement. From these lyceum addresses Emerson developed and then in 1836 published his most important work, Nature. Its publication also coincided with his organizing role in the Transcendental Club, a group of leading New England educators, clergy, and intellectuals interested in idealistic religion, philosophy, and literature.

O que somos?De onde viemos?!Para onde vamos? A que caminhos a vida nos leva? Essas e outras quest?es aflitivas e de todos os tempos nos s?o solucionadas por León Denis neste opúsculo. Filho da dor, Denis sabe, como você também, o quanto viver, muitas vezes é sofrer. E por isso apresenta, de modo t?o leve a solu??o espírita, racional, para o problema do existir. Mais do que um livro de Filosofia espírita, você tem em m?os palavras de consolo e estímulo para que cada trope?o do caminho seja compreendido e por assim dizer, aproveitado! Venha acompanhar-nos nesta viagem e descubra, em rápidos parágrafos os porquês de sua vida, da nossa vida, do planeta, do Universo.? Aos poucos, entenderemos com a lógica espírita como tudo esta em seu devido lugar.

Dignità o miseria della natura umana? ?C'è un principio supposto prevalere tra molti che è del tutto incompatibile con ogni virtù o senso morale [...] Questo principio è che ogni benevolenza è mera ipocrisia, l'amicizia un inganno, lo spirito pubblico una farsa, la fedeltà un trucco per procurare fiducia e confidenza; e mentre tutti noi, in fondo, perseguiamo solo il nostro interesse privato, indossiamo questi bei travestimenti in modo da abbassare le difese degli altri ed esporli maggiormente alle nostre astuzie e macchinazioni?... Le meditazioni senza tempo di uno dei più grandi filosofi europei. SOMMARIO: Introduzione e avvertenza ai testi / Nota bibliografica: una mappa degli studi (di Fabrizio Pinna) - David Hume: Dignità o miseria della natura umana? / L'Amore di Sé. APPENDICE: Of the Dignity or Meanness of Human Nature; Of Self-love; My Own Life & Letter from Adam Smith, LL. D. to William Strahan, Esq.; Of the Reason of Animals; Of the Immortality of the Soul; Of Superstition and Enthusiasm; Of some Verbal Disputes. LE COLLANE IN/DEFINIZIONI & CON(TRO)TESTI

DAVID HUME (1711 – 1776) was a Scottish philosopher, historian, economist, and essayist known especially for his philosophical empiricism and skepticism. He was one of the most important figures in the history of Western philosophy and the Scottish Enlightenment. Hume is often grouped with John Locke, George Berkeley, and a handful of others as a British Empiricist. Beginning with his A Treatise of Human Nature (1739), Hume strove to create a total naturalistic "science of man" that examined the psychological basis of human nature. In stark opposition to the rationalists who preceded him, most notably Descartes, he concluded that desire rather than reason governed human behaviour, saying: "REASON IS, and OUGHT ONLY to BE the SLAVE of the PASSIONS". A prominent figure in the sceptical philosophical tradition and a strong empiricist, he argued against the existence of innate ideas, concluding instead that humans have knowledge only of things they directly experience.. NOTHING is more usual and more natural for those, who pretend to discover anything new to the world in philosophy and the sciences, than to insinuate the praises of their own systems, by decrying all those, which have been advanced before them. And indeed were they content with lamenting that ignorance, which we still lie under in the most important questions, that can come before the tribunal of human reason, there are few, who have an acquaintance with the sciences, that would not readily agree with them. It is easy for one of judgment and learning, to perceive the weak foundation even of those systems, which have obtained the greatest credit, and have carried their pretensions highest to accurate and profound reasoning. Principles taken upon trust, consequences lamely deduced from them, want of coherence in the parts, and of evidence in the whole, these are every where to be met with in the systems of the most eminent philosophers, and seem to have drawn disgrace upon philosophy itself. Nor is there required such profound knowledge to discover the present imperfect condition of the sciences, but even the rabble without doors may, judge from the noise and clamour, which they hear, that all goes not well within. There is nothing which is not the subject of debate, and in which men of learning are not of contrary opinions. The most trivial question escapes not our controversy, and in the most momentous we are not able to give any certain decision. Disputes are multiplied, as if every thing was uncertain; and these disputes are managed with the greatest warmth, as if every thing was certain. Amidst all this bustle it is not reason, which carries the prize, but eloquence; and no man needs ever despair of gaining proselytes to the most extravagant hypothesis, who has art enough to represent it in any favourable colours. The victory is not gained by the men at arms, who manage the pike and the sword; but by the trumpeters, drummers, and musicians of the army. From hence in my opinion arises that common prejudice against metaphysical reasonings of all kinds, even amongst those, who profess themselves scholars, and have a just value for every other part of literature. By metaphysical reasonings, they do not understand those on any particular branch of science, but every kind of argument, which is any way abstruse, and requires some attention to be comprehended. We have so often lost our labour in such researches, that we commonly reject them without hesitation, and resolve, if we must for ever be a prey to errors and delusions, that they shall at least be natural and entertaining. And indeed nothing but the most determined scepticism, along with a great degree of indolence, can justify this aversion to metaphysics. For if truth be at all within the reach of human capacity, it is certain it must lie very deep and abstruse: and to hope we shall arrive at it without pains, while the greatest geniuses have failed with the utmost pains..

The Prince (Italian: Il Principe) is a political treatise by the Italian diplomat, historian and political theorist Niccolò Machiavelli. From correspondence a version appears to have been distributed in 1513, using a Latin title, De Principatibus (About Principalities). But the printed version was not published until 1532, five years after Machiavelli's death. This was done with the permission of the Medici pope Clement VII, but "long before then, in fact since the first appearance of the Prince in manuscript, controversy had swirled about his writings" Although it was written as if it were a traditional work in the Mirror of Princes style, it is generally agreed that it was especially innovative, and not only because it was written in Italian rather than Latin. The Prince is sometimes claimed to be one of the first works of modern philosophy, in which the effective truth is taken to be more important than any abstract ideal. It was also in direct conflict with the dominant Catholic and scholastic doctrines of the time concerning how to consider politics and ethics. Although it is relatively short, the treatise is the most remembered of his works and the one most responsible for bringing "Machiavellian" into wide usage as a pejorative term. It also helped make "Old Nick" an English term for the devil, and even contributed to the modern negative connotations of the words "politics" and "politician" in western countries. In terms of subject matter it overlaps with the much longer Discourses on Livy, which was written a few years later. In its use of examples who were politically active Italians who perpetrated criminal deeds for politics, another lesser-known work by Machiavelli which The Prince has been compared to is the Life of Castruccio Castracani. The descriptions within The Prince have the general theme of accepting that ends of princes, such as glory, and indeed survival, can justify the use of immoral means to achieve those ends.

"Wilde è profetico sin dalle prima righe, quando denuncia la prevalenza dell’emozione sulla razionalità, male principe del nostro tempo, e poi del pietismo sull’emancipazione, male di tanta politica di pseudo sinistra" (dall'Introduzione di Alfredo Sgarlato). Wilde: ?perché la vita raggiunga la sua più elevata perfezione, ci vuole qualche cosa di più. Ciò che ci vuole è l'individualismo?, ?Utopia? Una carta geografica del mondo in cui non sia segnato il paese dell'Utopia, non varrebbe la pena d'essere guardata, perché vi mancherebbe il paese in cui l'Umanità atterra ogni giorno. Ma non appena v'è sbarcata, ella guarda più lontano, scorge una terra ancora più bella, e spiega di nuovo le vele. Progredire significa realizzare l'Utopia?. SOMMARIO: Introduzione (di Alfredo Sgarlato) - Postfazione. Breve biblio-nota ai testi e alla traduzione (di Fabrizio Pinna) - OSCAR WILDE Società e libertà: elogio dell'individualismo - APPENDICE I Oscar Wilde, Rapporti fra il socialismo e l'individualismo (di Luigi Fabbri, 1913) - APPENDICE II The Soul of Man under Socialism (1891). LA COLLANA IN/DEFINIZIONI

●从未有哪个时代像今天一样，科学让人类社会以肉眼可见的速度向前演化。这场两千多年的长程奔跑似乎来到了冲刺阶段，不断有人做出世界末日的预言，那么，科学*终带给我们的究竟是生存还是毁灭？科学研究的目的究竟是什么？科学能告诉我们*真理吗？ 带着这样的终极关怀，《人人都该懂的科学哲学》首先讲述了科学脱离哲学、独立成长的过程，然后以智慧设计论、弦理论、占星术、有神论、社会建构主义、女性主义等充满争议的问题为例，辨析了科学的定义、方法和目的，科学和社会的关系。伟大的科学哲学家亚里士多德、笛卡儿、休谟、培根、波普尔、库恩等纷纷出场，上演了一场绵亘数千年的*辩论。 面对未来的挑战，无论人类能否破解“公地悲剧”、实现星际殖民、活到长生不老，杰弗里·戈勒姆以科学哲学的视角安慰我们：“当生命终结，人类文化仍然存在，只不过是存在于过去。希望它永远存在就太过分了，无异于希望巴黎时时处处是春天。” ●《人人都该懂的科学哲学》属于湛庐文化重磅推出的“新核心素养”系列图书之一。本系列图书致力于推广通识阅读，扩展读者的阅读面，培养批判性思考的能力。其中涵盖了哲学、心理学、法律、艺术、物理学、生物科技等诸多人文科学和自然科学的知识，其中《人人都该懂的科学哲学》的内容涵盖了科学哲学的核心思想，让你一本书了解科学哲学的核心智慧。

本书首先依据西方马克思主义探讨了马克思主义的“真精神”，特别是探讨了马克思主义与哲学，以及马克思主义哲学与本体论之关系，然后着重从马克思主义的思考角度和范式来审视和反思当今的世界，特别是当今的中国。本书通过对马克思走向政治经济学批判的三次飞跃的分析，发出了“回归政治经济学批判”的呼唤；用马克思两大发现的整体视角剖析了资本主义的“经济人”，并基于此对当今学术界的一些人无原则地宣扬“经济人”展了批判；揭示了改革放以来我国学术界理解马克思主义哲学的三种路向，特别是批判了对马克思主义做启蒙主义和后现代主义解释的缺陷；归纳了马克思主义哲学与中国道路的双向促；用马克思主义公平观审视了社会的不平等，用马克思主义生态观审视了生态危机；描述了“马中西”三大资源在中国道路中的交互汇通。

《道德经说什么》是一本人人看得懂、用得上的《道德经》经典解读本。罗大伦博士把其中的智慧总结提炼成通俗易懂的语言，结合其中流传千年的智慧，助您解决生活中常见的各种实际问题。罗博士在书中告诉我们，每个人的人生不过是在“有”和“无”之间寻找平衡，不要因为自己暂时处于一个不好的状态而觉得焦虑，只要好好遵循天道去做，把自己的位置放低，把心放空，把名利看轻，把事做成，把身体照顾好，这样的人才能得道。

本书为广东省哲学社会科学规划项目“齐泽克后现代主义文艺批评研究”和广东海洋大学科研启动资助项目“齐泽克哲学理论的文学阐释研究”的研究成果。近年来，斯洛文尼亚左翼思想家齐泽克的理论与批评实践引起了中国学界的高度重视。国内学者主要致力于对他进行马克思主义的阐释，本书则从意识形态和法权批评入手，通过梳理齐泽克的思想谱系，回顾从康德、黑格尔、马克思到弗洛伊德、拉康诸位西方思想家的相应理论建构，挖掘齐泽克表面庞杂的理论深处所蕴含的道德哲学与新人本主义闪光。本书在解读齐泽克思想的同时贯穿着坚定的马克思主义立场与辩证思维，对齐泽克研究及西方哲学研究有一定参考价值。

《前期与后期》是清华大学国学院刘东教授以独特视角研究思想史，深刻反思当今人文学科学术状况之作。刘东教授认为，对于人文学者来说，创作生涯的前期与后期同样重要，从前期到后期是一个自我修养、磨炼心性的过程。在前期，需要视野的确立与充分的积累；而后期，则是一个在大量积累的基础之上进一步发挥，走向成熟，释放出更多创造性的过程。有志于学术的学者，应该有所坚守与执信，不必在意短期、世俗意义上的成功；而在学术生涯的后期，要以刻苦与坚忍，坚持进行“后期写作”。

Bogged down by an endless onslaught of stumbling blocks and disasters that keep pushing you farther away from fulfilling your purpose and achieving your goals? ? This book could radically change all that. ? This simple, clear, and highly practical step-by-step guide will show you: ? How to manage all the problems and disasters that come your way while still making progress on all your goals—short-term and long-term—without sacrificing the important things in life. How to turn obstacles into an advantage that will propel you along the path to fulfilling your goals and achieving your purpose. How to shift your thinking so that all you see are opportunities that will open doors to great possibilities you may have never imagined before.

　　在《迟到民族与激思想》中，作者以《德国思想的他者视角》篇，从著名学者卡尔·曼海姆、马丁·格莱芬哈根、库尔特·伦克的研究成果出发，考察了有关保守主义的不同定义，揭示了德国保守主义思想的发生语境，分析了德国保守主义的思想结构，发掘其背后隐藏的思想关联、社会关联，特别是政治关联，揭示出德国作为后发现代化国家的激思想；从宏观上勾画出德国保守主义的发展脉络。

　　《黑格尔早期神学著作》（“贺麟全集”第八卷）是著名哲学家、翻译家贺麟的重要译著之一，以八十岁高龄自诺尔编黑格尔著《早期神学著作》的德文原版翻译而成，并参考诺克斯与克朗纳的英译本。本书也是身为译介黑格尔至中国人的贺麟先生，生前后一部黑格尔相关译著。其中收黑格尔著《民众宗教和基督教》《耶稣传》《基督教的权威性》《基督教的精神及其命运》及《1800年体系残篇》等五篇论文，是了解和研究黑格尔早期神学思想的手资料。